

POLITICAL BELIEF NETWORKS:

Socio-Cognitive Heterogeneity in American Public Opinion. *

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Abstract

Most research on public opinion assumes that American political views are structured by a belief system with a clearly-defined liberal-conservative polarity; however, this is not true of all Americans. In this article we document systematic heterogeneity in the organization of political attitudes and explain its basis in individuals' social identities. We use Relational Class Analysis (RCA), a graph-based method for detecting heterogeneity in collective patterns of opinion, to identify distinctive *belief networks*, each shared by a different group of respondents. Analyzing ANES data between 1984 and 2004, we identify three groups of American citizens: *Ideologues*, whose political attitudes strongly align with either liberal or conservative categories; *Alternatives*, who are instead morally conservative but economically liberal, or vice versa; and *Agnostics*, who exhibit weak associations among political beliefs. Respondents' sociodemographic profiles, particularly their income, education, and religiosity, lie at the core of the different ways in which they understand politics.

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American politics over the last four decades has been characterized by increased partisanship and growing polarization in Congress, campaigns and the political debate (Abramowitz and Saunders 1998; Bartels 2000; Fiorina and Abrams 2008; Hetherington 2001; Levendusky 2009; McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal 2006). This has led to stronger partisan alignment in public opinion: voters' preferences on a large set of political issues have become increasingly consistent with their party identification, especially on issues relating to morality (Bafumi and Shapiro 2009; Baldassarri and Gelman 2008; Carmines and Wagner 2006; Legee, Wald, Krueger, and Mueller 2002). Whereas in 1972 voters' positions on topics such as abortion or gay rights were not correlated with their party identification, by the turn of the century knowing whether a respondent was pro-choice or pro-life increased the capacity to correctly predict his partisan allegiance by 20%. A widely accepted argument in the literature on partisan alignment is that party polarization has made it *easier* for voters to identify with a party because parties have become more distinguishable on a broad set of issues (Hetherington 2001; Levendusky 2009). Portrayals of the American electorate as engaged in a polarizing cultural war have helped fuel this image (Bishop 2008; Hunter 1991; Shogan 2002; and see Williams (1997) for a critical overview).

This and other similar arguments, implicitly assume that voters understand the political debate through a conventional opposition between liberal and conservative positions across a spectrum of political issues. Namely, individuals who are liberal on economic issues, are also expected to be liberal on civil rights and moral issues, and vice-versa. Yet analyses of public opinion consistently find that while the mainstream political discourse has become more polarized in recent years, there is no evidence for increased constraint between moral, economic and civil rights opinions in the American public at large (Baldassarri and Gelman 2008; Davis and Robinson 1996; DiMaggio, Evans and Bryson 1996; Evans 2003). Indeed, there are reasons to believe that parties' growing division in their stances on moral, economic, and civil rights issues have also made it *more difficult* for certain Americans to identify wholeheartedly with either the Republican or Democratic party. Within the dominant political framework, for example, how can a low-income, highly religious African-

American voter reconcile liberal tendencies on economic redistribution and civil rights with moral conservatism? Similarly, will a wealthy, non-religious voter identify with the Republican party for its economic policies, or with the Democratic party's moral progressivism? In fact pundits and academics alike have been debating whether the growing salience of moral 'values' in US politics has pushed working-class Americans to embrace moral conservatism at the expense of their economic interests and into the bosom of the Republican Party, and whether a rising new political culture has induced the younger, and more educated among the Democrats to distance themselves from traditional economic liberalism in favor of a mild form of fiscal conservatism and strong progressive positions on moral issues (Bartels 2008; Clark and Hoffmann-Martino 1998; Evans 2000; Frank 2004; Fischer and Mattson 2009; Hout, Brooks and Manza 1995).

Rather than assuming that American voters necessarily understand politics exclusively in terms of the liberal-conservative divide, we explore the possibility that individuals differ qualitatively, and systematically, in the ways in which they structure their political preferences. We expect that those whose social identities are incongruent with the established political discourse, namely those whose religious orientations and socio-economic status push them in opposite directions vis-a-vis the standard political offer, exhibit alternative interpretations of the political debate. Expanding on Converse (1964), our first contribution is to demonstrate that American public opinion is underpinned by multiple, and competing, belief systems. Our second contribution is to show that people's social identities are implicated in generating these alternative belief systems. Namely, different *sociodemographic profiles* (combinations of relevant sociodemographic characteristics) are correlated with distinct ways of understanding politics.

We analyze data from the American National Election Studies over a period of twenty years between 1984 and 2004. Unlike the majority of previous studies on this topic, we do not focus on variables, by examining opinions on various issues independently. Rather, our analysis focuses on individuals, and explores the various ways in which a wide variety of opinions relate to one another across respondents. We use a graph-based method, Rela-

tional Class Analysis (RCA, Goldberg 2011), in order to look for systematic heterogeneity in public opinion. RCA enables us to divide our respondents into groups, each subscribing to a distinctive political logic according to which certain opinions are correlated with one another. In contrast to previous research, this approach does not require any presuppositions about how political beliefs are organized, or how sociodemographic attributes (e.g., education) or cognitive capabilities (e.g., political knowledge) structure political opinion.

Our analysis demonstrates that the American public is comprised of three groups, each characterized by a different understanding of the political debate: *Ideologues*, whose organization of political attitudes is consistent with the prevalent liberal-conservative polarity; *Alternatives*, who dissociate between moral and economic conservatism by adopting what are normally considered liberal views on moral issues and conservative views on economic issues, or vice versa; and *Agnostics*, whose political beliefs are only weakly associated with one another. We then establish the consistency of this partition over time, and its capacity to distinguish respondents according to their level of political sophistication.

Our contribution extends beyond a simple descriptive account of how people’s political preferences are cognitively organized: we show that individuals’ social identities stand at the heart of the different ways in which they think about politics. For instance, Alternatives are disproportionately comprised of individuals whose combination of religious and class identities result in conflictual political interests; high-earners with weak religious commitments, and low-income believers, are over-represented in this group. These ‘rich but secular’ or ‘poor but religious’ citizens are motivated by combinations of interests that make it particularly difficult to be consistently conservative (or liberal) on both moral and economic issues. Indeed, they deviate from the orthodox understanding of politics, adopting a political logic in which conservatism and liberalism are not entirely at odds.

In the discussion we consider the consequences of our approach for the study of trends in political polarization. We show that while Ideologues have indeed become increasingly aligned with liberal and conservative ideologies both on economic and moral issues, Alternatives have increasingly rejected the notion that economic and moral conservatism (or

liberalism) necessarily entail one another. In the aggregate, both trends offset one another, and only considering the socio-cognitive heterogeneity of American public opinion allows us to discover that the increasing salience of moral issues has induced these two alternative tendencies in public opinion. Similarly, we cast new light on the research on the determinants of political behavior, by showing that the relationship between sociodemographic profile, political attitudes and party identification is mediated by the way in which individuals organize their political preferences. Whereas Ideologues' party identification is congruent with both their moral and economic worldviews, in contrast individuals holding seemingly competing opinions are more likely to be influenced by their conservative tendencies: the co-presence of conservative and liberal preferences is, more often than not, resolved in favor of the Republican Party (irrespective of whether conservatism is on moral or economic issues). These results raise important methodological questions concerning the limitations of traditional analytical techniques, which assume population homogeneity in the organization of political beliefs. Failing to recognize the heterogeneity of political belief systems may lead to biased evaluations of the impact of social identities on political behavior.

Conceptualizing and Measuring Multiple Belief Systems

Studies in public opinion traditionally assume the existence of a single belief system by which interconnected political beliefs are organized: in the U.S., such a political belief system is structured around the distinction between conservative and liberal views. Converse's seminal research on this topic (1964), as well as the work of numerous scholars following him, demonstrates that only a small proportion of the public can appreciate the political debate using abstract categories such as 'liberal' and 'conservative', while the large majority of citizens exhibit limited levels of constraint and coherence in the overall organization of their political beliefs. According to this framework, citizens greatly differ in their levels of political sophistication, thus in their capacity to understand politics using established ideological categories. Most citizens are, in fact, "innocent of ideology" (Converse 1964; see also Campell, Converse, Miller and Stokes 1960; Luskin 1987). This result has been shown

to be very robust and stable over time and across cultures (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1991; Popkin 1991; Popkin and Dimoch 1999, but see Ansolabehere, Rodden, and Snyder (2006) for a different view).

