

Rewarding Bad Behavior: How Governments Respond to Rebel Group Tactics in African Civil Wars

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Introduction:

A fair amount of recent scholarly work focuses on explaining why civil wars are so unlikely to have peaceful resolutions (Zartman 1993; Stedman 1997; Walter 1997, 2002, 2009; Fearon 2007; Fearon and Laitin 2007; Toft 2006; Cunningham 2011). There has been very little focus, however, on whether systematic features of the parties that make up bargaining dyads explain why the prospects of peace are so poor. Very little work systematically examines which groups governments extend negotiations and subsequent concessions to. Surely this is important.¹ If dyads engaged in civil wars are frequently composed of at least one party lacking the desire or the ability to commit to peace, it is reasonable to expect a bleak forecast for the probability of peaceful conflict resolution.

To understand fully how civil wars end, it is important to consider the characteristics of the parties fighting them. Specifically, if we are interested in determining whether conflicts will be resolved peacefully, we should determine whether the dyad is a reasonable candidate for peaceful resolution. We cannot realistically expect to witness the peaceful termination of a conflict if the parties involved have not made even the smallest of steps toward peace. More precisely, belligerents

¹ Cunningham (2011) and Walter (2006) examine whether self-determination movements are likely to attract concessions from governments. At the end of this chapter, I discuss Cunningham (2011) at length and contrast her findings with mine.

should not be expected to agree to end their conflicts before they have even agreed to negotiate with one another as negotiations themselves are a major concession.

Negotiations serve at least two purposes: to formally recognize groups and their demands, and to actively discuss parties' conditions for peace. Groups often use violence as a means to gain formal recognition from the state (Crenshaw 1981:386). If groups use violence as a means of publicity, they should be unlikely to stop fighting if governments deny them the attention they seek. Thus, if governments disregard negotiations, groups should be less likely to agree to settlements. Moreover, groups should be reticent to sign agreements with governments before their demands are properly discussed, as accords reached outside of negotiations likely only reflect government's preferences.² Groups that do not attain negotiations should be significantly less likely to enter into formal agreements while groups that do negotiate should be much more inclined. Whether all groups are equally likely to experience negotiations has not been tested.

Thus, whether a dyad attempts negotiations is likely related to the composition of that dyad, or the characteristics of the belligerents. The characteristics of rebel groups should explain a great deal of the variation in which dyads negotiate. While it is certainly important to examine whether some features make some states more or less likely to negotiate with their oppositions, the characteristics of the rebels likely explain just as much, if not more. In order for a dyad to engage in dialogue, governments must make the first move in extending negotiations. As it is most states' first inclination to reject compromise with their opposition, we can assume that most governments will not do so unless they are compelled. Something must change the government's obdurate posture to

² Since rebels announce their demands publicly, it is conceivable that the governments can unilaterally create an agreement that rebels would be happy to accept. This is unlikely, however, because if governments do not think highly enough of rebels to initiate dialogue with them they probably do not think enough of them to offer generous settlements.

one that is more conciliatory. Features of a conflict, like an increase in costs or a hurting stalemate, may explain a change in the government's posture (Zartman 1993). In a related fashion, features of an opponent might produce specific conditions, like a steep increase in costs, that explain a government's re-orientation toward compromise. In this paper, I examine the characteristics of rebels that might convince governments to extend negotiations. I argue that characteristics related to rebels' ability to hurt governments and to frustrate governments' ability to hurt them back are likely to produce a more conciliatory government posture. Governments will be more inclined to cooperate when rebels are able to impose extreme costs. They should also be likely to cooperate as their ability to reciprocate costs declines. Basically stated, when forced to, governments will negotiate. As I am interested in examining conditions that make governments more disposed to compromise, I also examine whether features related to rebels' "power to hurt" affect states' decisions to offer more concessions to rebels. The empirical results demonstrate that governments are indeed more likely to compromise when rebels possess a power to impose significant costs on them.

It is incredibly important to determine whether there is a systematic component that explains when governments decide to compromise or who they decide to compromise with. There are a few cases of agreements without negotiations, but it is nevertheless, a highly unlikely trajectory for the road to peace. It suggests there is a systematic element to the process that generates data on formal agreements. If whether they sign agreements is conditional on some unobservable features related to whether belligerents reach negotiations, there is likely some selection bias in the estimates of extant studies. Selection bias can lead to incorrect inferences about the effect of covariates on the dependent variable. Thus, determining whether there is a systematic component to negotiations and accounting for it in models examining agreements is prudent.

In this paper, I find that governments are overwhelmingly likely to offer concessions to violent groups that behave “badly.” Specifically, I uncover that governments are likely to open dialogue with and offer concessions to groups that employ extreme tactics, like terrorism, banditry, and crime in civil war. More moderate groups are systematically excluded from negotiations and concessions. I demonstrate that governments make peace overtures to groups that use extreme tactics, like terrorists, and groups with strong incentives to see the continuation of conflict, like bandits and criminals, in order to stop the pain caused by the tactics these groups employ. As groups using terrorism are often thought to be radical extremists or groups with aversions to compromise on their extreme goals, it should be much more difficult to come to peaceful settlements when dyads contain one of these groups. Even if these dyads are able to come to agreements, governments should be much less likely to honor these bargains as they are incredibly costly to implement. Groups that find conflict profitable should also be likely to renege on bargains that are struck because for them, peace is less lucrative. That governments appear to reward these types of groups suggests they are likely selecting as bargaining partners groups with whom there are already significant commitment problems at the outset. So, in addition to selection bias that might be pervasive in existing models on agreements, there might be unaccounted selection bias in models examining the durability of peace after settlements as well.

