

The Bad, the Good, and the Ugly: The Curvilinear Effects of Civil-Military Conflict on International Crisis Outcome

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Abstract

Does civil-military conflict harm military effectiveness? Most previous empirical literature on the effects of civil-military conflict has utilized dichotomous indicators of the presence or absence of overall civilian control. However, the extant theoretical literature is clear that mid-levels of civil-military conflict could be good for innovation and overall decision-making. In line with these arguments, I argue that we should not expect all civil-military conflict to harm military effectiveness and, by extension, international crisis bargaining outcome. Instead, some civil-military conflict should have a positive effect on the overall success of the military. Utilizing new events data that captures the level of civil-military conflict cross-nationally from 1990-2004, I examine how civil-military conflict actually has an inverse U-shaped relationship with crisis success. This project also adds to the theoretical literature by examining variations across different degrees of civil-military conflicts, drawing attention to the usefulness of mid-range civil-military “friction.”

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1 Statement of the Question

In early spring of 1999, Pakistani forces crossed into the Indian-controlled Kargil district of Kashmir, escalating ongoing territorial and security tensions between the states. By the end of the summer, with an estimated 4000 troops killed, the last of a defeated Pakistani military was forced to cross back into Pakistan. In later reports, the Prime Minister of Pakistan at the time, Nawaz Sharif, claimed that the "ill-conceived, ill-planned and ill-executed misadventure" was completely orchestrated by chief of the army General Pervez Musharraf.¹ Not only did Musharraf use military forces internationally without a civilian mandate, by the end of 1999, Musharraf had ousted Sharif in a bloodless coup.

Less than three years earlier in Greece, Prime Minister Kostas Simitis was involved in a crisis with Turkey over the small island of Imia/Kardak in the Aegean Sea. This time, unlike Sharif, Simitis had the military completely under his control. In fact, during this time, many were lamenting that the Greek military had become too complacent with key civilians and political parties in order to garner cushy post-service appointments.² Despite the complete "civilianization" of the Greek military, the crisis with Turkey was resolved only after Greece took down its flag on Imia/Kardak.³

What explains the crisis defeats in these situations? Did civil-military relations play a part in the crisis outcomes here? For Pakistan, the typical answer is a resounding yes. The military ineffectiveness of Pakistan during the Kargil conflict, together with the coup later that year, are events long thought to be linked to issues of bad or unhealthy civil-military relations.⁴ Without civilian control of the military, military forces cannot be used advantageously by civilian leadership, leading to fewer victories in international crises.⁵ Additionally, without civilian control, civilians run the risk of being overrun by the very forces designed to protect them. In short, too much civil-military conflict leads to military ineffectiveness, as well as a host of domestic problems, including increased risk of military coup.

At the other end of the spectrum, however, is another, albeit more often overlooked, form of unhealthy civil-military relations that could also impede military effectiveness and, by extension, the likelihood

of crisis victory: the problem of over-deference. This appears to have been occurring in Greece during the Imia/Kardak crisis. Unlike the problem of too little civilian control, the problem here is a military too micromanaged or controlled to such an extent as to not provide critical advice to civilian leaders when it is needed.⁶ When this occurs, the civilian leadership lacks the expertise of the military in making calculated crisis bargaining decisions. Much like Goldilocks's problem, as this line of reasoning goes, civil-military conflict can neither be “too hot” or “too cold.”

In this paper, I first develop the theoretical underpinnings of this argument and then empirically test the somewhat controversial “Goldilocks” hypothesis using newly created data that captures quantitatively the extent and degree of conflict between the armed forces and executive leaders for all countries involved in an international crisis from 1990 to 2004. Using this new data, I find much support for the idea that not all civil-military conflict is problematic for military effectiveness. Intermediate levels of civil-military conflict, hereafter referred to as civil-military “friction,” can heighten the probability of victory in crisis bargaining situations.⁷

2 Theoretical Background and Argument

2.1 Review of the Literature - Current understanding of civil-military relations owes much to the early work of Huntington and Janowitz.⁸ Building off of the classical work of Clausewitz, Huntington's *The Soldier and the State* stressed the importance of a form of interaction where civilian political leaders have ultimate control on large political issues but where the military retains autonomy within its own sphere. The key to a highly functioning military, according to Huntington, is professionalism of the armed forces. When the armed forces are allowed and encouraged to adopt an alternative military culture, distinct from civilian authorities, this aids in their functioning as a group and separates military officers from the political process, lessening the threat of military coups or insubordination. Huntington refers to this type of civilian control as “objective” in nature and contrasts it with “subjective” civilian control, which occurs when civilians politicize and control all aspects of military decision-making.

Janowitz disagrees. In *The Professional Soldier*, Janowitz stresses the need for the military to reflect the civilian society writ large; civil-military relations more closely follows an interest group model where the

military competes with other groups for funds and attention. Compared to Huntington, Janowitz, however, prescribes a far reaching form of civilian control at different levels within the organization.

Since these works, many have continued to utilize Huntington's or Janowitz's frameworks of civil-military relations.⁹ Feaver largely departs from this literature in arguing that civil-military relations follow a classic principal-agent framework, with the civilian leadership serving as the principals and the military officers serving as agents.¹⁰ Accordingly, Feaver argues that the military has the tendency to “shirk” from its delegated duties and a system of monitoring behavior by the agents is necessary to punish the military when civilian instructions are not followed.

Nonetheless, Feaver's work is consistent with the canonical Huntington and Janowitz in identifying the “problematique” of civil-military relations being ultimately about making a strong and armed military still under civilian control.¹¹ This problematique represents a fundamental tension, Feaver contends, between having “protection by the military and the need to have protection from the military.”¹²

Although most scholars recognize this basic tension, the predominant focus has continued to center on the determinants and effects of civilian control. On one hand, this makes sense, especially for the time period immediately after Huntington and Janowitz's work first appeared. Military coup attempts in the 1960s were at an all time high, impeding democratic transitions in much of Latin America, for example.