Over the last two decades, however, scholars have begun to question the assumption of homogeneity that underlies these analyses (namely, the presupposition that there exists a single way of making sense of the political debate) in favor of the possibility that “people make up their minds in different ways” (Sniderman et al. 1991, 8). This work starts from the premise that individuals differ qualitatively in the ways they think about politics, and rely on different schemata or cognitive shortcuts (heuristics) to make decisions about political matters (Baldassarri 2005; Lupia, McCubbins and Popkin 2000; Kinder and Sears 1985; Kuklinski 2001; Popkin 1991; Sniderman, Brody and Tetlock 1991; Zaller 1992). Research in political cognition has relaxed the assumption of homogeneity by focusing on different schemata (Lodge, McGraw, Conover, Feldman, and Miller 1991) or levels of political expertise (Fiske and Kinder 1981; Krosnick 1990), modalities of information processing (Lodge and McGraw 1995; Campus 2000), and the use of heuristics (Fiorina 1981; Lupia 1994; Popkin 1991; Kuklinski and Quirk 2000; Sniderman, Brody and Tetlock 1991): some studies also focus on affective elements as complements to cognitive components of political decision-making (i.e., the “likeability heuristic” proposed by Sniderman et al. 1991). The major limitation of this second tradition of research is that respondents are classified *ex ante* into different cognitive groups according to their level of political sophistication (i.e., political expertise, education, or interest in politics), thus making it impossible to test the assumption of heterogeneity, as we do in this paper. In order to overcome the limitations of both approaches, it is necessary to employ a method that *inductively* identifies different belief systems and classifies individuals into groups according to the way in which they organize their political preferences.

Converse defines a *political belief system* as a “configuration of ideas and attitudes in which the elements are bound together by some form of constraint or functional interdependence” (Converse 1964, 207). However, extant empirical analyses, which consider

individual attitudes, summary indices, or dyadic relationships between variables (i.e., correlation coefficients between variables), do not fully capture Converse’s idea of *constraint between attitudes*. By relying on a recently developed graph-based technique, we provide a more satisfying operationalization of the concept of belief system, while allowing for the identification of alternative ways of organizing political preferences.

Imagine a multidimensional ‘belief space’ in which each dimension measures opinion on one political issue. Individuals’ positions in this space correspond to their political preferences. Constraint refers to the extent to which positions on various issues are bound together, thus leaving certain areas of the space largely unoccupied (Martin 2002). In this perspective, a belief system does not prescribe the adoption of certain opinions; rather it defines which opinions go with one another. People may frame their understanding of politics in similar terms, even if they take different substantive positions. Conservative and liberal pundits such as Rush Limbaugh or Jon Stewart, for example, subscribe to very similar logics of conceptualizing the political debate in the U.S., despite their vehement disagreements. To have a shared understanding does not imply having identical attitudes or behaviors, but rather being in agreement on the structures of relevance and opposition that make actions and symbols meaningful. Empirically, this means focusing on the *relationships* between political preferences, thus on political *belief networks*,¹ rather than examining preferences discretely (Goldberg 2011; DiMaggio 1997; 2010).

Despite the fact that most Americans exhibit limited levels of constraint in their political opinions (DiMaggio et al. 1996; Baldassarri and Gelman 2008), established public discourse makes little room for configurations of opinion that depart from the liberal-conservative rationale, and scholars tend to consider those who diverge from the mainstream less sophisticated in their ability to reason politically (Converse 1964). Yet it is important to make an analytical distinction between divergences that are the result of weak opinion constraint and those that present an alternative, internally coherent, belief system. Consider a group of hypothetical respondents asked about their opinions on three issues: affirmative

¹A belief system is here conceived as a network of interconnected beliefs.

action, gay rights and health care reform. We would expect those subscribing to a liberal ideology to express positive attitudes on all three issues, and those defining themselves as conservative to express negative attitudes. Figure 1 plots these respondents on a stylized belief space. Respondents plotted in red, and marked with a plus sign, seem to follow the conventional liberal-conservative logic: they either support or oppose (to varying degrees) all three issues (i.e., subject D). Those plotted in blue, and marked by a dot (i.e., subjects A, B, and C), deviate from this pattern: their position on gay rights is opposed to their positions on the two other issues. Examined individually, these deviations might seem like misunderstandings of what the political debate is about. Yet taken together, these supposedly unsophisticated individuals exhibit a coherent pattern of political attitudes; their organization of preferences constitutes an alternative to the dominant belief system.²

Figure 1 about here.

Our expectation is that not all respondents who depart from the liberal-conservative belief system are misinformed about politics. Rather, we argue that when such heterogeneity is systematic – when it is consistent within groups of respondents – it can be understood as evidence of multiple belief systems. To explore this possibility, we use Relational Class Analysis (RCA, Goldberg 2011). RCA divides a sample of respondents into groups that are undergirded by distinctive belief networks, in other words, that exhibit distinctive patterns of relationships between beliefs. Members of the same group do not necessarily hold the same opinions, however. For example, respondents A and B in Figure 1 express opposing opinions on all three issues. Nevertheless, they both exhibit the same pattern of interdependences between opinions, suggesting that they organize their beliefs using the same rationale, even if deployed in opposite directions. RCA, by examining patterns of responses in the aggregate, distinguishes between different groups of respondents that exhibit distinctive patterns of opinions, such as the two groups depicted in Figure 1.

In technical terms, RCA constructs a proximity matrix between all pairs of respondents.

²Our goal is to identify alternative political logics that are systematic, not to capture individual idiosyncrasies. We identify political *Weltanschauungs* that are shared within different social groups and shaped by the political offer and macro-institutional arrangements (Baldassarri and Schadee 2006; Lupia, McCubbins and Popkin 2000; Kuklinski 2001).

The value of each cell in the matrix corresponds to the degree of *relationality* between the given pair of respondents. Relationality captures similarity in the organization of political preferences by measuring the aggregate difference between all pairs of the two respondents' individual opinions.³

Like correlation, relationality is bounded by -1 and +1. Values close to either extreme indicate that the patterns of responses of the two individuals are strongly similar, either in the same (such as respondents A and C in Figure 1) or opposing (respondents A and B) directions. Values in between these extremes indicate that the two respondents (such as A and D) exhibit different patterns, and therefore subscribe to different belief systems. RCA transforms the matrix by retaining only those cells that are close to either extreme, and taking their absolute value. The resulting matrix represents a sparse network in which ties connect individuals who share similar *patterns* of beliefs, although not necessarily similar beliefs. RCA then uses a spectral algorithm in order to partition the network into groups that maximize within-group relationality (cfr. Goldberg 2011). Each group thus corresponds to a different and distinctive belief system.⁴

We argue that accounting for heterogeneity in the organization of political beliefs re-

³Formally, relationality R_{ij} between observations i and j in dataset X of N observations and K variables is defined as follows:

$$R_{ij} = \frac{2}{K(K-1)} \sum_{k=l}^{K-1} \sum_{l=k+1}^K (\lambda_{ij}^{kl} * \sigma_{ij}^{kl}) \quad (1)$$

where:

$$\sigma_{ij}^{kl} = 1 - \left| |\Delta X_i^{kl}| - |\Delta X_j^{kl}| \right| \quad (2)$$

is the relational similarity for the variable pair k, l between observations i and j ,

$$\Delta X_i^{kl} = X_i^k - X_i^l \quad (3)$$

is the distance between the values of variables k and l for observation i , and

$$\lambda_{ij}^{kl} = \begin{cases} 1 & \Delta X_i^{kl} * \Delta X_j^{kl} \geq 0 \\ -1 & \Delta X_i^{kl} * \Delta X_j^{kl} < 0 \end{cases} \quad (4)$$

is a binary coefficient that determines the sign of the relational similarity: λ_{ij}^{kl} is positive if ΔX^{kl} has the same sign for observations i and j , and is negative otherwise.

⁴RCA is particularly designed to detect heterogeneity in response patterns in ordinal attitudinal data. Though similar to correlation, relationality outperforms correlation for this purpose because it is less sensitive to outliers and therefore does not overweight responses by opinionated respondents. See Goldberg (2011) for a more detailed discussion.

quires addressing three methodological limitations endemic to analytical strategies commonly used in studies of public opinion and political cognition. First, as the underlying logic of a political belief system inheres in the relationships between political opinions, *preferences must be examined in relation to one another, not independently*. Second, because these relationships vary across groups of individuals, *we must avoid a priori assumptions about how people organize their political belief systems*. Otherwise, we risk privileging dominant understandings of the political debate and neglecting others. Finally, *the relationship between sociodemographic variables and political attitudes can vary across political belief systems*. Decomposing the population into predetermined sociodemographically homogenous groups may actually mask the predictive effects of these variables.