First, rewarding with negotiations and concessions groups that employ extreme tactics is counterproductive to any peace process. By offering concessions to extremely violent but not to more moderate groups, governments appear to reward the means by which groups seek to accomplish their ends. Such policies likely encourage other groups to use extreme strategies as a means to accomplish their aims as well (Toros 2008). Governments unintentionally promote terrorism or extreme violence as a legitimate and acceptable means to gain concessions by offering concessions and negotiations to these groups exclusively. Second, groups that use extreme tactics

like terrorism are expected also to possess extreme goals. Crenshaw (2008:25) argues that terrorist groups are often organizations seeking radical changes to the status quo. She (1981:383) argues that terrorism is usually the work of extreme factions within a broader movement. For settlements to actually placate these groups, groups extremely dissatisfied with the status quo, agreements must contain exorbitant concessions. The concessions these groups require for settlement are likely to be those that governments are unwilling or unable to implement. Even if belligerents are able to come to an agreement in the short run, neither side is likely to be able to commit in the long run. Thus, negotiations with extreme groups should lead to incredibly fragile peace, if any at all.

In the next section, I advance an argument that explains why governments should be more likely to offer negotiations and concessions to organizations that engage in “bad behavior.” I apply Slantchev’s (2003) “power to hurt” argument to civil wars to elucidate the connection between rebel tactical choices and government concessions. I test this argument and find that, contrary to conventional wisdom, governments are overwhelmingly likely to cooperate with groups that use extreme and unpopular tactics, including terrorism and banditry.

Why *Not* Negotiate With The Terrorists?

Most governments claim they do not negotiate with terrorists. While western democracies are most renowned for this expression, African governments like Liberia’s also “know that it's the policy of most democratic governments in the world not to negotiate with terrorists.”³ Yet, we witness quite often that governments, including those in the United States, Britain and Spain, do in fact negotiate

³ “Liberia; Liberian Government Rejects Calls for Ceasefire” *Africa News* May 21, 2002

with groups they label terrorists. The Burundian government, for example, has participated in negotiations with the FNL, a rebel group they routinely dismiss as bandits.

That governments claim never to negotiate with terrorists but actually do so is remarkable and important. The fact that governments frequently offer negotiations and concessions to groups that use abhorrent tactics to execute their conflicts is likely damning for the entire enterprise of peaceful conflict resolution. Scholars are concerned that offering negotiations to terrorists is especially inappropriate and dangerous because granting negotiations confers a measure of legitimacy on groups (Neumann 2007; Toros 2008). Negotiations are not only likely to legitimize the groups, they are expected to legitimize the strategies, tactics and means they use. Scholars have voiced concern that negotiating with groups that choose terrorism as a strategy likely marginalizes groups that choose to seek change peacefully, or at a minimum, according to the “laws of war.” Negotiations are likely to incentivize such behavior and negatively influence groups that have previously shied away from such tactics (Wilkinson 2001; Neumann 2007; Toros 2008). Essentially, negotiating with groups employing extreme tactics glorifies or rewards “bad” behavior.

Negotiating with groups that use illegitimate means to achieve their political goals is destructive to the legitimacy of the governments that initiate dialogue. Negotiating with such groups is also destructive to the prospects of peace with these particular groups and with other groups attempting to enact changes in the status quo. As such, peace should be less likely to result from negotiations with illegitimate groups or groups that behave badly. The problem that these negotiations pose is likely to be negligible if negotiations with these groups are infrequent. However, if governments negotiate with terrorist groups often, it is likely to have a sizeable and important impact on peace and stability in countries experiencing internal conflict. Negotiations with extremist groups are likely to result in the adoption of extremist tactics by a greater number of other groups.

There is sufficient reason to believe that governments offer negotiations and concessions to groups that can be deemed “extremist” quite frequently. A reasonable explanation for a group’s tactical choice is that they believe it will be effective in helping them achieve some end. In civil war, this end is often political concessions or alterations in the status quo. Terrorism is but one tactic in a dossier of repertoires that violent groups can choose from to achieve these goals (Crenshaw 2008:24). For a variety of reasons, groups make intentional choices to employ one set of tactics over others but in civil war it is likely that groups choose terrorism from all other available strategies because they believe it will be the most effective strategy for garnering concessions from the government.⁴ But is it? That many governments, like those of Sudan, Niger, Mali and Burundi, have all declared they do not negotiate with terrorists seems to suggest that terrorism might not be an effective strategy. However, that many of those same governments have negotiated with the very groups they labeled terrorists, criminals, and bandits (the FNL, SLM/A, and ATNMC), might cause one to rethink the effectiveness of the strategy and decide that it likely is.

At least anecdotally, it appears governments are overwhelmingly likely to backpedal on their vows not to negotiate with unsavory groups. This may be due to governments’ insistence on branding any armed opposition groups “terrorist groups,” “armed bandits,” or “criminal gangs.” Whether these groups actually terrorize, or engage in banditry or criminal activity is usually an unrelated consideration. Sambanis (2008:177) argues that regimes label or mislabel the activities of their armed opposition as banditry or terrorism to downplay the political threat they pose. Toros (2008) suggests, similarly, that governments name groups in this way to ensure that their opposition is delegitimized, stigmatized and isolated. Governments attempt to make their opposition groups

⁴ Groups often claim to select terrorism as a last resort to achieve their goals. They may select terrorism when they feel that they have exhausted all other options.

pariahs in order to lessen their threat and to ensure they do not garner support that will allow them to constitute an even greater threat.

Governments are highly likely to regard any opposition group as terrorist or criminal, regardless of their actual tactics. As a matter of policy, they also claim not to negotiate with these types of groups. As such, governments can choose to never negotiate with any group offering violent resistance or prove themselves false by opening dialogue with groups with whom they said they would not negotiate. Since civil wars are less likely to end in victories by either side (DeRouen & Sobek 2004), these choices leave governments with the options of letting civil wars continue indefinitely or backtracking on their word never to negotiate with the “terrorists.” Most governments are unlikely to have the ability to sustain internal conflict indefinitely, and are thus likely to be forced to initiate dialogue or create some opening for a peaceful settlement. This means that we should expect to see at least some negotiating with “terrorists.”