On the other hand, however, this primary focus on civilian control seems to have limited discussions concerning the other half of Feaver's “problematique:” making a strong and capable military that is able to aid the civilian leadership in times of crisis. In other words, like Avant, Gibson and Snider, Bruneau and Matei, Schiff, and Herspring all contend, there has been an overemphasis on civilian control as the key determinant of “healthy” civil-military relations.¹³ As such, any civil-military conflict has often been summarily dismissed as problematic.

All civil-military conflict is not necessarily “zero-sum.”¹⁴ Avant makes this point as well when arguing against seeing all civil-military tension as a problem.¹⁵ Even Desch's work on civilian control echoes this contention: “some conflict is inevitable and perhaps even desirable in a pluralistic political system.”¹⁶ This appears to be largely consistent with Huntington's classic argument against subjective control of the

military. Although the military must be professional and under the ultimate control of civilian authorities, the military cannot be comprised of political yes-men to the civilian leadership. The military must still be able to advise their civilian leaders with military and strategic information that runs counter to the civilian leadership's predisposed preferences. This can bring friction without causing a loss of civilian control.

This contention of the utility of conflict in inter-organizational dealings is also reflected in the larger literature on conflict in public administration.¹⁷ According to Pondy, in disturbing the organizational equilibrium, low levels of conflict can positively affect "productivity, stability, and adaptability."¹⁸

Further, although the presence or absence of civilian control may be useful in accounting for the likelihood of military coups in dictatorships, for example, ultimate civilian control is well-established in most regimes in the post-Cold War period.¹⁹ Coup attempts are down 63% since the mid-1960s.²⁰ Although military coups still occur, the predominant focus on a dichotomous indicator of civilian control could limit a more nuanced understanding of the causes and effects of a broader spectrum of civil-military cooperation and conflict in the post-Cold War environment.

By moving beyond a focus on just the presence or absence of civilian control, the literature concerning the effect of civil-military relations on military effectiveness in international crises could also benefit. Brooks defines military effectiveness as the "capacity to create military power from a state's basic resources."²¹ As such, military effectiveness is important for achieving a state's preferred outcome in an international crisis. Whether from the threat of force or actual force usage, an effective military will provide civilian leaders with bargaining leverage and information in times of international crises.

Below, I use a more nuanced conceptualization of the degree of civil-military conflict to expand on the causal pathways through which a middle range of civil-military friction can help crisis bargaining interactions. Throughout this theory, I'm arguing that civil-military conflict cannot be simply viewed as a dichotomous (yes/no) variable but should instead be viewed as events along of continuum. At very low levels, subjective control is likely. At very high levels, coup risk and overall lack of civilian control is also likely. Between these two extremes, however, I argue there exists a middle range of civil-military "friction" which can increase the probability of military effectiveness.

2.2 Theoretical Argument - I argue that middle ranges of civil-military friction benefit military effectiveness and, by extension, crisis bargaining outcomes in three ways: (1) military fighting, (2) information to civilian leadership on capabilities, and (3) information to adversaries on credibility of the threat of force.

Before outlining these causal mechanisms, however, it is worth noting that I remain consistent with the larger literature in arguing that ultimate civilian control is necessary for military effectiveness. As such, high levels of civil-military conflict will indicate a loss of civilian control that will impede military effectiveness in much the same way that civil-military relations in Pakistan impeded crisis-bargaining with India during the Kargil conflict. Past a certain level, therefore, civil-military friction should quickly change into civil-military insubordination and represent a lack of civilian control.

Military Fighting - First, civil-military friction is needed to ensure that the military has leeway over their domain of war fighting. Without friction, it is too easy for bureaucratic mission creep to result in a situation of subjective control and, thus, civilians making decisions outside of their realm of expertise.²²

Subjective control of military forces by Russia president Boris Yeltsin is one explanation, for example, for that military's ineffectiveness in the First Chechnya conflict in 1994 and 1995. During this time, both Desch and Herspring contend the Yeltsin had the military under "subjective control mechanisms."²³ According to Herspring, Yeltsin had overstepped his bounds in the war planning, instigating maneuvers that the army did not have the training or equipment to carry out successfully. Perhaps increased friction from the military to civilians would have improved the war planning that occurred in the lead up to the conflict. However, Yeltsin had effectively silenced all critiques from officers during this time period, even starting criminal proceedings against discontents.

In the new quantitative data I use in this paper, I also see dynamic with respect to Russia. There is a dramatic decrease in the overall conflictual intensity of civil-military friction in the time period immediately prior to the First Chechnya conflict. In fact, there are twelve times as many cooperative events between military officers and civilians as there are conflictual (friction) events in 1993. This could indicate that any civil-military friction was not allowed by civilian leaders, leading to mission creep that harmed war fighting by limiting the input and expertise of military officers on the conduct of the war.

In addition, civil-military friction can serve as an indicator of military initiative. Initiative is a process of fighting efficiently and utilizing military expertise to insure that the fighting plans provide a strategic advantage.²⁴ Having a military that is able to update battle plans and take initiative on the field has long been thought of as essential in military effectiveness and victory. According to the democratic peace literature, soldiers in democratic countries are more likely to take initiative on the battlefield, forcing their opponents to follow their battle plan and, in the long run, contributing to successful bargaining outcomes.²⁵ Though democracies typically have soldiers with more initiative, the larger literature views military initiative as a crucial component for military effectiveness across regime types. As such, indicators of military initiative should make victory more for any state in crisis.²⁶

There is no reason to expect that initiative by soldiers on the battlefield would not be observed off the battlefield as well. It seems likely that military initiative could result in disagreements with civilian leaders as to battlefield and training decisions. In other words, in taking the initiative, officers are going to have to present ideas to civilian leaders which could run counter to the civilian's preexisting desires and plans. When they are able to do that, overall military effectiveness will be improved. As such, in addition to the large advantage that democracies have in crisis bargaining, it follows that civil-military friction, as an indicator of military initiative, will contribute to military effectiveness and crisis bargaining success.