Our analytical strategy is particularly suited for detecting individual heterogeneity in the composition of political preferences while overcoming these limitations. It both inductively identifies the organization of coexisting political belief systems, and assigns respondents to the resulting groups, without relying on assumptions about how issues or individuals are interrelated. Other existing methods that explore underlying latent variables, such as factor analysis or latent class analysis, either look at the respondents in the aggregate to group variables together (as is the case with factor analysis), or look for groups of individuals who provided substantively similar responses, while overlooking the relationships between these responses. Neither technique examines intra-variable and intra-respondent variability simultaneously as RCA does.

Data and Results

We apply RCA to data from the American National Election Studies and replicate the analysis for all years available for the period 1984-2004.⁵ ANES includes a large number of attitudinal questions on political issues, ranging from state economic intervention and

⁵Unfortunately, substantial changes in the survey instrument made it impossible to replicate the analysis for 2008. Moreover, years 1990, 1998, and 2002 had too many missing answers to be included. See supporting materials for a detailed description of the data included in the analysis.

spending to civil rights, morality, and foreign policy.⁶ We classified attitudinal questions into four different issue domains: Economic; Civil Rights; Morality; and Security/Foreign Policy. Examples of Economic issues are government involvement in the provision of health insurance and jobs, and federal spending on the poor, welfare, and food stamps. Civil Rights issues concern the treatment of African Americans and other minorities, as well as opinions on affirmative action and equality of opportunities and chances. Moral issues include abortion, gay rights, women’s role in society, traditional values, and new lifestyles. Finally, Security and Foreign Policy issues (hereafter referred to as Foreign Policy issues) comprise, among others, international cooperation, federal spending on defense, the space program and international aid. For a detailed account of all the variables used in the analysis see Supporting Information 1 (SI1).

Analysis I: Ideologues, Alternatives, and Agnostics

We begin by closely examining responses from 2004. Our application of RCA to the data resulted in a partition of respondents into three groups of comparable sizes (that include 33%, 40%, and 27% of the population, respectively). For each group, we represent the belief network by looking at the correlations between political preferences. The strength and directionality of the correlation coefficients are visually represented in Figure 2. In the right column we show this information in matrix form; political issues are grouped by issue domain. In the left column we use network visualizations to better reveal the overall structures of the three political belief systems: each node corresponds to a political attitude (nodes are color-coded by issue domain), and we draw edges connecting political attitudes when correlation coefficients are statistically significant (at $\alpha = 0.05$). Solid lines represent positive correlations, and dashed lines negative correlations. Line shades and widths are proportional to the strength of the correlation.⁷

⁶We considered all the attitude questions that were asked at least three times and received a sufficient number of responses (cfr. Baldassarri and Gelman 2008 for a discussion of temporal comparability problems).

⁷All the diagrams are standardized such that the widths and shades of all the edges/cells on the graphs/matrices correspond to the exact same levels. Networks are spatially drawn using the Furchtman-Reingold algorithm so that distances between nodes correspond to the edge weights connecting them. Otherwise, the spatial position of each node is insignificant.

Figure 2 about here.

Members of the first group exhibit a densely interconnected belief network. Following Converse, we call them *Ideologues*. Ideologues organize their political attitudes according to the liberal-conservative ideological continuum and show very high levels of constraint among issues across all four issue domains. Conversely, members of the second group – the *Alternatives* – do not fully adopt the liberal-conservative framework. Their position on economic (yellow nodes) and civil rights issues (green nodes) is dissociated from their preferences on moral issues (red nodes). As the negative correlations suggest, in 2004, Alternatives tend to be morally conservative and socially liberal, or vice versa (i.e., a member of this group who is pro-choice is likely to oppose economic redistribution and the promotion of civil rights). Finally, members of the third group exhibit weak associations among political beliefs: their network is relatively sparse. Unlike in the two other groups, correlations within issue domains in this group are sporadic and weak; no coherent pattern of belief organization is readily apparent. It seems that members of this group are, generally, not as politically consistent as their peers are. For lack of a better term, we characterize them as *Agnostics* for the remainder of the analysis. Further analyses, which are not reported, provide suggestive evidence that this group is characterized by a subtle decoupling between attitudes specifically relating to African-Americans, and those relating to economic and civic inequality. Members of this group are systematically more conservative than their peers on issues explicitly pertaining to race. We suspect that these individuals’ thinking about politics is, perhaps unconsciously, shaped by racial intolerance, but we do not pursue this line of investigation any further in the present paper. The remainder of this analysis mostly focuses on the other two, more clearly structured, groups.

A political belief system is a fundamental and durable component of the political landscape, which, barring unusual exceptions, remains stable in the face of campaigns and other political events. While at any given moment in time the political discourse tends to concentrate on a few salient issues and neglect others, the overall organization of beliefs is the “shared grammar” that guarantees continuity over time. Thus, if our findings describe

Americans' belief systems, as we argue, they should be temporally consistent. We applied RCA over a period of twenty years and found staggering similarities in the results. For all years but one, the RCA algorithm detected three groups, which clearly exhibited Ideologue, Alternative and Agnostic patterns. RCA produced a partition into four groups only for data from 1996, and merging the additional group with one of the three other groups only insignificantly decreased within-group relationality. This allowed us to maintain a tripartite division throughout the twenty-year period. For a more detailed description of how the RCA procedure was implemented, consult SI2.

The belief structure of each of the three groups remained surprisingly stable over time. Since different questions were asked in different survey years, we cannot compare correlations between specific pairs of questions over time. Nevertheless, we are able to examine the overall correlation structure between the four issue domains. These are reported in Figure 3. Each of the matrices in this figure summarizes the correlations between pairs of issue domains in one survey year, for one of the three groups. Each matrix cell represents the average weighted correlation between all pairs of variables in the two issue domains the cell corresponds to (see SI4 for more details). For instance, the top cell in each matrix reports the intensity and sign of the average weighted correlation between economic and civil rights issues: in the Ideologue group in 2004, the average correlation between pairs of economic and civil rights variables was 0.43. Over the entire period, the Ideologue group is characterized by extremely high correlation coefficients for all issue domain pairs.

The Alternative group presents a substantial dissociation between economic and civil rights issues, on the one hand, and moral issues, on the other. With the exception of the period 1992-1996, in all years the relationship between moral and economic or civil rights issues is insignificant or even negative, as shown previously for 2004. Further visual inspections of the belief networks, as well as a factorial analysis, confirm the tendency among Alternatives to decouple their preferences on moral issues from their opinion on other issues. Throughout the period under study, and particularly in 1994 and 1996, opinions on moral issues are far apart from those on economic and civil rights issues, even when

correlations between them are significantly positive. (Belief networks graphs are available from the authors, while results from factor analysis are reported in SI3). Finally, in all years, the Agnostic group is a pale version of the Ideologue groups showing comparatively weak positive, or insignificant, correlations between issue domains.

Figure 3 about here.

A deeper examination of group members' political sophistication provides additional support for the validity of our partition. Converse's study and later work in this tradition have repeatedly demonstrated that the consistency and constraint of political beliefs are related to one's level of political sophistication: individuals with high levels of education, interest in politics, and political knowledge show, on average, greater levels of political coherence. Scholars who follow the cognitive heuristics approach use this as a starting point for analyses that classify individuals by their levels of education or political knowledge. In line with both of these scholarly traditions, we find that our partition effectively captures inter-group differences in levels of political sophistication.

Figure 4 about here.

The plots in Figure 4 report group means for four variables that are commonly used as measures of political sophistication: education, political interest, political activism, and political discussion. Circles indicate that the group mean is significantly different from the mean of those not in the group. For all four measures, Ideologues and Agnostics are at opposite ends of the sophistication spectrum: Ideologues consistently have higher levels of education, political interest, activism and discussion than Agnostics, and Alternatives occupy a position in between these two extremes. This result is consistent over time. Unlike previous studies that presuppose that political sophistication relates to belief constraint, our partitioning strategy makes no such a priori assumption, thus providing a test of this relationship. While other scholars assume differences based on political sophistication, we provide a proof for this assumption.

Analysis II: The Sociodemographic roots of Belief Networks

However, political heterogeneity should not be conceived as the mere by-product of cognitive differences in levels of political sophistication. In this section we show that the ways people organize their thinking about politics is rooted in their socio-demographic profiles. Indeed, scholars have long examined how different social attributes such as class, religion and racial identity are related to political preferences and behaviors. Yet they have mostly limited their analyses to relationships between single preferences and sociodemographic characteristics, without considering relationships among political attitudes. Though informative, this strategy may be misleading: if different people organize their political beliefs in different ways, the relationship between sociodemographic variables and political beliefs might vary across cognitive frameworks.