If we limit the designation of terrorist, criminals, or bandits to only those groups that actually use terrorism, banditry, and crime as a strategy, we should still expect to see that despite the declarations of states, governments are likely to negotiate with objectionable groups. Governments should only be expected to pay attention when they are forced to. Scholars argue that terrorism is usually used to gain a government’s attention. Crenshaw (2008: 29) argues that terrorism can be an effective tool because “by attracting attention it makes the claims of the resistance a salient issue in the public mind. The government can reject but not ignore an opposition’s demands.” The very public, overt nature of terrorism makes governments pay attention, and its painful nature makes governments seek compromise. Terrorism is particularly painful for governments to endure because it disrupts the rule of law. Unavoidable attacks against civilians humiliate the government, challenge its legitimacy, and ostensibly make the state ungovernable (Crenshaw 2008:29, 1981:386; Hultman

2007, 2009). Hultman (2009) proffers that rebels' strategies of terrorism can inflict severe costs on governments, especially when the civilian targets form a core government constituency. Crenshaw (1981: 386) and Kydd and Walter (2006) argue that groups utilize terrorism to execute wars of attrition against their governments. Hultman (2009:823) suggests that "by destroying the government's ability to maintain control, and by proving that the state is unable to provide security, a rebel group can force the government to back down and offer them concessions." As terrorism is so painful for governments enduring the attacks, groups that use it should be particularly successful in forcing government cooperation.

Terrorism, Terror and the Power to Hurt

Slantchev (2003) argues that the realization of the power to hurt one's opponent increases the probability that belligerents will pursue a peaceful settlement as it opens up a range of bargains that would not otherwise exist. States are expected to accept less-than-favorable settlements when they recognize that their ability to hurt their opponent has diminished and/or when they realize their opponent has the ability to inflict severe pain on them. Slantchev (2003:128) writes, "the diminished, or eliminated, capacity to hurt the enemy is a major reason to terminate war and seek a negotiated settlement." He further argues that "since the power to hurt is a kind of bargaining power, the denial of such power undermines the bargaining position of the opponent" (Slantchev 2003:128). In the context of civil war this means that when a government is forced to recognize they no longer possess the capacity to hurt their opponent but their opponent can inflict unbearable costs on them, they will be forced to pursue a peaceful settlement. Translating this logic from the inter- to the intrastate level, it follows that an asymmetry in the power to hurt that favors rebels should lead to governments seeking compromise (or vice versa).

Groups that use terrorism as a strategy in civil war have the ability irreparably to hurt governments. By targeting civilians, they are able to call the governments' legitimacy into question by demonstrating first that the government is not the sole proprietor of force within the state and further that the government may be illegitimate because it is unable to protect its civilians (Hultman 2007, 2009). When governments demonstrate that they are unable to protect civilians from violence, civilians are more likely to seek protection from rebels (Kalyvas 2004). This is important, because in civil wars the ability to protect civilians often coincides with control over territory and maintaining or capturing territory is a measure of battle success. Thus, for rebels terrorism becomes a means to undermine the government's control of the state (Crenshaw 1981: 386).

Under the "power to hurt" argument, groups using terrorism should be especially likely to gain concessions as the strategy they pursue limits or eliminates the government's ability to hurt them back. Like insurgent or guerrilla strategies, the quintessence of terrorism is the lack of direct engagement. If governments do not have the ability to engage, they lack the ability to respond effectively, and also lack the power to hurt. Thus, when rebels use terrorism as a strategy we can expect governments to offer negotiations and attempt to locate peaceful settlements. Similarly, we expect rebels to possess the power to hurt governments when they are strong and when they use other strategies that terrorize, like kidnapping or forcible recruitment. These strategies should make governments more likely to offer peaceful settlements. This argument produces the following expectations:

H1a: In civil war, governments should be more likely to offer negotiations to groups using terrorism as a strategy.

H1b: In civil war, governments should be more likely to offer concessions to groups using terrorism as a strategy.

H2a: In civil war, governments should be more likely to offer negotiations to groups using kidnapping or forcible recruitment strategies.

H2b: In civil war, governments should be more likely to offer concessions to groups using kidnapping or forcible recruitment strategies.

Especially in Africa, natural resources are important for the functioning of the state. Many African governments rely on the export of natural resources, or primary commodities, as a main means of raising revenue. Governments are often able to fund their wars through the sale of future contracts to foreign investors (Ross 2004). Governments are able to use the sale of natural resources to hire mercenary groups to defend their regimes against rebels. If governments lose access to these resources, they also lose access to a mechanism to resist the coercion of rebel groups. If resources help governments remain viable parties in war, the loss of these resources should diminish their ability to inflict pain. As they are less able to inflict pain on their opponent, they should be more likely to agree to a peaceful settlement of the conflict even if they know they are likely to get a raw deal. Thus,

H3a: In civil war, governments should be more likely to offer negotiations to groups extracting valuable resources including, oil, gems or drugs.

H3b: In civil war, governments should be more likely to offer concessions to groups extracting valuable resources including, oil, gems or drugs.

The loss of the power to hurt explains why governments might be more likely to negotiate with the type of group they specifically claim they are unwilling to negotiate with. Despite governments' vehemence to the opposite, I expect them to be more likely to negotiate with groups that have the power to hurt them. This means that while governments like that of al-Assad in Syria

argue “no political dialogue or political activity can succeed while there are armed terrorists groups operating,” we know that political dialogue will succeed when the government *needs* it to.

I test the power to hurt argument in civil wars. Specifically, I am interested in determining whether governments are more likely to engage in dialogue with groups when they use extreme and painful tactics, like terrorism, banditry, and crime. I, then, examine whether governments are as likely to offer groups greater concessions during peace processes when they use such tactics. Using the “UCDP Dyadic Armed Conflict Dataset” (ACD) on African rebel groups from 1989-2009, I find that governments are, in fact, more likely to dialogue with groups that can demonstrate the power to hurt them. Moreover, governments are more likely to offer meaningful concessions to groups’ demands when they use some of these strategies. In the next section, I discuss the research methods and data I use to test this argument. Subsequently, I discuss the results from logistic regression models examining whether governments hold formal talks with rebel groups and negative binomial models examining the number of concessions governments offer rebels on their demands. I conclude the paper by explaining why it is a big deal that governments negotiate with these groups more frequently and follow up with expectations of how this affects the prospects for long-term peace in civil war, broadly.