This conceptualization of mid-level civil-military conflict is fundamentally different than Feaver's principal-agent account in many regards.²⁷ First, unlike Feaver, the military may not be "shirking" when they voice opinions in an insolent manner. Instead, the military, by stressing their divergent preferences and advice, may be involved in a process of conflictual relations with the civilian leadership that will result in a more preferred outcome for all parties. As such, some civil-military conflict may lead to innovation, as it did in the case of Russian military use of fuel oil explosives in 1999 in Dagestan.²⁸ The military had continually pressed for the use of these explosives from Yeltsin; if they had not "shirked" and just fought the war as they had had been requested to do, the military would not have been as effective on the ground. Later, Putin recognized the validity of their request and gave them permission to use the explosives.²⁹ Feaver's conceptualization of "shirking" does not appear to allow for any achievement of the principal's goals; it is

mainly viewed as a negative for overall military operations. Instead, as presented here, some push-back from the agents, military officers, to their principals, the civilian leadership, can be indicative of military initiative and, as such, contribute to overall crisis success.

Information to Civilian Leadership - Within the crisis bargaining model, information is a necessary component for successful bargaining short of war and a key component to outcome success once war has begun.³⁰ The military, as the key guardians and experts of the force structure, maintains a more updated view of military capabilities than the civilian leadership. By providing this information to civilian leaders, the civilian leadership is better able to bargain successfully short of war and will be more choosy in the crises it is in, all leading to a better likelihood of crisis bargaining victory.

In providing this information to the civilian leadership, however, friction is likely. The civilian leadership may have preexisting beliefs about the strength of a certain strategy or force structure. They even can have certain preexisting beliefs about how issues can be solved without involving military force, as Clinton did prior to the Haiti invasion of 1994.³¹ When the military provides advice to the contrary of a civilian leadership's pre-existing beliefs, it is likely that that this will be a somewhat conflictual event. However, it is also likely that the overall result will be much improved.

For example, Brooks 's account of the differences between Egypt's abysmal performance in the 1967 Arab-Israeli war and the 1973 Arab-Israeli war is highly dependent on the increased information Sadat had in 1973 from his military leaders.³² As Brooks points out, "Sada had unfettered access to multiple sources of information."³³ This information from military officers, however, was definitely not free of conflict. The military frequently had somewhat serious friction with Sadat in the pre-war planning phase of 1972. This was especially true when military officers had to provide Sadat with information he did not expect or like.³⁴

Despite this friction, information from the military as to capabilities is necessary for civilian leaders to recognize their bargaining situation short of war or to bargain successfully during a conflict situation. As such, when the military is able to provide this information, victory in a crisis is more likely. When subjective control mechanisms do not allow this information to be conveyed to the leadership or when the military is

too “civilianized” to want to provide conflictual information to the leadership, it is more likely that the civilian leadership will be disadvantaged in crisis bargaining situations.

Information to Adversaries - Finally, civil-military friction can serve as a signal to adversaries that the military is mobilizing or, at the very least, discussing battle plans. Quite basically, it can provide necessary information concerning the use of objective civilian control within the state. This information is necessary to reinforce the credibility of a threat of force during crisis bargaining.³⁵ When bargaining, there are incentives for states to “bluff,” indicating that they have more resolve or better capabilities than they actually do. Therefore, states seek ways to provide information to signal their resolve and capabilities in order to show the credibility of their threat, improving their bargaining outcome. Consistent with the crisis bargaining model, this information can lead to capitulation by the other side as it updates its beliefs concerning likely outcomes of conflict and reevaluates possible bargains on the table.³⁶

Lai argues that public military mobilization reveals information to an adversary that can stop a conflict short of war.³⁷ Similarly, Slantchev argues that military mobilization is a very effective way for leaders to both sink costs and tie hands concerning both their resolve and capabilities, leading to a more likely favorable war or negotiated settlement.³⁸ Much like Slantchev's discussion of how military moves reveal information, mid-range civil-military conflict could provide information of both impending mobilization and capabilities. Without any civil-military friction, an adversary has limited information about the credibility of a threat before actual mobilization occurs. With too much civil-military conflict, however, the adversary can expect the mobilized military to be less effective and can question the legitimacy or carry-through of any threat of force. Therefore, evidence of this mid-range civil-military friction could be used by a crisis adversary as a signal that the state is actually preparing to carry out its threat in a very militarily advantageous way. As such, once civil-military friction is observed in a bargaining partner, a state could be more likely to take a lesser negotiated settlement.