Consider again the two hypothetical groups depicted in Figure 1: something about who these people are might make them think about politics in systematically different ways. Suppose subject B is a working-class, Kansan male of the kind Frank (2004) writes about. His modest means might make him likely to support health care reform, while his small-town roots might steer him toward moral conservatism. His mirror image, subject A, might be a high-earning urban cosmopolitan who holds progressive opinions about gay rights, but who nevertheless vehemently opposes health reform and its potential detrimental effects on his income. For members of this group like A and B, we might therefore find income to be positively associated with moral liberalism. In another group, however, where subject D's support for health reform is associated with moral and racial liberalism, we might expect income to be negatively related to moral liberalism. In other words, within each ideational group, social attributes might have different relationships with particular opinions. This is precisely what we demonstrate next by examining the sociodemographic organization of the belief space.

Figure 5 about here.

Figure 5 visualizes the belief space along its economic and moral dimensions. Similar results are obtained considering civil rights instead of the economic dimension; the two

dimensions can be considered interchangeable for this part of the analysis. Each panel examines how one sociodemographic attribute relates to positions in this two-dimensional space, in which each of the three RCA groups is represented by a color-coded line. The coordinates that mark the two extremes of each line correspond to the mean correlation between the sociodemographic attribute in question and the variables that make up the relevant opinion category (economic or moral), averaged over the twenty-year period under study. The plus and minus signs represent high and low sociodemographic values, respectively. The lines connecting these coordinates thus illustrate the direction and magnitude of the relationship between the sociodemographic variable and opinions on economic and moral issues. For example, the upper left diagram plots the location in the belief space of the highest and lowest income categories in each of the RCA groups. In the Ideologue group, high income is, on average, positively correlated both with economic and moral conservatism, as indicated by the blue line. In the Alternative group, high income is also positively correlated with economic conservatism, but is negatively correlated with moral conservatism. In the Agnostic group, high income is correlated only with economic conservatism, while there is no relationship with opinions on morality. High earners tend to be economically conservative in all groups, but they have opposing views on moral issues: while high-income Ideologues are also morally conservative, their Alternative peers tend to be morally liberal.

The diagrams also illustrate that the more professional and more educated tend to be morally liberal in both the Ideologue and Alternative groups, confirming work by Brooks and Manza (1997). However, it is only amongst the Alternatives that these two attributes are also strongly associated with economic conservatism. Similarly, religious participation and age are strongly associated with moral conservatism in both groups, but only in the Ideologue group are they associated with economic conservatism. (As one would expect, religiosity has a strong correlation with moral conservatism in all three groups.) Surprisingly, however, living in the south accounts for almost no variability in opinions on either dimension in either group. Finally, African-Americans tend to be economically liberal in

both the Ideologue and Alternative groups. While they tend to be slightly morally liberal in the Ideologue group, they lean toward moral conservatism in the Alternative group.

On the whole, the above sociodemographic decomposition of the belief space suggests that the relationship between social positions and political preferences is contingent on the overall organization of beliefs. In particular, class (as measured by income) and religious participation play different roles in the Ideologue and Alternative groups: whereas in the former both are associated with moral and economic conservatism, in the latter their associations are oppositional. High-income individuals who subscribe to the Alternative belief system are, like their Ideological peers, economically conservative, but unlike them are morally liberal; similarly, religious Alternatives are morally conservative like their Ideologue peers, but differ by being economically moderate, on average.

Figure 6 about here.

These results suggest that the interplay between income and religiosity has a bearing on how people understand politics. To investigate this possibility, we modeled the odds ratio of being assigned to the Ideologue group (versus being assigned to the Alternative group) as a function of an interaction between income and religious participation. Figure 6 plots the odds ratio of being assigned to the Ideologue group, compared to being assigned to the Alternative group, as a function of an interaction between income and religious participation, as modeled by a multinomial logistic regression (cfr. caption for further details). We find that high-income individuals who often attend religious services are more than twice as likely to be Ideologues as their low-income counterparts. High-income individuals who never attend religious services, on the other hand, are 10% less likely to be Ideologues than their low income counterparts. The slope of the line changes from positive to negative as a function of religious attendance. In other words, high-income and religious or working-class and non-religious individuals are more likely to align with the liberal-conservative ideology. In contrast, non-religious high-earners and religious low-earners orient toward the Alternative group. Our interpretation of these results is that the latter two groups occupy social positions that push them to take ideological stances that are seemingly contradic-

tory. To reconcile this tension they deviate from the orthodox view (the liberal-conservative framework) to adopt an alternative way of understanding politics.

Figure 7 about here.

The organization of political belief systems is thus related in a non-trivial way to individuals' sociodemographic profiles. This raises the question of how citizens define their partisan allegiances in the presence of competing interests and political views. The political debate, at least as represented in the media, is primarily organized around a liberal-conservative framework. How do Alternatives strike a balance among their political preferences? Do their economic worldviews trump their opinions about morality when ultimately deciding on whom to vote for?

We modeled party self-identification and found that when Alternatives' conservatism on the moral dimension, and even more significantly on the economic dimension, is strong, they tend to disregard their other preferences and identify with the Republican Party. In Figure 7.A we plot Ideologues' (blue line) and Alternatives' (red line) party self-identification as a function of the difference between their degree of conservatism on economic and moral issues, using OLS regression and controlling for additional relevant sociodemographic characteristics (see caption and SI5 for further details). The independent variable, the economic-moral delta, corresponds to the difference between respondents' mean level of economic conservatism and their mean level of moral conservatism. Alternative respondents who are strongly economically conservative but morally moderate or liberal, as well as those who are strongly morally conservative but economically moderate or liberal, are significantly more likely to identify as Republicans than those whose moral and economic opinions are congruent. When faced with seemingly competing opinions, Alternatives are more likely to be influenced by their conservative opinions, and identify with the Republican Party. This is not the case in the Ideologue group, however, where the economic-moral delta is insignificantly consequential for party self-identification, and where, conversely, opinion incongruence is related to less support for the Republican Party. In other words, the different relationships between particular political attitudes and party identification that are found

in different groups suggest that the effect of political preferences on voting behavior is mediated by the overall organization of beliefs.

The same can be said for the relationship between sociodemographic characteristics and partisanship. While for Ideologues, self-identification has a curvilinear relationship with education, with both low and high education leading to identification with the Democratic Party, in the Alternative group, identification with the Democratic Party strongly decreases as a function of education (Figure 7.B). Education predicts different voting behaviors depending on individuals' ideological framework: educated Ideologues tend to vote Democratic, but in the Alternative group, the educated lean toward economical conservatism, and are ultimately drawn to the Republican Party, even when controlling for their income and religiosity. Unlike education, as income and religious participation increase, the likelihood of self-identifying as Republican increases in both groups (Figures 7.C and 7.D).

Discussion

We turn now to consider the relevance of our findings for current debates on trends in political polarization and the relative importance of moral issues in shaping partisan identities. Moving beyond the assumption of population homogeneity to consider the socio-cognitive heterogeneity of American public opinion, we were able to cast new light on both debates. In this section, we limit ourselves to stating the major issues at stake, and show how our analytical strategy improves on existent findings.

As we touch on briefly in the introduction, American public opinion has undergone a process of partisan alignment in recent decades, whereby voters' political preferences have become more consistent with their partisan identities. Given this trend, and the growing salience of moral issues in political debates, scholars have been wondering whether an analogous process of alignment between issue domains is also manifest in American public opinion. Namely, has the correlation between opinions on economic and civil rights issues, on the one hand, and moral issues, on the other, increased over time? Traditional analyses of aggregate trends suggest that there is no evidence for such a process in the population

as a whole (DiMaggio et al. 1996; Evans 2003; Davis and Robinson 1996; see also Layman and Carsey 2002). Increased alignment between moral positions and other issue domains is apparent only among individuals with high levels of income, and those who are more educated, politically active, and interested in politics (Baldassarri and Gelman 2008).

However, reexamining these data through the lens of our RCA-based partition leads to somewhat different conclusions. We find significant evidence for alignment between moral issues and opinions on economics and civil rights issues, but this has occurred exclusively within the Ideologue group. Simultaneously, particularly during the last ten years, Alternatives have exhibited a process of decoupling between moral issues on the one hand, and economic and civil rights issues on the other.

Figure 8 about here.