Research Methods

Independent Variables:

To test whether governments are more likely to make peace overtures to organizations that have the power to hurt, I identify three types of groups possessing the power to hurt: terrorists, kidnappers, and criminals/bandits. By their very nature, terrorist groups should possess the power to hurt. I use the “Global Terrorism Database (GTD)” to identify African groups within the ACD that employ

terrorism as a strategy. The GTD dataset records individual instances of terrorist attacks globally. The GTD records attacks by subnational actors intended to coerce a large audience and/or attain broader social, religious, political, or economic goals. Types of incidents coded in the dataset include assassinations, armed assaults, bombings, attacks on facilities, hijackings, and kidnappings. These data include both successful and unsuccessful attempts at domestic and international attacks. Since I am interested in rebels' ability to inflict pain on the domestic government they are fighting, I exclude cases of transnational terrorism and include only successful domestic attacks. Therefore, I only include observations where the target and the government are of the same nationality. The independent variable is a count of successful domestic terror attacks executed by rebel groups in a month. The number of attacks in a month ranges between 0 and 49. Kidnapping and abductions are included in the GTD dataset only when the actions are intended to coerce the government into concessions. However, it is likely important to consider kidnappings or abductions outside of those intended to produce concessions. Specifically, rebels kidnapping and abducting children to enlist them in their armies should be considered a form of terror. Because data on abductions are difficult to locate, I use the recruitment of child soldiers as a proxy. I code whether a group was reported as using children under the age of 18 from the "Child Soldiers Global Report 2008." Like other forms of terror, I expect abducting children to have a positive effect on negotiations and concessions offered to rebels groups.

Extracting natural resources, specifically gemstones, drugs, and oil, can be considered a criminal or quasi-criminal activity, or a form of banditry. By occupying or controlling areas with natural resources, groups prevent governments from benefiting from these goods. If governments cannot use these resources to execute their wars with rebels, rebels are able to reduce government's power to hurt. Rebels are further able to hurt the government by potentially crippling the economy. Such a move would hurt the government by generating new civilian grievances and creating new

challengers to the state's legitimacy. I use data from Lujala et al. (2009) to identify whether there were extractable resources in the conflict region. I include three measures of natural resources: gems, drugs, and oil as each of these might have a different impact on the likelihood of government cooperation.

As control variables, I include relative rebel strength, explicit rebel support, and main group. Unequivocally, strong rebels are much more likely to have the power to hurt than weaker rebel groups. I use the rebel strength variable from the Cunningham et al. (2009) "Non-State Actor Dataset" (NSA) to examine the relative power between belligerents in conflict. This is an ordinal variable that captures whether rebels are much weaker, weaker, at parity with or stronger than the government. From this dataset, I also include whether rebels have explicit outside support. If rebel groups have supporters assuring their viability, they are much more likely to have the power to hurt. As groups may inflict a great number of costs on the government even when they are not necessarily the strongest or most capable militarily, I also code whether a group was the main group inflicting casualties on the government in a month. When groups inflict the greatest number of casualties in a conflict, they can be thought to have greater power to hurt, relative to the other groups in a conflict. This allows for the possibility that governments' evaluation of a rebels' power to hurt is not objective, but it is relative to that possessed by other groups. In this way, governments may choose to cooperate with a weak group if they are able to inflict more pain than can other groups. I coded this variable from the UCDP database listing the number of casualties each group caused in a year. If a group caused the greatest number of deaths in a conflict, they were coded as the "main group" in the conflict for that year. Multiple groups were coded a main group if they inflicted roughly the same number of casualties. I include a measure of battle-related deaths to control for the intensity of the conflict. I use the best estimate of battle deaths included in the dyadic UCDP Battle-Related

Deaths Dataset. These data include all casualties related to fighting between the warring parties, including civilians killed in the cross-fire.

It is likely that certain types of governments are more sensitive to costs than others. In particular, high war costs are likely to be more damaging to democratic governments, as they are expected to be more accountable to their constituents (Kydd and Walter 2006; Valentino et al. 2010). Additionally, democratic governments should have a decreased capacity to retaliate against attacks as they have greater constraints on their ability to reciprocate. Here, using painful tactics should be more effective at producing concessions as they must restrain their power to hurt. Kydd and Walter (2006) argue that terrorism is most likely to be used as a strategy of attrition against democracies as these states are more restrained in their power to retaliate against attacks. Thus, I expect democratic governments to be more likely to adopt conciliatory postures when faced with steep costs than are autocratic governments. To test the effect that regime type has on negotiations and concessions, I include a regime type measure from the Polity IV dataset. I use the Polity2 variable, which ranges from -10 to 10 in the Polity data and -8 and 8 in the sample.

I also include a variable measuring the total number of demands rebels made in that month. The number of demands variable ranges from 0 to 21. I include a measure of time, ln(time), in the fully specified models. I coded the number of months the conflict episode had been ongoing and I took its natural log. I also account for the number of conflict episodes the dyad has experienced. The greatest number of episodes in the sample was 6. The variables representing the number of months in the conflict episode and the number of episodes in the conflict measure how protracted the conflict within the dyad is. This is necessary because protracted conflicts may be riper for settlement. If both sides have sustained significant costs over time, they may be better able and more willing to attempt to locate bargains preferable to continued conflict. Moreover, after a significant

period of time, learning is likely to have taken place and both sides should be more likely to estimate accurately future costs as well their probability of victory.

Dependent Variables:

Because I am interested in evaluating two different phenomena, the incidence of negotiations and the number of concessions offered, I code two dependent variables. I code whether governments engaged rebels in negotiations in a given month. This variable is a dichotomous measure that takes on the value of one when negotiations take place in a month and is zero otherwise. The second dependent variable assesses the volume of concessions governments offer rebels in a given month. Concessions are coded when a government addresses, at least in part, something rebels demand in that month. The measure of concessions, I include in the count model captures the number of **maximal** and **substantial** concessions rebels receive on their demands in a month. To address the concern that rebels using painful tactics are more likely to gain only meaningless concessions, I include a dependent variable that examines the number of maximal and substantial **political** concessions rebels gain in Model 8 of Table 2. This variable differs from the main independent variable as it only includes concessions and demands that are political as opposed to those that are tactical or procedural (a change in venue of negotiations for example).