An example of this could have occurred in the United States prior to the deployment of ground troops in Bosnia in 1995. Immediately prior, military officials were taking up lots of newsprint lamenting against the use of “pin-prick” bombing techniques.³⁹ Though the military was not overtly supportive of any

intervention in Bosnia, their critique to the use of the pin-prick bombs in conflict, which Feaver (2003) does say was “not wrong,” would be the type of strong signal sent to an adversary that could provide information about the credibility of the threat of military mobilization. In fact, the Dayton Accords were signed shortly after the summer United States military mobilization for ground combat.⁴⁰

This causal pathway, though perhaps very important, does rely on the assumption that any civil-military friction is observable to the adversary. To the extent that this information is widely provided in newspaper reports, like measured here, this assumption appears to hold water. If the civil-military friction, however, occurs in private, it would follow that this mechanism would not provide information to the adversary. This is similar to the dynamic Lai outlines with respect to private military mobilizations.⁴¹

In short, there appears to be many causal pathways through which mid-range civil-military friction could positively military effectiveness and, by extension, crisis bargaining outcomes. Friction, otherwise thought of as the presence of civil-military conflict that is not too intense, aids in military fighting and may provide necessary information to civilian leaders and bargaining adversaries. Without any friction, the military is likely too micromanaged or controlled to be effective. Too much friction, however, and there is the real risk of a lack of civilian control, leading to a military ineffectiveness. This theoretical argument implies the following testable hypothesis:

Civil-military conflict has a curvilinear or inverse U shaped relationship with crisis bargaining success. At mid-levels, civil military conflict can increase the probability of crisis bargaining success.

In the next section, I outline the novel way in which I test this hypothesis cross-nationally.

3 Research Design

To examine the validity of the above hypothesis, I construct a new dataset of civil-military conflictual intensity from 1990-2004 to evaluate the way civil-military conflict impacts crisis outcome success. Below, I first outline the variables and model specification used in this project. I then discuss the results of the statistical tests and examine the robustness of these results.

Key Independent Variable - First off, nuanced data concerning the degree or level of civil-military conflict, as the key independent variable, is necessary. No existing work moves far enough beyond a simple

dichotomous presence/absence of civilian control distinction. In fact, very little quantitative work is done in the area of civil-military relations; much of the existing quantitative work focuses exclusively on military spending or the military history of civilian elites.⁴² These measures, though useful in looking at other aspects of civil-military relations, do not adequately capture the key concept of interest for this project. As such, a measure of the amount of conflict from military leaders to the civilian leaders is necessary.

To construct indicators of the key concept necessary for this project, I rely on events-data approaches.⁴³ Events-data approaches have been previously used to examine everything from the strategic interactions of forces during the Bosnian conflict to the impact of human rights non-governmental organizations worldwide.⁴⁴ For this project, I utilize the publicly available events-data from the Integrated Data for Events Analysis (IDEA) project.⁴⁵ This dataset focuses on all Reuters Global News Service reports from 1990 to 2004. The raw dataset is organized in a 'who' did 'what' to 'whom' manner for each particular event, over 10 million events in the complete dataset. To capture the concepts necessary for this project, the larger dataset was restricted to only events that capture an interaction where (a) the source of the interaction ("who") is the military and the target ("to whom") is the civilian leadership in the same country. In other words, I restrict the dataset to events from a military actor to his or her civilian authorities.

For the final indicators of civil-military conflict, however, I cannot just rely on counts of all events by country-year. It is likely, for example, that the events captured in this restricted dataset could indicate subjective control. For example, we could see events where the military commends or extols the civilian leadership in hopes of gaining post-service appointments, as was the case in Greece in 1996. Luckily, within studies of events-data, there is a well established scoring method for both the presence or absence and the degree of conflict or cooperation between the source and the target actor.⁴⁶ This method, advanced first by Joshua Goldstein in 1992, relies on what the source "did," or the form of the event, and whether the event form is determined to represent conflict or cooperation between the source and target. Therefore, for each event pertinent to this project, an indicator of whether each event was conflictual was added to the dataset. Then, using scores first developed by Goldstein, a continuous indicator of the relative degree of cooperation or conflict in each event was also added. This score ranges from -10 for the most conflictual events, such as

a military coup, to +10 for the most cooperative events, such as the military praising a decision of the civilian leadership. The final variables used here, therefore, measure *the total number or count of civil-military conflictual events* in a country-year and, more precisely, the *total weight or intensity of all civil-military events* in a country-year. This total weight measure is the total Goldstein score of all civil-military events in the country-year.

The count measure is a good first cut at the overall amount of conflict within the country at a given time. Among countries that have a crisis during this time period, this variable ranges from 0 to 18, with the greatest number of conflictual events occurring in Yugoslavia in 1999, Pakistan in 1999, and Haiti in 1994, for example. Given the coup or defeats that occurred in each of these countries in this year, this measure appears to have a lot of face validity.⁴⁷

The overall Goldstein intensity measure also has a lot of face validity. For the sample used in this project, this variable ranges from -77.8 to 15.6. Again, lower values represent more overall civil-military conflict while higher values would be indicative of a military that is largely supportive of everything the civilian leadership is doing. Countries at the low end of the spectrum include Yugoslavia and Pakistan in 1999. Countries at the high end of the spectrum include North Korea in 1996, the Philippines in 1995, Greece in 1996, and Democratic Republic of Congo in 1998. Again, these are all countries and time periods where subjective military control seems likely to have been occurring.

Given that the hypothesis listed above contends that the effect of civil-military conflict is curvilinear (ie the Goldilocks hypothesis), these variables are normalized around a mean of zero and squared in the analyzes. Following convention, I also include the normalized constituent term.⁴⁸

Though an events-data approach to the study of civil-military relations adds much to the empirical literature, I do recognize some of the shortcomings of utilizing events data. As Azar et al. and Bond et al. have stated, events data focus only on what makes it to the page.⁴⁹ Though this is theoretically important for the information mechanism to work, I was concerned about the potential effects of any media bias. Therefore, for all statistical models, I include a control for the total number of events concerning the country as reported in Reuters.⁵⁰

Dependent Variable - The central argument of this paper concerns the role civil-military friction plays in military effectiveness and, ultimately, bargaining success. Unfortunately, there is not an ideal ranking of overall military effectiveness.⁵¹ Data at the battle success level is also not available for the time period for which I have data on civil-military relations. As an proxy, therefore, I use crisis actor success as the dependent variable in the model presented here. This variable, coded from the International Crisis Behavior (ICB) Project dataset, captures whether an individual state actor in an international crisis is able to reach an ultimate outcome that is deemed a “victory” from the crisis situation.⁵²