Figure 8 displays trends in the level of constraint between issue domains by RCA group. Each plot reports the average correlation between all pairs of issues in two given domains over the twenty-year period. In the Ideologue group, the average correlation between civil rights and moral issues more than doubled in two decades from less than 0.2 in 1984 to more than 0.4 in 2004. A similar trend is visible for the relationship between economic and moral issues. In contrast, in the Alternative group the average correlation between these issues remained insignificant during nearly all of this period. Moreover, by 2004 moral issues became significantly negatively correlated with both other issue domains in this group, such that those expressing conservative opinions on economic or civil rights issues tended to express liberal opinions on moral issues, and vice versa.

It appears that the growing salience of moral issues resulted in two opposing reactions in the American population: whereas Ideologues have increasingly integrated moral issues into their liberal-conservative framework, Alternatives' relative dissociation between moral and other political views gradually evolved into an antonimical view of moral and economic conservatism (or liberalism), as they are conventionally construed in the dominant political discourse. This finding explains why studies of public opinion have found little evidence for alignment between moral and other issues, even as political discourse has become increas-

ingly polarized on themes such as abortion and gay rights. By overlooking socio-cognitive heterogeneity in the population, scholars were not able to identify these two mutually offsetting trends, focusing instead on a misleading image produced by examining both in the aggregate.

Acknowledging heterogeneity in belief systems, and its root in people's socio-demographic profiles, has consequences not only for research on political attitudes, but also for analyses of the determinants of partisan identification and voting behavior. In recent years, many lay observers have interpreted the impassioned tones of partisan debates on moral issues as a sign of a deepening "cultural war" that has caused basic changes in American political behavior (Hunter 1991; Shogan 2002; Bishop 2008; and see Williams (1997) for a critical overview). Indeed some have argued that the working-class has increasingly adopted cultural conservatism, to the neglect of its economic interests, and that this shift of balance accounts for the Republican Party's recent electoral success (Frank 2004). In response, scholarly work has repeatedly demonstrated that social class (measured either as income, education, or occupational status) remains a significant determinant of voting behavior (Evans 2000; Fischer and Mattson 2009; Hout, Brooks and Manza 1995; McVeigh and Sobolewski 2007), even finding evidence for a decline in the size of the religious cleavage (Wuthnow 1988; Manza and Brooks 1997). Moreover, economic issues continue to predominate over moral issues in defining partisan allegiances (Ansolabehere, Rodden, and Snyder 2006), especially among low-income voters (Bartels 2008). However, both camps have based their accounts on the assumption that class, religiosity, education, and other socio-demographic attributes, affect partisan identification in the same way for all Americans. Yet they do not take into consideration how belief systems mediate this relationship and therefore the possibility that these effects are not homogenous across the population (with the partial exception of Clark and Hoffmann-Martinot (1998), Fischer and Hout (2006), and McVeigh and Sobolewski (2007)).

In contrast, the results of our analysis, which are reported in the previous section (Figures 6 and 7), complicate this debates by suggesting that political partisanship (and voting

behavior) cannot be explained in terms of whether or not the working class has ‘abandoned’ the Democratic Party or whether ‘values trump economics’. The story that emerges from this analysis cannot be reduced to such one-dimensional sweeping statements. Working-class religious Americans are indeed more likely to support the Republican Party, but so are high-earning, educated, non-religious Americans. Education predicts different partisan orientations in the Ideologue and Alternative group. Moreover, among the Alternatives, economic conservatism trumps moral liberalism, but moral conservatism similarly trumps economic liberalism, both in favor of the Republican Party. In more general terms, whether economic or moral preferences will prevail, depends on the type of belief system people have adopted. Examining each of these components in isolation, while assuming homogeneity in their aggregate effects, draws an incomplete, and potentially misleading, picture about how Americans determine their political allegiances.

Figure 9 about here.

Our general claim is that the relationship between sociodemographic attributes – particularly income, religious participation and education – and partisanship is mediated by divergent understandings of the political debate. Similarly, the relationship between political attitudes – particularly economic and moral preferences – and partisanship depends on the way in which these attitudes are internally organized and therefore associated with one another. However, one might claim that these findings are mere by-products of our classification of respondents into groups. To preempt to this criticism, we conclude our analysis by showing that the same results can be obtained conducting an ordinary least squares regression on the entire sample without making any distinctions between respondents based on how their political opinions are structured. The dependent variable in this model is a 7-point party identification scale, and the independent variables include a three-way interaction between religious participation, income and education, a quadratic term for the interaction between income and religious participation,⁸ as well as an economic-moral delta (see caption and SI5). Even without a partition of respondents into groups, we show

⁸This capture the fact that the likelihood of being assigned to the Ideologue group is U-shaped – it increases either with low income and low religiosity or with high income and high religiosity (Figure 6).

that the effect of education on party identification varies as a function of the combination of income and religiosity. Each line in Figure 9 corresponds to a fixed value of the interaction between religious participation and income, ranging from minimum (light gray) to maximum (black). The slope of this function changes direction and magnitude as the interaction term changes; it is plotted in inset A. For those on either extreme of this range – namely the high-earning religious and low-earning non-religious – education increases identification with the Democratic Party. For those in between, that is, the low-earning religious or the high-earning non-religious, who tend to adopt an alternative belief system, education increases support for the Republican Party. Inset B plots self-identification with the Republican Party as a function of the economic-moral delta. In the population as a whole, we find that as respondents express opposing opinions on economic and moral issues – and controlling for all other socio-demographics – their likelihood of identifying with the Republican Party increases.

Conclusions

“Belief systems have never surrendered easily to empirical study and quantification” (Converse 1964, 206). The opening line of Philip Converse’s influential study succinctly captures the gap between theories of public opinion and how they are borne out in empirical studies. Indeed, the study of belief systems, as well as more recent research on political sophistication and heterogeneity, developed amid discussions concerning analysis and measurement. Our research contributes to the study of public opinion by overcoming a few important analytical limitations that previous research suffers from, thus better fulfilling its theoretical objectives.

Though a belief system is characterized by a “functional interdependence” between attitudes and ideas (Converse 1964, 207), empirical analyses of public opinion are usually based on models that assume independence among individual attitudes or summary indices, while the analysis of issue constraint is mostly limited to dyadic interdependence, measured with correlation coefficients. Using novel graph-based analysis techniques, we capture the inter-

connected nature of political beliefs and fully map their interdependencies. Our analytical strategy inductively identifies collective belief networks, without making any assumptions about how beliefs relate to one another. It also allows the detection of multiple and competing belief systems, thus providing a test for the hypothesis of political heterogeneity. While previous studies of political cognition assume the existence of a single political belief system or, alternatively, assume a multiplicity of ways in which people understand politics, we use RCA's inductive analysis to find coexisting political belief systems and assign respondents to these groups without relying on assumptions concerning how issues or individuals are combined.

The substantive payoff has been the identification of three distinctive ways in which American citizens interpret the political debate: Ideologues organize their political attitudes according to the prevalent liberal-conservative polarity; Alternatives dissociate their preferences on moral issues from their economic and civil rights attitudes; and Agnostics exhibit weak associations among political beliefs. These findings, which are consistent throughout the twenty-year period under study, cast new light on previous scholarship: Ideologues and Agnostics conform to Converse's argument that individuals' organization of political beliefs differs according to their level of political sophistication. Nonetheless, the identification of the Alternative group challenges the assumption that there is only one "correct" way of thinking about politics by demonstrating the existence of competing, and equally coherent, ways of organizing political beliefs. This finding strongly supports the political heterogeneity approach, while bringing its social underpinnings to the fore. We demonstrate that the observed heterogeneity of understandings does not merely derive from differences in individuals' levels of political interest, information, or cognitive capabilities. Rather, people with different sociodemographic profiles understand the political debate in systematically different ways. Indeed, Alternatives' deviation from the orthodox political view "makes sense" in that it effectively accommodates their otherwise irreconcilable interests and social identities. Given the predominance of moral and economic issues in political discourse, and their relationships with religious and class identities, it is difficult for those

who are pushed in different ideological directions by their religiosity or economic status to find a comfortable position along the liberal-conservative continuum. Their solution has been to adopt a political worldview that makes room for their seemingly opposing political interests.⁹

The belief system that characterizes Alternatives derives from the tension these individuals face in combining their economic and religious social identities. Of course, there are plenty of other, potentially conflicting identities. Why have some identities crystallized in a shared system of beliefs, while others have not? We speculate this has to do with the growing importance of moral issues in the political discourse in the U.S., and, moreover, the ambiguous and potentially self-contradictory ideological stance that underlies rhetoric emanating from the Republican Party. Our results suggest that when Americans hold seemingly competing opinions, they are more likely to privilege their views which are conventionally seen as conservative, and identify with the Republican Party. We believe that the political offer plays an important role in building the cognitive framework within which people operate. Over the past four decades both neo-liberal and ultra-conservative advocates have found voice in the Republican Party. To political commentators, neo-liberal support for economic deregulation and ultra-conservative support for moral restrictions might appear at odds; nonetheless, these views have found a way to co-exist in the Republican Party, thus making the party more appealing to “ideologically heterodox” voters, and contributing to the crystallization of an alternative belief system.