I also include leads of both dependent variables which amounts to lags of all of the independent variables in the models. Thus in Table 2, for example, Model 5 examines the effect that the independent variables in month t have on the number of concessions in the following month ($t+1$). I include measures that account for the effect of the independent variables in month t on the dependent variables in $t+2$ and $t+3$ as well.

The unit of analysis for all of the models is the dyad-month. For each month a dyad is actively fighting, there is one observation. I use logistic regressions to examine the effect of rebels' ability to hurt the government on negotiations because negotiations is a dichotomous dependent variable. The results of these analyses are reported in Table 1. Table 2 displays the results of Negative Binomial Regressions. I use Negative Binomial Regression because the dependent variable here is a count of the number of concessions governments offer rebels. I employ a Negative Binomial model because I expect that the underlying rate of events (λ) within each period is not constant as assumed by the Poisson model. Specifically, I expect there to be over-dispersion in the data as the occurrence of one event is likely to lead to another. In these data, events are concessions. It is reasonable to suspect that after the government offers one concession, the probability that they offer another increases. Therefore, I expect that the rate of events until we see at least one concession is significantly different from the rate after we have observed at least one concession. This violates a main assumption of the Poisson model which the Negative Binomial model relaxes.⁵ From the non-zero α parameter in the models (which indicates over-dispersion), it is clear that the Negative Binomial Model is the correct model for these data.⁶ In the analyses examining the number of concessions offered I cluster the errors on the conflict, as concessions may be offered to multiple groups in that conflict when they are given at all. There may be other dynamics of the conflict that

⁵ A main assumption of the Poisson Model is that the probability of an event is independent of all other events in that period.

⁶ Because I cluster on the conflict, Stata does not compute a likelihood ratio (LR) test. The LR test evaluates the null-hypothesis that α is equal to zero. A non-zero α suggests that a Poisson model is not the appropriate model. The α in all of the models are in fact non-zero, but whether this is a statistically significant test-score cannot be verified without a formal statistical test (ex. LR or Wald test) or a manual test that checks whether the distribution of the errors of the Poisson model are statistically different from λ . When I exclude the clusters, the likelihood ratio test of α is significant, suggesting we can reject the null hypothesis that $\alpha=0$.

explain the rate of concessions. I reran these analyses without the clusters and very few of the results differed from those reported in Table 2.

Results

<Insert Table 1 Here>

Table 1 demonstrates that the power to hurt argument applies to civil wars. I include several models to demonstrate the results I garner are not produced by missing data as some variables have quite a bit of data missing (natural resources, rebel strength and explicit support). I introduce variables with missing data one group at a time to demonstrate that the main results are robust to the variables and number of observations included. All the models in Table 1 demonstrate that groups using terrorism as a strategy are highly likely to be invited to negotiations with the government. While I include multiple models, particular attention should be given to Models 4 through 7 as these are fully-specified models. While terrorism is a significant predictor of negotiations, using terror or kidnapping civilians is less likely to induce government conciliation. Arguably, the kidnapping of non-strategic children in rebel zones of control should have less of an effect on a government's legitimacy and should, therefore, be much less hurtful. Alternatively, abducting children may only serve to delegitimize rebel groups using these tactics. Therefore, civilians should be less supportive and governments less conciliatory.

Model 4 also demonstrates that groups extracting resources or fighting in an area with gems and drugs are more likely to be included in negotiations. Such a strategy likely reduces the government's power to hurt rebels and increases rebel viability which increases these groups' power to hurt. As a state's power to hurt decreases, or its opponent's power to hurt increases, governments will be more likely to seek peaceful settlements. While groups that extract drugs are likely to gain

negotiations, it is dubious that states are as likely to profit from drugs as from oil or gems. It is possible that the drugs variable is largely capturing rebel viability. I do not believe this undermines my argument as viable groups are likely also more capable and wield the capacity to hurt governments in more conventional ways. While it is significant in all other models, Model 4 demonstrates that rebels extracting oil or fighting in the proximity of oil fields, does not assure them negotiations.

Model 4 also illustrates that when rebels are either strong or the main group engaging in violent conflict with the government, they are more likely to be selected for negotiations than groups that are weaker or otherwise are peripheral to a conflict. Rebel relative strength is a direct measure representing how strong rebels are vis a vis their state opponent. If a group is stronger than their opponent, they no doubt yield the power to hurt. If states are more likely to offer concessions to groups that are able to exact costs on them, they should surely offer concessions to stronger rebels. Whether a group is a main group is an indirect measure of rebel strength measuring whether fighting between a dyad is more intense than that between other dyads in the conflict. Even if rebels are not numerous or as strong as the state, they may still be able to inflict more pain than other groups fighting the government. What matters more than how many rebels belong to a group is how much trouble they are able to cause. The significant coefficient on the main group variable demonstrates that governments are, in fact, likely to offer concessions to the group that inflicts the most costs on them. The results of Model 4 also demonstrate that groups with explicit outside support are not more likely to gain negotiations. However, some models (2, 3, 7) do suggest explicit outside support does improve rebels' prospect of achieving recognition at the bargaining table.

Dyads including a more democratic government and those involved in protracted conflicts are likely to negotiate. Dyads experiencing a greater number of episodes, however, are less likely to

be involved in negotiations. This result may indicate that groups experiencing more conflict episodes are involved in an enduring intrastate rivalry (DeRouen and Bercovitch 2008), and are thus less likely to attempt negotiations under any circumstances. Also unlikely to engage in talks are dyads involved in very intense conflicts.