In addition to the negative crisis outcomes of “stalemate” and “defeat” in the ICB dataset, there is also a mid-range category of “compromises.” Therefore, as a robustness check, I both run an ordered probit analysis on all four categories of crisis outcome and a probit analysis where the dependent variable is the dichotomous indicator of victory/compromise in the crisis. As highlighted below, results remain consistent as to sign and significance in both specifications.⁵³ I think the coding of crisis events as successful for only ICB victories provides the harder empirical test and, thus, I utilize that coding of the dependent variable as the baseline in this project. This is similar to Gelpi and Griesdorf.⁵⁴

Because military effectiveness can theoretically impact crisis bargaining without actual war, as discussed above, using a sample of all international crises allows me to examine the usefulness of civil-military friction short of war. Additionally, because the argument above concerns the impact at the state actor level, the actor level of analysis in this dataset is useful here. I measure all independent variables at their levels at the start of the crisis. This best reflects the information mechanisms through which civil-military friction impacts bargaining success.

Model Specification - Many additional factors could also impact crisis bargaining success. Whenever possible, I have tried to control for variables which could be related to both the key independent and dependent variables. First, I control for democracy, utilizing a dichotomous indicator for whether the state's revised Polity IV score (-10 to 10 scale) at the beginning of the crisis was 6 or greater.⁵⁵ I also include a control for the gravity of threat from the ICB dataset.⁵⁶ This variable captures on a scale from 0 to 6 the intensity of the “gravest” threat during the crisis. I also include a control of military capability from the

Correlates of War project. This measure, a composite index of military capabilities, captures “total population, urban population, iron and steel production, energy consumption, military personnel, and military expenditure” of the crisis state.⁵⁷ Higher values equal a more capable military. Like mentioned, I also include a control for the total number (log) of reports of the crisis state in the IDEA dataset. When these variables were added, the final dataset included 102 crisis actors from 1990 to 2004.⁵⁸ Due to the dichotomous nature of the dependent variable, I use a probit model with robust standard errors clustered on the crisis.⁵⁹

Though the Correlates of War capability data is the best proxy of military power, it does reduce the sample size from 126 to 102. Below, I also show that the results as to the key civil-military variables are consistent with or without the capabilities measure.

Though constrained by the limited time period for which I have data on the key independent variable, this model specification provides a useful first test of the central hypothesis that flows from the theoretical argument outlined above.

4 Results and Analysis

Baseline Results - The basic hypothesis is confirmed in a number of the statistical models and robustness checks: civil-military friction can increase the probability of crisis bargaining success. If civil-military conflict is too low, it is likely that the military is under subjective control and will not be effective. Like discussed prior, however, if civil-military conflict is too high, it is likely that civilian control is in question, also leading to a lack of crisis bargaining success. Below, I outline these results and discuss their substantive importance.

Table 1 provides the baseline results when capability is included as a control. First, Column 1 of Table 1 provides the results of the baseline model where the key independent variable is the squared normalized count of the number of strictly conflictual events between the military and civilians. As can be observed, the coefficient on this variable is negative and statistically significant. This indicates that both high and low levels of civil-military conflict result in a decreased probability of winning a bargaining crisis. All statistically significant controls are in the expected direction.

Figure 1 provides a visualization of this Goldilocks finding using the statistical model represented in Table 1. With all controls at their mean and the democracy variable set to its mode (0), as the count of civil-military conflict (normalized around mean 0) moves from its lowest to the highest levels in the dataset, the likelihood of winning an international crisis first increases and then decreases.

Column 2 of Table 1 echoes this basic finding, this time utilizing the weighted measure of civil-military conflict. Like before, the square of this indicator is statistically significant and in the negative direction. Thus, both very cooperative and very conflictual civil-military relations diminish the likelihood of success in an international crisis. Figure 2 highlights this finding graphically. Starting with the most conflictual relations on the left hand side, the probability of crisis success resembles an upside down U shape as the civil-military relationship becomes more cooperative. Although the upper bound of the confidence level is very large on the left hand side of this graph, this visual representation is still striking in that it highlights the diminishing returns of more cooperative civil-military relationships on the right hand side of the figure. This, in and of itself, is something not well established in the empirical literature.

Robustness Checks - As indicated above, results on a larger sample where capabilities was not included as a control remain consistent. These results are provided in Column 1 of Table 2, where the key independent variable comes from the count of civil-military conflict and Column 2 of Table 2, where the key variables come from the weighted intensity scale. As these tables indicate, the results do not change with regards to sign or significance and indicate a curvilinear relationship between civil-military conflict and crisis bargaining outcome.

Also mentioned above, the baseline results presented here all concern the likelihood of crisis victory for the state actor. However, there are situations in the ICB dataset coded as “compromises.” As a robustness test, therefore, I recode my dependent variable to define success as either crisis victory or crisis compromise (ie not crisis stalemate or crisis defeat). As Columns 3 and 4 of Table 2 show, the non-linear impact of civil-military conflict remains identical in these additional specifications. Results also remain identical as to sign and significance if an ordered probit model is used on the original ICB scale of crisis outcome.