The existence of multiple belief systems also complicates the relationship between sociodemographic characteristics and voting behavior. Traditional models of political behavior assume (often implicitly) the following causal pattern:

Sociodemographic characteristics → *Political preferences* → *Voting behavior*

⁹From this perspective, Alternatives, as well as Ideologues, can be understood within a “rational voter” framework (Downs 1957). In Downs’ original framework voters and parties are positioned in the same ideological space, and voters maximize their utility by choosing the party that is closer to their political preferences. However, for Alternatives the process of party selection is not straightforward, because the political offer does not fully map onto their position in the belief space.

Such models conceive of sociodemographic attributes and their relationships with political preferences, and consequently partisanship, in “statistical isolation”. Religious commitments, for example, are assumed to increase conservative preferences on issues pertaining to morality, and therefore the likelihood of voting Republican, net of other effects. Our core findings suggest that the relationship between voting and sociodemographic attributes is mediated by one’s belief system, and that education, income and religiosity have different effects on partisanship for different people. Examining these relationships in the aggregate potentially obscures such differences. Moreover, if different belief systems embody different understandings of the relationships between political issues, people who subscribe to different belief systems might have different motivations for their voting decisions.

Our research has shown that the interaction between religiosity and income gives rise to alternative ways of organizing political preferences, that education affects party identification in opposite directions for members of the Ideologue and Alternative groups, and that the co-presence of seemingly opposing conservative and liberal preferences is often resolved in favor of the Republican Party. To our knowledge, these are all novel findings. Nonetheless, one might wonder whether one needs RCA to draw these conclusions. Technically, as the OLS model summarized in Figure 9 demonstrates, the answer is no. Why, then, has no one reached these conclusions before? Clearly, without the insights offered by RCA concerning the structure of preferences, the relationship between political attitudes and sociodemographic profiles, and voters’ biases in favor of conservative views, we would not have come up with such a complex model specification. Moreover, this regression model, which successfully captures the relationship between sociodemographic traits and partisanship, and between issue preferences and partisanship, cannot provide even a hint about how beliefs are organized, and thus cannot help us understand the cognitive framework that people use to make sense of politics in their own lives.

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Figures




Figure 1: Hypothetical Belief Space. Respondents plotted in red and marked with a plus sign (i.e., subject D) organize their preferences according to the liberal-conservative divide on all three issues, while respondents plotted in blue and marked by a dot (i.e., A, B, and C) structure their preferences on an opposition between gay rights and the other two issues. The inset plots the relationship between political preferences for subjects A, B, C, and D.




Figure 2: Belief Networks and Correlation Matrices.




Figure 3: Time Consistency: Correlation Matrices by Group over Time. Each cell represents the average correlation between all pairs of variables in the two issue domains the cell corresponds to. Each matrix corresponds to a particular survey year in one of the three RCA groups. Cell shades correspond to correlation strengths, and the plus and minus signs to the correlation direction.




Figure 4: Group Membership by Various Measures of Political Sophistication. Plots report group average levels of education, political interest, political activism, and political discussion. A circle indicates that the mean is significantly different from the means in the other two groups.




Figure 5: Belief Spaces. Each of the seven diagrams in this figure represents the location of one sociodemographic attribute in a two-dimensional belief space (the economic dimension on the X axis, the moral dimension on the Y axis). For each RCA group we draw a line in this two-dimensional space. The coordinates that define the two extremes of the line correspond to the mean correlation between the sociodemographic attribute in question and the variables that make up either the economic or moral opinion categories, averaged over the twenty-year period. The plus and minus signs represent high and low sociodemographic values respectively. The lines connecting these coordinates outline the direction and magnitude of the relationship between the sociodemographic variable and opinions on economic and moral issues.




Figure 6: Multinomial Logistic Regression for RCA Group Membership: Plot of the interaction between Income and Religious Attendance. This diagram plots the odds ratio of being assigned to the Ideologue group, compared to being assigned to the Alternative group, as a function of an interaction between income and religious participation, as modeled by a multinomial logistic regression. The data are pooled across the twenty year period. The model is described by the following formula:

$$\log\left(\frac{P(RCA)=I}{P(RCA)=A}\right) = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 * income + \alpha_2 * religious + \alpha_3 * (income * religious) + \beta^T X + \epsilon$$

where X represents control variables (sociodemographic and year dummies, see Supporting Materials), and α and β are regression coefficients. Each of the five lines plotted in the diagram corresponds to one of the five religious participation categories. The income variable is categorized by percentile to make it comparable across years.




Figure 7: Party Identification by RCA group. These diagrams plot OLS predictions of party self-identification on a 7-point scale, ranging from strong Democrat to strong Republican, as a function of (A) the difference between one’s degree of conservatism on economic and moral issues, (B) education, (C) income, and (D) religious participation. The economic-moral delta $\Delta EM_i = \bar{E}_i - \bar{M}_i$ which is plotted on the X-axis of panel A, corresponds to the difference between respondent i ’s mean level of economic conservatism, \bar{E}_i , and mean level of moral conservatism, \bar{M}_i , both scaled over a zero-to-one range. A ΔEM value close to 1 corresponds to high economic conservatism and high moral liberalism, whereas a value close to -1 corresponds to the opposite. The data are pooled across the twenty-year period, and fitted using the following model:

$$PartyIdent = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 * \Delta EM + \alpha_2 * \Delta EM^2 + \beta_1^T * R * X + \beta_2^T Z + \epsilon$$

where X represents sociodemographic variables and Z year dummies (see SI), and α and β are regression coefficients. R represents interaction terms that allow effects to vary by RCA group. The lines plotted correspond to the modeled probability of self-identifying as a Republican for the respondent with average control values in each of the two groups. While in the Ideologue group the economic-moral delta has an insignificant ($p(\alpha_1)=0.754$, $p(\alpha_2)=0.395$) effect on party self-identification, in the Alternative group identification as Republican significantly increases ($p(\alpha_1)=0.016$, $p(\alpha_2)=0.038$) as the respondent expresses opposing opinions on economic and moral issues. In other words, controlling for their sociodemographic attributes, Alternative respondents who are either strongly economically conservative but morally moderate or liberal, as well as those who are strongly morally conservative but economically moderate or liberal, are significantly more likely to identify as Republicans, compared to those whose moral and economic opinions are aligned.




Figure 8: Trends in Pair Correlations between Issue Domains by Group. Each figure plots the average correlation between all pairs of issues in two given issue domains over the twenty-year period. The uppermost figure, for example, plots the average correlations between economic and civil rights issues. A circle indicates that the average correlation is statistically different from zero at the $\alpha=0.05$ level.




Figure 9: Party Identification. Analysis on the entire sample. OLS prediction of party identification as a function of a three-way interaction between income, religious participation and education. Data are pooled across the twenty-year period, and fitted using the following model (see Figure 7 caption for a description of the variables):

$$PartyIdent = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 * \Delta EM + \alpha_2 * \Delta EM^2 + \alpha_3 * edu * (inc * relig)^2 + \beta_1^T * R * X + \beta_2^T * Z + \epsilon$$

Each line plots the expected party identification as a function of education, constrained to a fixed level of an interaction term between religious attendance and income. These levels range from low, when income and religious attendance are minimal (light gray), to high, when both religious attendance and income are maximal (black). For example, when both religious attendance and income are minimal, identification as Republican decreases by roughly one point as education increases from minimum to maximum. Inset A plots the slope of the line as a function of change in the interaction term. The dashed blue line corresponds to the median respondent. Inset B plots the predicted degree of party identification as a function of the economic-moral delta, ΔEM .

Supporting Information

SI1. Data

The analysis is based on the American National Election Studies (ANES) cumulative dataset that includes variables from each of the biennial cross-sectional studies conducted between 1948 and 2008. We used a subset of this dataset that includes variables from each of the studies conducted between 1984 and 2004. Public opinion variables that were asked in fewer than three different studies since 1984 were removed from the dataset. Our dataset focuses exclusively on variables that fall under one of our four issue categories: economic, civil rights, morality and foreign policy. Studies conducted before 1984 included too few variables pertaining to moral issues, and were therefore not included. Wording and variable scaling were changed significantly in 2008: as a result, this year was not included in our analysis.