Models 5 through 7 examine the effect of rebels wielding the power to hurt in a given month on the probability of negotiations in the following period. It is possible that the effects of rebel strategies are not readily apparent. Governments may need time to recognize how damaging rebel's strategies are, and may need more than a few weeks to reassess the utility of settlement and reformulate their policies regarding how best to deal with rebels. Thus, governments should be just as likely or perhaps more likely to hold negotiations in future periods when rebels inflict significant costs on them as they are in the present period. The results demonstrate this. They show that groups that use terrorism as a strategy, exploit natural resources, are stronger and inflict the greatest number of casualties in a conflict, are significantly more likely to be involved in subsequent negotiations than are groups that do not have a significant, asymmetrical power to hurt.

Perhaps one of the most interesting and telling results is that rebels groups that garner the support of a significant portion of the population are significantly less likely to be included in negotiations with the government. This finding holds across all of the models where the variable is included. The theory in this dissertation suggests groups with ethnic support bases have mechanisms that can help generate credible commitments. These groups should be more likely to uphold agreements and stop fighting when they gain concessions on their demands as they are bound by their constituencies. If governments are systematically less likely to include these groups in talks, it may explain why civil wars are so unlikely to end in negotiated settlements. It is reasonable to expect conflicts to be less likely to end peacefully when at least one party in a negotiating dyad is unlikely to

honor their agreements. The results of Table 1 demonstrate governments are more likely to offer negotiations to groups that are, in theory, less credible. Groups engaging in banditry and crime, or groups exploiting natural resources and kidnapping civilians to increase their ranks, do not have the credibility mechanism that groups relying on an ethnic support base have. Despite this, governments are significantly more likely to offer negotiations to (some types of) non-credible groups over groups with the ability to generate audience costs, or more credible groups.

<Insert Figure 1 Here>

Figure 1 shows predicted probabilities of the effect of different independent variables on the probability of negotiations. Figure A shows the effect that terrorism in time t has on the probability of negotiations. When rebels do not use terrorism as a strategy, the likelihood of being offered negotiations is about 10 percent. There is a 50 percent chance of negotiations when rebels use around 27 terror attacks in a month. If rebels use 49 terror attacks, the probability of negotiations is incredibly high. The confidence bands get larger around the larger values of terror attacks because there are far fewer observations where rebels launch a huge number of successful terror attacks against the government than those where rebels do not launch any successful attacks at all.⁷ Figure B demonstrates a very similar trend. This figure depicts the effect of terrorist attacks on the likelihood of negotiations in the following month. When rebels launch no successful terror attacks, the likelihood they will participate in negotiations is about 10 percent. If they launch roughly 25 successful attacks, the chance of negotiations has increased to a little greater than 60 percent. At 35 attacks, they should expect to be invited to negotiations with a probability of around 85 percent.

⁷ The mean number of terror attacks in the sample is 0.45. In only 14 percent of the observed months was there at least one terror attack

Figure C displays the effect of rebel strength on the probability of negotiations. When rebels are weaker than the government, they can expect to gain negotiations at $t+1$ with a probability of about 0.10. At parity, the probability that a dyad will negotiate in the following month jumps to about 18 percent, and when rebels are stronger than the government the probability increases to about a 27 percent. Finally, Figure D exhibits a clear positive relationship between the length of time an episode has been ongoing and the probability of negotiations in the subsequent month. At about 4 years of sustained violence the probability of negotiation in the following month is about 15 percent. The probability of negotiations doubles when the conflict has been ongoing for 12 years.

<Insert Table 2 Here>

Table 2 examines how rebel characteristics affect the number of concessions governments offer. The full model, Model 4, demonstrates that groups using more terrorism in civil war are likely to gain a significantly greater number of concessions on their demands. Here, violence leads to more concessions. Very few studies have systematically examined which rebel groups gain concessions in civil war. Cunningham's (2011) is one such study that does assess the effect of group-level factors on whether the government offers concessions. She examines whether violent and non-violent self-determination movements are more likely to gain concessions when they are divided or unified, and finds that when movements contain multiple divided factions, they are more likely to gain concessions as governments employ divide and conquer strategies. Cunningham (2011) examines the effect of violence on whether movements gain concessions and finds that groups using violence are only more likely to gain concessions in the year that the civil war begins. Other measures of violence, including whether there is conflict in the previous year and whether violence is ever used, do not appear to explain government concessions. This diverges from my results in that I find more violence prompts government concessions. While the initial onslaught of violence seems to predict

concessions in Cunningham's models, I expect sustained violence to be responsible for inducing concessions. Concessions should be more likely after costs have mounted. The divergence between our findings may come from the differences in our samples. Cunningham examines whether violence explains concessions to self-determination movements including groups using violent and non-violent strategies while I examine only groups engaging in armed conflict. Cunningham surveys whether using violent strategies helps groups attain concessions. In contrast, I examine how the level of violence among violent groups affects the probability of concessions, and I find that governments are significantly more likely to make concessions when violent groups adopt more extreme violent strategies.

In these models, whether rebels operate in areas rich with gemstones and oil does not make government concessions any more or less likely than cases where groups do not exploit resources. This result suggests that while these groups may be more likely to be more involved in negotiations, these negotiations do not always lead to a greater number of concessions. On the contrary, if groups extract drugs they are likely to gain significantly fewer concessions.

Model 4 suggest that if a rebel group inflicts more costs on the government than any other group they are no more likely to receive concessions. Whether a group is strong or whether they have outside support also does not affect whether they gain concessions. Democratic governments are not more likely to provide concessions. Only in Model 2 does recruiting children affect the probability of concessions. In all other models, whether groups recruit children in a war has no effect on the number of concessions rebels will gain. Again, it is likely that governments are just less vulnerable to this type of rebel tactic. Alternatively, since the variable is measured to include any recruitment of children, whether forceful or voluntary, it is possible that it is not precise enough to

distinguish between groups that practice routine abduction and groups that begin legitimately recruiting soldiers at 17 and 18 years old. A better measure might produce different results.