Figures 3 and 4 highlight the curvilinear effect that civil-military conflict continues to have on this alternative coding of the dependent variable. Figure 3 is based on the results summarized in Column 3 of Table 2 where the count of civil-military conflict is utilized in creating the key independent variables. Figure 4, based on the model in Column 4 of Table 2, focuses on the Goldstein (1992) weighted score of civil-military events. Most striking, the confidence intervals on these new figures, especially Figure 4, provides more support to this non-monotonic relationship between civil-military conflict and crisis outcome. The results of these additional models support the validity of the baseline results: civil-military friction can increase the likelihood of a favorable crisis bargaining outcome.⁶⁰

5 Conclusion

Do civil-military relations impact crisis outcome? The results shown here indicate that civil-military conflict has a non-monotonic relationship with crisis success. Like Goldilocks and porridge, conflict can be either “too hot” or “too cold.” However, mid-level civil-military friction does appear to improve the likelihood of crisis bargaining success. This project thus serves as a reminder of the importance of both halves of Feaver’s “problematique”: the military has to be both under the control of the civilian leadership but still emboldened in its mission directive. Unlike Feaver but very similar to Huntington, I argue that a military too complacent to the civilian leadership limits military effectiveness by diminishing military fighting and limiting the information both the civilian leadership and the adversary has in a crisis bargaining situation.⁶¹

I test this argument using a new and somewhat novel events-dataset. Though publicly available data has limited the focus of this project to just the years 1990 to 2004, perhaps future coding projects could extend this approach to cover a longer time series. Additionally, future work could focus on the impact of civil-military conflict on other measures of military effectiveness or crisis outcomes.

Nonetheless, the take-away message of this paper for civilian leaders and international observers is a powerful one: the impact of civil-military relations on crisis outcomes is more complex than just ensuring civilian control. Some leeway has to be provided to the military in order to maximize their role in creating successful crisis outcomes.

Table 1: Probit Analysis of Victory in International Crises, Impact of Civil-Military Conflict, 1990-2004

VARIABLES	(1) Civil-Military Conflict Count	(2) Civil-Military Conflict Weighted Goldstein Score
Civil Military Conflict Normalized Count Squared	-0.2683** (0.128)	
Civil Military Conflict Normalized Count	0.1145 (0.205)	
Civil Military Conflict Weighted Goldstein Score Squared		-0.0040* (0.002)
Civil Military Conflict Weighted Goldstein Score		-0.0926*** (0.035)
Democracy	0.2752 (0.290)	0.3578 (0.264)
Gravity	0.1662 (0.120)	0.1809* (0.110)
Capability	-7.4254 (8.363)	-9.2389 (8.698)
IDEA Report Count (ln)	0.2061* (0.122)	0.2383* (0.139)
Intercept	-2.0055** (0.838)	-2.6815*** (0.907)
Observations	102	102
Log-likelihood	-58.688	-57.325
$\chi^2(6)$	14.146	17.368

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 (two-tailed)

Table 2: Robustness Checks of Results, 1990-2004

VARIABLES	(1) Larger Sample - Civil-Military Conflict Count	(2) Larger Sample - Civil- Military Conflict Weighted Goldstein Score	(3) Dependent Variable as Victory/ Compromise - Civil- Military Conflict Count	(4) Dependent Variable as Victory/ Compromise - Civil-Military Conflict Weighted Goldstein Score
Civil Military Conflict Normalized Count Squared	-0.2958*		-0.3317**	
	(0.165)		(0.161)	
Civil Military Conflict Normalized Count	-0.0090		0.3104	
	(0.195)		(0.242)	
Civil Military Conflict Weighted Goldstein Score Squared		-0.0040**		-0.0052***
		(0.002)		(0.002)
Civil Military Conflict Weighted Goldstein Score		-0.0593**		-0.0834***
		(0.028)		(0.025)
Democracy	0.4034	0.4468	0.3213	0.4153
	(0.276)	(0.272)	(0.293)	(0.282)
Gravity	0.1522	0.1562	0.0400	0.0535
	(0.112)	(0.109)	(0.119)	(0.112)
IDEA Report Count (ln)	0.1113	0.1245	0.1024	0.1555*
	(0.077)	(0.079)	(0.083)	(0.091)
Capabilities			-8.6895	-10.7472
			(8.276)	(8.430)
Constant	-1.5942***	-2.0098***	0.2373	-0.7341
	(0.606)	(0.549)	(0.768)	(0.719)
Observations	126	126	102	102
Log-likelihood	-72.526	-72.97	-53.785	-53.462
$\chi^2(6)$	13.829	14.049	7.653	15.086

Robust standard errors in parentheses
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1(two-tailed)

Figure 1: Predicted Probability of Winning Crisis as Civil-Military Relations Vary, Based on Column 1 of Table 1 Model Results




Figure 2: Predicted Probability of Winning Crisis as Civil-Military Relations Vary, Based on Column 2 of Table 1 Model Results




Figure 3: Predicted Probability of Victory/Compromise in a Crisis as Civil-Military Relations Vary, Based on Column 3 of Table 2 Model Results





Figure 4: Predicted Probability of Victory/Compromise in a Crisis as Civil-Military Relations Vary, Based on Column 4 of Table 2 Model Results



¹“Nawaz blames Musharraf for Kargil,” *The Times of India*, May 28, 2006.

² Gerassimos Karabelias, “Civil-Military Relations: A Comparative Analysis Of The Role Of The Military In The Political Transformation Of Post-War Turkey And Greece: 1980-1995,” Final Report Submitted to NATO, 1998, <http://www.nato.int/acad/fellow/96-98/karabeli.pdf>; George Kourvetaris, *Studies on Modern Greek Society and Politics* (East European Monographs, 1999).

³ Ozkan Duman and Dimitris Tsarouhas, “Civilianization" in Greece versus "Demilitarization" in Turkey: A Comparative Study of Civil-Military Relations and the Impact of the European Union,” *Armed Forces & Society* 32 (2006): 405-423.

⁴ Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1957); Morris Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait* (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1960); Peter Feaver, “The Civil-Military Problematique: Huntington, Janowitz, and the Question of Civilian Control,” *Armed Forces and Society* 23 (1996):149-178.