To facilitate a relational class analysis (RCA), all respondents must provide answers for all questions. We therefore list-wise deleted respondents who had missing answers. For years 1990, 1998 and 2002, the list-wise deletion of respondents either removed the entire sample for that year, or retained only a very small number of variables for that year. Consequently, these study years were excluded from the analysis. Since binary variables have no mid-range values and are therefore inappropriate for use in RCA, they were also removed from the dataset. Two additional variables that had high levels of missing data (VCF9043 and VCF0818) were also removed.

This procedure left the 43 variables listed in Table S1, which were used for the relational analysis. Table S2 indicates which variables were available for each year, as well as the number of respondents used in the analysis, by year. The number of variables used in each year ranges from 24 to 40. The median study year included 32 variables. On average, each variable was available in six of the eight years analyzed. Sociodemographic and political sophistication variables, used for multivariate analyses reported in sections 3.2 and 3.3, are reported in Table S3.

SI2. Relational Class Analysis

The RCA analysis was conducted for each year independently; each year used a different subset of variables, as summarized in Table S2. For a detailed description of RCA, its theoretical and methodological assumptions and motivation, and its application, see Goldberg (2010). We provide a short summary of RCA in order to explain how we applied it to the

ANES data. The RCA procedure is based on the following three-stage sequence:

1. Relationality is calculated for all pairs of respondents, using the formula described in section 2. This results in a proximity matrix with cell values ranging from -1 to +1.
2. The statistical significance of each cell value is determined using a bootstrapping procedure that relies on 10,000 re-samples. Cell values are normalized by the sample mean and standard deviation. Insignificant cell values (for $\alpha = 0.05$) are set to zero, resulting in a sparse network.
3. A spectral algorithm using eigenvalues is used to partition the network into discrete groups. The spectral algorithm maximizes modularity, which is the difference between observed and random within-group edge weights (assuming the distribution of node degrees remains fixed). See Newman and Girvan (2004) for a discussion on modularity, and Newman (2006) for a detailed description of the spectral algorithm.

Applying RCA to each year's subset of observations independently results in a partition of each subset into discrete groups of respondents. The partitioning algorithm used by RCA is based on an iterative procedure that continues until modularity cannot be maximized: each group is recursively partitioned in two until such a partition no longer increases modularity (Newman 2006). However, not every maximization step produces a meaningful partition. When the increase in modularity is negligible, the partition creates two marginally different groups. Consequently, we ran the partitioning algorithm so that is stopped if the additional contribution to modularity was smaller than 1%. This resulted in a partition of seven of the eight yearly subsets into three groups. One subset, for the year 1996, was partitioned into four groups. In order to maintain consistency across all years, we decided to enforce a three-group partition in this subset by reversing the final step of the algorithm. This step only contributed 6.53% to modularity, and therefore had an insignificant impact on the results.

We then examined the correlation structure between opinion variables in each group produced by RCA in order to decide which of the three groups in each year would be labeled as Ideologue, Alternative and Agnostic. This turned out to be a trivial task, as each group is clearly characterized by an unambiguous pattern of relationships between variables that corresponding to one of these three groups.

SI3. Factor Analysis

The yearly correlations between issue domains reported in Figures 3 and 5 demonstrate that for members of the Alternative group, opinions on moral issues are generally disassociated with opinions on economic issues and civil rights. The exceptions are the years 1992 to 1996, in which the average correlations between opinions on morality, on the one hand, and economic and/or civil rights issues on the other, are significantly positive. The correlations are nevertheless significantly weaker than those in the Ideologue group, as Figure S1 illustrates.

In order to further investigate the relationships between the four issue domains in the three groups we conducted factor analyses for each year and group independently. The results of these analyses are reported in Figure S2. Each panel reports the results of a factor analysis applied to the responses of members of one of the three groups in a given study year. Each circle represents one issue domain. The coordinates of each circle correspond to the average factor loading for the first two factors for variables comprising that issue domain. The results clearly demonstrate that in the Alternative group’s opinions on morality and economics are consistently farthest apart, specifically in years 1992 to 1996, whereas in the Ideologue group they are closer together. In most years, for at least one of the two factors the average loading for moral opinions has a different sign than that for economic opinions.

SI4. Correlation Analyses

Figures 3 and 5 report correlations between issue domains for each year. Each cell reports the average weighted correlation between all pairs of issues in the given two domains. Formally:

$$\bar{\rho}(A, B) = \frac{1}{|A||B|} \sum_{\forall a \in A, b \in B} \tilde{\rho}(a, b) \quad (5)$$

where A and B are sets of variables, each for a different issue domain, and $\tilde{\rho}$ is the weighted Pearson correlation coefficient for two variables. We use centrality as our weighting coefficient. Centrality corresponds to the eigenvectors produced by the network partitioning algorithm used by RCA. Intuitively, the centrality of each observation measures the extent to which this observation is central to the group it was assigned to. We get very similar results if no weighting is used. We determine the significance of $\bar{\rho}$ using a simple t-test.

SI5. General Linear Models

Section 3.3 reports three different models, which include a combination of public opinion and sociodemographic/sophistication variables. In this section we provide a detailed description of each of the models. List-wise deletion was used to treat missing data in all models.

Figure 7 reports the results of a multinomial logit model, in which the dependent variable is a nominal variable that corresponds to RCA group assignment. Data are pooled across all years. Figure 7 reports the odds ratio of being assigned to the Ideologue group, compared to being assigned to the Alternative group. The odds ratio is plotted as a function of an interaction between religious participation and income. Sociodemographic control variables used are age, gender, race, southern and professional status (see Table S3). Because we want to examine the extent to which sociodemographic variables predict group membership above and beyond political sophistication, we include political interest and political activism as control variables (political discussion was not asked in 1988 and was therefore omitted). Dummy variables are included to account for year effects. Results are reported in Table S4.

Figure 8 reports results of an OLS model in which the dependent variable is a 7-point party identification scale. Data are pooled over all years. To account for different effects in each RCA group, all of the independent variables (excluding year dummies) were interacted with a group membership dummy for each of the three RCA groups. Independent variables include all sociodemographic variables. Also included is a ΔEM variable, which measures the difference between the average position on economic and moral issues (see Figure 8 caption for a formal definition). Quadratic terms are used for ΔEM and education. Results are reported in Table S5.

Figure 9 reports results of an OLS model in which the dependent variable is a 7-point party identification scale. Data are pooled over all years. Independent variables include a three-way interaction between income, religious participation and education. The interaction between income and religious participation is modeled with a quadratic term. Results are reported in Table S6.

	Label	Wording	Range	Scaling
Economics	health.ins	Support for government or private health insurance	7	1 - government, 7 - private
	jobs.guar7	Support for government guarantee jobs and income	7	1 - guarantee, 7 - not guar.
	gov.services	Should government reduce or increase spending	7	1 - increase, 7 - reduce
	FS.poor	Should federal spending on the poor	3	1 - increase, 3 - decrease
	FS.childcare	Should federal spending on childcare	3	1 - increase, 3 - decrease
	FS.crime	Should federal spending on crime	3	1 - increase, 3 - decrease
	FS.aids	Should federal spending on AIDS	3	1 - increase, 3 - decrease
	FS.publicschools	Should federal spending on public schools	3	1 - increase, 3 - decrease
	FS.aidcollege	Should federal spending on college aid	3	1 - increase, 3 - decrease
	FS.homeless	Should federal spending on homeless	3	1 - increase, 3 - decrease
	FS.welfare	Should federal spending on welfare	3	1 - increase, 3 - decrease
	FS.food.stamps	Should federal spending on food stamps	3	1 - increase, 3 - decrease
	FS.envir	Should federal spending on the environment	3	1 - increase, 3 - decrease
	FS.soc.sec	Should federal spending on social security	3	1 - increase, 3 - decrease
FS.assist.blacks	Should federal spending on assistance to blacks	3	1 - increase, 3 - decrease	
Civil Rights	urb.unrest	Best way of dealing with urban rioting	7	1 - solve poverty, 7 - force
	negro.chan	How much has the position of negros improved	3	1 - not much, 3 - a lot
	civil.rights.too.fas	Civil rights have pushed too fast	3	1 - too slow, 3 - too fast
	sch.busing	Support for school busing for integration	7	1 - support, 7 - oppose
	blacks.aid	Should the government help blacks	7	1 - help, 7 - not help
	aff.action	Opinion on affirmative action	4	1 - support, 4 - oppose
	eq.opp	Society should ensure equal opportunity	5	1 - agree, 5 - disagree
	too.much.eq.right	We have gone too far in pushing equal rights in country	5	1 - disagree, 5 - agree
	eq.chances	One of the big problems in this country is that we don't give everyone an equal chance.	5	1 - agree, 5 - disagree
	more.eq.chances	It is not really that big a problem if some people have more of a chance in life than others.	5	1 - disagree, 5 - agree
	less.eq	This country would be better off if we worried less about how equal people are	5	1 - disagree, 5 - agree
	eq.treat	If people were treated more equally in this country we would havemany fewer problems	5	1 - agree, 5 - disagree
	hard.blacks	Generations of slavery and discrimination have created conditionsthat make it difficult for blacks to work their way out of the lowerclass	5	1 - agree, 5 - disagree
	no.favor.blacks	Irish, Italians, Jewish and many other minorities overcame prejudice and worked their way up. Blacks should to the same without any special favors	5	1 - disagree, 5 - agree
blacks.try.harder	It's really a matter of some people not trying hard enough; if blackswould only try harder they could be just as well off as whites	5	1 - disagree, 5 - agree	
blacks.deserve.more	Over the past few years blacks have gotten less than they deserve.	5	1 - agree, 5 - disagree	
Morality	women.role	Should women have an equal role with men in running business, industry and government	7	1 - equal, 7 - women in the home
	new.lifestyles	The newer lifestyles are contributing to the breakdown of our society	5	1 - disagree, 5 - agree
	moral.behavior	The world is always changing and we should adjust our view of moral behavior to those changes	5	1 - agree, 5 - disagree
	trad.values	This country would have many fewer problems if there were more emphasis on traditional family ties	5	1 - disagree, 5 - agree
	different.values	We should be more tolerant of people who choose to live according to their own moral standards, even if they are very different from our own	5	1 - agree, 5 - disagree
	homosex	Do you favor or oppose laws to protect homosexuals against job discrimination	5	1 - favor, 5 - oppose
	gay.military	Should gays be allowed to serve in the military	5	1 - allowed, 5 - disallowed
abort	When should abortion be permitted	4	1 - always, 4 - never	
Foreign Policy	urss.coop	Should we try hard to get along with Russia	7	1 - try hard, 7 - get tougher
	defense.spend	Should we spend more or less on defense?	7	1 - less, 7 - more
	FS.foreignaid	Federal spending on foreign aid	3	?
	FS.space	Federal spending on space/science/technology	3	?