Models 5, 6, and 7, show the use of terrorism always increases the number of concessions rebels can be expected to gain in civil war, even up to three months after the attacks. The models with the lagged independent variables demonstrate that rebel strength enhances the prospect that rebels will gain greater concessions on their demands in later months. Explicit backing acts in a similar way. Again, operating in areas with drugs decreases the number of concessions rebels can gain in negotiations. Three months after rebels have been operating in oil fields, they are still more likely to gain concessions. While rebels exacting the greatest number of costs might gain more concessions a month or two after, this effect wanes because three months after there is no effect of a rebel group being the main group engaged in violence with the state.

Abrahms (2012) also examines whether terrorism is an effective strategy. Our results differ in that he finds terrorism to be ineffective at garnering concessions from the state. A significant reason for the divergence in our conclusions is that we examine completely different types of cases. Abrahms (2012:371) intentionally excludes “groups involved in protracted civil wars of attrition” as he believes they are conceptually distinct phenomena from terrorist campaigns. As I am interested in uncovering how rebel groups’ tactics contribute to their likelihood of gaining concessions in civil wars, I examine only those groups involved in conflicts with their government. While I only examine this subset of groups, I acknowledge that terrorism might also be an effective strategy outside of civil war.⁸ That we come to different findings may be useful as it can give us insight into the

⁸ Violent, revolutionary groups oscillate between strategies. In addition to or instead of terrorism, groups may strategically choose to engage their opponents directly, or may opt to use guerrilla strategies only targeting military targets. Groups may also opt to use non-violent strategies at times. As terrorism is a strategy that can be chosen from alternatives, any group using terrorism as a strategy can be considered a terrorist.

effectiveness of terrorism in different contexts. Terrorism is likely to prompt a government to offer concessions in a civil war when rebels couple the tactic with other painful tactics. Abrahms' study suggests terrorism outside of the context of war does not work in the same way. By only examining groups using terrorism as their predominant strategy, his study likely demonstrates that terrorism on its own is not painful enough to bring a government to its knees. It might be profitable to combine both types of groups into a single analysis to determine whether groups relying on a single strategy are as successful in achieving their goals as groups that employ a variety of tactics.

Discussion:

Overall, the analyses support the notion that governments are more conciliatory to groups that make war more painful for them. Governments might believe that negotiating with these groups is akin to putting a bandage on a wound to stop the bleeding, but instead they are in effect putting a Band-Aid on a leaky pipe. Rather than selecting bargaining partners based on whether they have "legitimate" claims or whether they are likely to uphold agreements, governments choose to offer olive branches to groups that are found to have the "power to hurt" them. Governments eschew peaceful settlements until conflicts become unbearable, and delay bargaining until they must sue for peace.⁹ Of course, this places the government at a huge disadvantage in bargaining. If it is clear that their opponents unilaterally possess the power to inflict damage, governments will be forced into suboptimal agreements each time. When bargaining with extremists, suboptimal agreements often mean the government is forced to offer concessions they cannot commit to, even in the short term. As extremism tends to be less amenable to compromise, extremists are likely to renege on any agreement not containing absolute concessions. Thus, neither party in the bargaining dyad has the capacity to commit to an agreement.

⁹ This differs from a hurting stalemate because both parties are not equally hurting. Only the government is.

Governments may create commitment problems in civil wars by self-selecting into bargaining situations where both parties are overwhelmingly likely to renege on any bargain that is struck, ostensibly stacking the deck in favor of peace failure. Extant research on conflict resolution fails to consider that there might be selection bias in the data generating process unaccounted for in models examining whether agreements lead to lasting peace. However, it is important to account for this bias: specifically scholars should account for which groups are even invited to participate in the peace process before they examine whether agreements are struck and whether these agreements hold.

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Appendix: Statistical Tables and Figures

Table 1: Logit Regressions of the Effect of Group Characteristics on Civil War Negotiations

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7
T	t	t	t	t	t+1	t+2	t+3
# Terrorist Attacks	0.085*** (0.027)	0.105*** (0.034)	0.097*** (0.036)	0.093*** (0.036)	0.115*** (0.039)	0.114*** (0.039)	0.111*** (0.038)
Child Recruitment	0.324*** (0.116)	0.340** (0.140)	-0.179 (0.187)	-0.096 (0.232)	-0.214 (0.228)	-0.162 (0.226)	-0.139 (0.224)
Gems			0.421*** (0.168)	0.422** (0.195)	0.398** (0.193)	0.366* (0.197)	0.336* (0.198)
Drugs			-0.462 (0.303)	0.709** (0.350)	0.591* (0.345)	0.522* (0.348)	0.438 (0.351)
Oil			0.582*** (0.152)	0.267 (0.185)	0.295* (0.181)	0.278* (0.182)	0.298* (0.182)
Relative Rebel Strength		0.749*** (0.085)	0.770*** (0.096)	0.500*** (0.112)	0.500*** (0.110)	0.598*** (0.111)	0.633*** (0.112)
Explicit Support		0.613*** (0.128)	0.350*** (0.144)	0.180 (0.177)	0.196 (0.173)	0.215 (0.175)	0.337** (0.175)
Main Group	0.238* (0.137)	0.003 (0.162)	0.226 (0.180)	0.481** (0.229)	0.565*** (0.225)	0.467** (0.225)	0.386* (0.223)
Ethnic Support Base				-1.10** (0.455)	-0.700* (0.417)	-0.740* (0.426)	-0.807* (0.436)
ln(Time)				0.266*** (0.084)	0.291*** (0.084)	0.307*** (0.086)	0.266*** (0.086)
ln(Deaths)				-0.193*** (0.065)	-0.137** (0.063)	-0.075 (0.063)	-0.037 (0.062)
Polity				0.106*** (0.026)	0.119*** (0.026)	0.108*** (0.024)	0.101*** (0.027)
Number of Demands				0.425*** (0.036)	0.304*** (0.032)	0.227*** (0.030)	0.174*** (0.030)
Number of Conflict Episodes				-0.360** (0.0529)	-0.404*** (0.161)	-0.326** (0.160)	-0.254* (0.163)
Constant	-2.35 (0.122)	-3.98 (0.227)	-4.44 (0.279)	-3.29 (0.529)	-3.49 (0.533)	-4.03 (0.551)	-4.19 (0.557)
N	3413	2517	2062	1908	1843	1781	1720