⁵ Risa Brooks, “Civil Military Relations and Military Effectiveness: Egypt in the 1967 and 1973 Wars,” in *Creating Military Power: The Source of Military Effectiveness*, ed. Risa Brooks and Elizabeth Stanley (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2007).

⁶ Dale Herspring, *Soldiers, Commissars, and Chaplains: Civil-Military Relations Since Cromwell*, (Landham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2001), Thomas C. Bruneau and Florina Matei, “Towards a New Conceptualization of Democratization and Civil-Military Relations,” *Democratization* 15(2008): 909-929, Rebecca L. Schiff, *The Military and Domestic Politics: A Concordance Theory of Civil-Military Relations* (New York: Routledge Press, 2009).

⁷ Nielsen has an especially relevant quote on empirically testing the utility of civil military friction: "It is also not clear that all civil-military friction is bad, either in a normative or in a policy sense (70). See Suzanne C. Nielsen, "Civil-Military Relations Theory and Military Effectiveness," *Public Administration and Management* 10 (2005): 61-84.

⁸ Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*; Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier*.

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- ⁹ Scott Gartner, *Strategic Assessment in War* (CT: Yale University Press, 1997); Michael Charles Desch, *Civilian Control of the Military: The Changing Security Environment* (Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins University Press, 2001); Risa A. Brooks, "Making Military Might: Why Do States Fail and Succeed?," *International Security* 28(2003): 149-191.
- ¹⁰ Feaver, "The Civil-Military Problematique;" Peter Feaver, *Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003).
- ¹¹ Feaver, "The Civil-Military Problematique," 150.
- ¹² Feaver, "The Civil-Military Problematique," 154.
- ¹³ Deborah Avant, "Conflicting Indicators of "Crisis" in American Civil-Military Relations," *Armed Forces and Society* 24(1998): 375-387; Christopher P. Gibson and Don M. Snider, "Civil-Military Relations and the Potential to Influence: A Look at the National Security Decision-Making Process," *Armed Forces and Society* 25(1999): 193-218; Bruneau and Matei, "Towards a New Conceptualization;" Schiff, *The Military and Domestic Politics*; Dale Herspring, "Civil-Military Relations in the United States and Russia," *Armed Forces and Society* 35(1999):667-687.
- ¹⁴ Herspring, "Civil-Military Relations in the United States and Russia."
- ¹⁵ Avant, "Conflicting Indicators."
- ¹⁶ Desch, *Civilian Control of the Military*, 4.
- ¹⁷ See classic pieces, for example, by Louis R. Pondy, "Organizational Conflict: Concepts and Models"," *Administrative Science Quarterly* 12(1967): 296-320; Karen A. Jehn, "A Multimethod Examination of the Benefits and Detriments of Intragroup Conflict," *Administrative Science Quarterly* 40(1995): 256-283; Karen A. Jehn, "A Quantitative Analysis of Conflict Types and Dimensions in Organizational Groups," *Administrative Science Quarterly* 42(1997): 530 - 557.
- ¹⁸ Pondy, "Organizational Conflict," 308.
- ¹⁹ Herspring, "Civil-Military Relations in the United States and Russia."
- ²⁰ Human Security Report Group, "Human Security Brief 2007," HSRP Vancouver.
- ²¹ Brooks, "Civil Military Relations and Military Effectiveness," 9.

²² Huntington states "the simplest way of minimizing military power would appear to be the maximizing of the power of civilian groups in relation to the military" (80). Similarly, Schiff's concordance theory sees optimal civil-military decision making like a corporation or team with "respect for individual opinions, and encouragement of professional skills" (140). See Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*; Schiff, *The Military and Domestic Politics*. I also thank Dr. Schiff for discussing the relationship of concordance theory to the theoretical argument presented here at the 2010 IUS Conference - Toronto. Any errors in application remain my own.

²³ Desch, *Civilian Control of the Military*, 40; Herspring, "Civil-Military Relations in the United States and Russia."

²⁴ Dan Reiter and Allan Stam, *Democracies at War* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002).

²⁵ Reiter and Stam, *Democracies at War*.

²⁶ For a discussion of military initiative across regime types, see Michael A. Desch, *Power and Military Effectiveness: The Fallacy of Democratic Trumphalism* (John Hopkins Press, 2008); Bruce Newsome, *Made, Not Born: Why Some Soldiers Are Better Than Others* (Praeger, 2007).

²⁷ Feaver, *Armed Servants*.

²⁸ Herspring, "Civil-Military Relations in the United States and Russia."

²⁹ Herspring, "Civil-Military Relations in the United States and Russia."

³⁰ See Geoffrey Blainey, *The Causes of War* (London: Macmillian Press, 1973); James Fearon, "Rationalist Explanations of War," *International Organization* 49(1995): 379-414; Dan Reiter, "Exploring the Bargaining Model of War," *Perspectives on Politics* 1(2003): 27-43; Robert Powell, "Bargaining and Learning While Fighting," *American Journal of Political Science* 48(2004): 344-361.

³¹ Dale Herspring, *The Pentagon and the Presidency: Civil-Military Relations from FDR to George W. Bush* (University of Kansas Press, 2005).

³² Brooks, "Civil Military Relations and Military Effectiveness."

³³ Brooks, "Civil Military Relations and Military Effectiveness," 124.

³⁴ Kirk Beattie, *Egypt During the Sadat Years* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000); Risa Brooks, *Shaping Strategy: The Civil-Military Politics of Strategic Assessment* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008).

³⁵ Branislav Slantchev, "Military Coercion in Interstate Crises," *American Political Science Review* 99(2005): 533-547; Branislav Slantchev, *Military Threats: The Costs of Coercion and the Price of Peace* (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 2010).

³⁶ See James Fearon, "Signaling Versus the Balance of Power and Interests: An Empirical Test of a Crisis Bargaining Model," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 38(1994): 236-269; Jessica Weeks, "Autocratic Audience Costs: Regime Type and Signaling Resolve," *International Organization* 62(2008): 35-64.

³⁷ Brian Lai, "The Effects of Different Types of Military Mobilization on the Outcome of International Crises," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 48(2004): 211.

³⁸ Slantchev, *Military Threats*.

³⁹ Feaver, *Armed Servants*, 265.

⁴⁰ R. Cody Phillips, "Bosnia-Herzegovina: The United States Army's Role in Peace Enforcement Operations, 1995-2004," Center of Military History Publication 70 97 1, US Defense Department, 2005.

⁴¹ Lai, "The Effects of Different Types of Military Mobilization."

⁴² See, for example, Peter Feaver and Christopher Gelpi, *Choosing Your Battles: American Civil-Military Relations and The Use of Force* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004); Seung-Whan Choi and Pat James, "Civil-Military Structure, Political Communication, and the Democratic Peace," *Journal of Peace Research* 45(2008): 37-53.

⁴³ Doug Bond, Joe Bond, Churl Oh, J. Craig Jenkins, Charles Lewis Taylor, "Integrated Data for Events Analysis (IDEA): An Event Typology for Automated Events Data Development," *Journal of Peace Research* 40(2003): 733-745; Gary King and Will Lowe, "An Analysis Automated Information Extraction Tool for International Conflict Data with Performance as Good as Human Coders: A Rare Events Evaluation Design," *International Organization* 57(2003): 617-642.

⁴⁴ Joshua Goldstein and Jon C. Pevehouse, "Reciprocity, Bullying, and International Cooperation: Time-Series Analysis of the Bosnia Conflict," *American Political Science Review* 91(1997): 515-529; Amanda Murdie and

Tavishi Bhasin, "Aiding and Abetting: Human Rights INGOs and Domestic Protest," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 55(2011): 163-191.

⁴⁵ King and Lowe, "An Analysis Automated."

⁴⁶ These scores are based on a ranking of the conflictual nature of world events given to international relations researchers. See Joshua Goldstein, "A Conflict-Cooperation Scale for WEIS Data," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 36(1992): 369-385.

⁴⁷ Worth mentioning, the United States, due to an over-abundance of Reuters news stories, is omitted from the analyzes. This omission is consistent with statistical tests for outliers and is consistent with other recent work utilizing events data methods. The inclusion of the United States does not result in a change in the sign of the results but does, as to be expected, result in a loss of statistical significance at conventional levels. The results are consistent if large multilateral actions are omitted or if any crisis where the US was an actor is omitted as well. See Vic Barnett and Toby Lewis, *Outliers in Statistical Data*, 3rd edition (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley Series in Probability and Statistics, 1994); Murdie and Bhasin, "Aiding and Abetting."

⁴⁸ If the constituent terms are rescaled to be only positive, in both the Goldstein score models and the models with the civil-military conflict count, the constituent terms are positive and the squared terms are negative and statistically significant, all reinforcing the inverse U-shaped relationship shown in Figures 1-4.

⁴⁹ Edward E. Azar, Stanley H. Cohen, Thomas O. Jukam, and James M. McCormick, "The Problem of Source Coverage in the Use of International Events Data," *International Studies Quarterly* 16(1972): 373-388; Bond et al, "Integrated Data for Events Analysis."

⁵⁰ This variable is logged to deal with variance nonstationarity.

⁵¹ Brooks, *Shaping Strategy*.

⁵² This coding of victory is objective but represents the "achievement of basic goal(s)" "from the perspective of a specific actor. See Christopher Gelpi and Michael Griesdorf, "Winners or Losers? Democracies in International Crisis 1981-1994," *American Political Science Review* 95(2002): 633-647; Jonathan Wilkenfield and Michael Brecher, "Codebook for ICB2 - International Crisis Behavior Project," 2010, ICPSR Study 9286.

⁵³ In fact, my results slightly improve as to significance in both of these additional specifications.

⁵⁴ Gelpi and Griesdorf, "Winners or Losers?"

⁵⁵ Results are also consistent as to sign and significance for the dependent variable crisis success if the sample is divided into only democracies and only non-democracies. Monty Marshall and Keith Jagers, "Polity IV Project." Center for Systemic Peace 2007; <http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm>

⁵⁶ Wilkenfield and Brecher, "Codebook for ICB2."

⁵⁷ I used Version 4.0 of this dataset; See David J. Singer, Stuart Bremer, and John Stuckey, "Capability Distribution, Uncertainty, and Major Power War, 1820-1965." in *Peace, War, and Numbers*, ed. Bruce Russett (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1972).

⁵⁸When additional ICB controls are used to capture societal unrest, mass violence, and major power involvement (US or USSR/Russia), results remain consistent at at least the $p=.10$ (one tailed) level for all models. These results are available by request from the author and will be available as a web appendix available at the author's website.

⁵⁹ Using a properly identified instrument, all models as currently specified did not appear to be complicated by issues of endogeneity, as indicated by the Wald Test of Exogeneity. See the Online Appendix, available on the author's website, for a discussion of this test and other measures taken to specifically address issues of endogeneity.

⁶⁰ Results of models where the sample is of all militarized interstate disputes (MIDs) are similar as to sign and statistical significance. Please see online appendix for a discussion of these models. Faten Ghosn, Glenn Palmer, and Stuart Bremer, "The MID3 Data Set, 1993–2001: Procedures, Coding Rules, and Description," *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 21 (2004):133-154.

⁶¹ Feaver, "The Civil-Military Problematique;" Herspring, "Civil-Military Relations in the United States and Russia."