Logit models presented with robust standard errors clustered on conflict; Statistical significance denoted by ***= $p \leq .01$, **= $p \leq .05$, *= $p \leq .10$

Table 2: Negative Binomial Regressions of the Effect of Group Characteristics on the Number of Government Concessions

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	‡Model 8
T	t	t	t	t	t+1	t+2	t+3	t
# Terrorist Attacks	0.082*** (0.027)	0.045*** (0.010)	0.044*** (0.012)	0.048*** (0.015)	0.056*** (0.015)	0.105 (0.076)	0.032*** (0.012)	0.090** (0.043)
Child Recruitment		0.436* (0.263)	0.019 (0.277)	0.385 (0.294)	0.309 (0.332)	0.343 (0.374)	0.547 (0.428)	-0.195 (0.776)
Gems			0.437* (0.247)	0.030 (0.262)	0.214 (0.380)	0.268 (0.396)	0.304 (0.447)	-0.889 (0.797)
Drugs			-1.74*** (0.417)	-1.36*** (0.372)	-1.48*** (0.474)	-1.90*** (0.432)	-1.89*** (0.464)	1.23 (1.07)
Oil			0.069 (0.236)	0.300 (0.351)	0.431 (0.424)	0.543 (0.432)	0.616* (0.410)	-1.05* (0.567)
Relative Rebel Strength			0.329 (0.264)	0.358 (0.270)	0.510* (0.313)	0.775*** (0.286)	0.986*** (0.248)	0.361 (0.337)
Explicit Support			0.183 (.322)	0.364 (0.354)	0.421 (0.324)	0.587* (0.385)	0.836* (0.495)	-0.697 (0.427)*
Main Group		0.041 (0.225)	0.340* (0.223)	0.360 (0.267)	0.718** (0.324)	0.525* (0.280)	0.276 (0.328)	-1.76*** (0.658)
Number of Demands		0.537*** (0.054)	0.494*** (0.071)	0.520*** (0.074)	0.337*** (0.054)	0.246*** (0.063)	0.201*** (0.047)	0.826*** (0.311)
ln(Time)				-0.297** (0.128)	-0.145 (0.127)	-0.114 (0.144)	0.027 (0.172)	-0.156 (0.147)
ln(Deaths)				-0.072 (0.123)	-0.097 (0.098)	-0.05 (0.095)	-0.063 (0.112)	0.178 (0.159)
Polity				0.076 (0.063)	0.013 (0.091)	0.005 (0.087)	-0.017 (0.083)	0.007 (0.085)
Number of Conflict Episodes				-0.384** (0.170)	-0.978*** (0.348)	-1.02*** (0.362)	-0.894** (0.448)	-1.22* (0.711)
Constant	-2.75 (0.259)	-4.43 (0.215)	-5.27 (0.609)	-3.61 (0.771)	-3.56 (1.18)	-4.37 (1.20)	-5.31 (1.58)	-2.29 (1.57)
α	20.46	3.87	3.19	2.94	4.19	5.33	6.10	10.94
N	3413	3413	2062	1908	1843	1781	1720	1908

Logit models presented with robust standard errors clustered on conflict; Statistical significance denoted by ***= $p \leq .01$, **= $p \leq .05$, * = $p \leq .10$. ‡This dependent variable examines only the number of political concessions. All non-political concessions excluded.

Figure 1: Predicted Probabilities of Negotiations by Terrorism, Rebel Strength and Time




Table 3: Rebel Groups Coded as Using Terrorism in the Global Terrorism Database (GTD)

State Name	Rebel Group Name (GTD)
Niger	Air and Azawak Liberation Front (FLAA)
Ethiopia	Al-Ittihaad al-Islami (AIAI)
Uganda	Allied Democratic Forces (ADF)
Algeria	Al-Qa`ida Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)/ Salafist Group for Preaching and Fighting (GSPC)
Somalia	Al-Shabaab
Sierra Leone	Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC)
Algeria	Armed Islamic Group (GIA)
Nigeria	Boko Haram
Congo (Kinshasa)	Bunda Dia Kongo (BDK)
Chad	Committee for a National Drive for Peace and Democracy (CSNDP)
Niger	Democratic Front for Renewal (FDR)
Ethiopia	Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF)
Angola	Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda (FLEC)
Djibouti	Front for the Restoration of Unity and Democracy (FRUD)
Uganda	Holy Spirit Movement
Mali	Islamic Arab Front of Azawad (FIAA)
Somalia	Islamic Courts Union (ICU)
Algeria	Islamic Salvation Front (FIS)
Sudan	Justice and Equality Movement (JEM)
Sierra Leone	Kamajor Hunters
Liberia	Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD)
Uganda	Lord's Resistance Army (LRA)
Senegal	Movement of Democratic Forces of Casamance (MFDC)
Niger	Movement of Niger People for Justice (MNJ)
Mozambique	Mozambique National Resistance Movement (MNR)
Congo (Kinshasa)	National Congress for the Defense of the People (CNDP)
Burundi	National Council for Defense of Democracy (CNDD)
Sudan	National Democratic Alliance of Sudan (NDA)
Burundi	National Liberation Front (FNL) (Burundi)
Sudan	National Redemption Front (NRF)
Angola	National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA)
Congo (Brazzaville)	Ninjas
Ethiopia	Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF)
Ethiopia	Oromo Liberation Front (OLF)
Burundi	Party for the Liberation of the Hutu People (PALIPEHUTU-FNL)
Sierra Leone	Revolutionary United Front (RUF)
Rwanda	Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF)

Niger	Saharan Revolutionary Armed Front (FARS)
Somalia	Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM)
Sudan	Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLM/A)
Angola	The Front for the Liberation of the Cabinda Enclave – Renewed (FLEC-R)
Uganda	Uganda People's Army (UPA)
Chad	Union of Forces for Democracy and Development (UFDD)
Chad	United Front for Democratic Change (FUCD)
Uganda	West Nile Bank Front (WNBF)