Table S1: List of Variables

	Label	Wording	Tot	1984	1986	1988	1992	1994	1996	2000	2004
Economics	health.ins	Health Insurance	7	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1
	jobs.guar7	Government Guarantee Jobs	8	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
	gov.services	Government Spending	8	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
	FS.poor	Spending on Poor	4	0	0	0	1	0	1	1	1
	FS.childcare	Fed Spending on Childcare	6	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1
	FS.crime	Fed Spending on Crime	6	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1
	FS.aids	Fed Spending on AIDS	5	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	0
	FS.publicschools	Fed Spending on Public Schools	7	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1
	FS.aidcollege	Fed Spending on College Aid	4	0	1	1	1	0	1	0	0
	FS.homeless	Fed Spending on Homeless	3	0	0	1	1	0	1	0	0
	FS.welfare	Fed Spending on Welfare	5	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1
	FS.food.stamps	Fed Spending on Food Stamps	7	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0
	FS.envir	Fed Spending on Environment	7	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0
	FS.soc.sec	Fed Spending on Social Security	8	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
	FS.assist.blacks	Fed Spending on Assist. Blacks	5	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	0
Civil Rights	urb.unrest	Urban Unrest	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0
	negro.chan	Negro Position Changed	5	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0
	civil.rights.too.fast	Civil Rights Push Too Fast	4	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0
	sch.busing	School Busing	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	blacks.aid	Aid to Blacks	8	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
	aff.action	Affirmative Action	6	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	1
	eq.opp	Ensure Equal Opportunity	8	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
	too.much.eq.rights	Too Far Pushing Equal Rights	8	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
	eq.chances	Problem if Chances not Equal	8	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
	more.eq.chances	Some Have More Equal Chances	8	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
	less.eq	Should Worry Less about Equality	8	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
	eq.treat	More Equal Treatment	8	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
	hard.blacks	Conditions Difficult for Blacks	6	0	1	1	1	1	0	1	1
	no.favor.blacks	Blacks Shouldn't be favored	6	0	1	1	1	1	0	1	1
	blacks.try.harder	Blacks Must Try Harder	6	0	1	1	1	1	0	1	1
blacks.deserve.more	Blacks Deserve More	6	0	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	
Morality	women.role	Women Equal Roles	7	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1
	new.lifestyles	New Lifestyles Break Down Society	7	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
	moral.behavior	Moral Behavior	7	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
	trad.values	Emphasis Traditional Values	7	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
	different.values	Tolerant Different Values	7	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
	homosex	Law Protect Homosexuals	5	0	0	1	1	0	1	1	1
	gay.military	Gays in the Military	4	0	0	0	1	0	1	1	1
	abort	Abortion	8	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Foreign Policy	urss.coop	Cooperate w USSR	3	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0
	defense.spend	Defense Spending	8	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
	FS.foreignaid	Fed Spending on Foreign Aid	3	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1
	FS.space	Fed Spending on Space	5	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	1

Year	1984	1986	1988	1992	1994	1996	2000	2004	total
Number of issues	24	29	35	40	31	32	35	32	258
Number of respondents	456	625	766	954	1136	871	443	609	5860

Table S2: Variables by Year

Variable	Measurement	Year	Mean	Standard Deviation	Variable	Measurement	Year	Mean	Standard Deviation
Age	Measured in years	1984	41.47	15.22	Church	How often attends religious services, scaled: (1) Never, (2) Few times a year (3) Once a month, (4) Almost every week, (5) every week	1984	3.01	1.41
		1986	41.22	15.62			1986	3.12	1.46
		1988	43.58	16.22			1988	3.19	1.42
		1992	43.76	16.18			1992	2.77	1.64
		1994	44.60	16.23			1994	2.83	1.63
		1996	47.14	16.28			1996	2.86	1.59
		2000	46.84	16.42			2000	2.81	1.56
		2004	47.02	16.46			2004	2.76	1.58
Gender	Binary, respondent is female	1984	1.48	0.50	Party ID	Party identification, ranging from (1) strong Democrat, through (4) Independent, to (7) strong Republican	1984	4.04	2.10
		1986	1.52	0.50			1986	3.61	2.08
		1988	1.50	0.50			1988	4.13	2.11
		1992	1.48	0.50			1992	3.77	2.06
		1994	1.49	0.50			1994	4.10	2.12
		1996	1.52	0.50			1996	3.84	2.18
		2000	1.47	0.50			2000	3.78	2.08
		2004	1.49	0.50			2004	4.04	2.12
Black	Binary, respondent's race is black	1984	0.09	0.29	Political Interest	Respondent's interest in elections, scaled (1) not much, (2) somewhat, (3) very much	1984	2.19	0.69
		1986	0.14	0.34			1986	1.98	0.72
		1988	0.10	0.30			1988	2.18	0.71
		1992	0.11	0.32			1992	2.36	0.67
		1994	0.10	0.30			1994	2.11	0.70
		1996	0.08	0.27			1996	2.14	0.68
		2000	0.10	0.30			2000	2.14	0.71
		2004	0.15	0.36			2004	2.35	0.67
Income	Family income, standardized by year over 5 categories that correspond to 0-17, 17-33, 33-67, 67-83 and 83-100 percetinles.	1984	3.21	1.02	Political Activism	Campaign Participation Count, scaled from 1 to 6	1984	1.71	1.06
		1986	3.04	1.05			1986	1.63	1.03
		1988	3.09	1.04			1988	1.70	0.99
		1992	3.10	1.10			1992	1.84	1.04
		1994	3.01	1.07			1994	1.55	0.93
		1996	3.07	1.08			1996	1.66	0.98
		2000	2.97	1.11			2000	1.64	0.93
		2004	3.07	1.18			2004	2.07	1.12
Professional	Binary, respondent's occupational group is professional or managerial	1984	0.32	0.47	Political Discussion	Binary, does respondent discuss politics with family and friends	1984	1.78	0.41
		1986	0.31	0.46			1986	1.79	0.41
		1988	0.35	0.48			1988	NA	NA
		1992	0.32	0.47			1992	1.90	0.30
		1994	0.34	0.47			1994	1.83	0.37
		1996	0.41	0.49			1996	1.85	0.36
		2000	0.41	0.49			2000	1.84	0.37
		2004	0.39	0.49			2004	1.84	0.37
Southern	Binary, respondent's state is one of the Census Bureau's southern states	1984	0.29	0.46					
		1986	0.33	0.47					
		1988	0.32	0.47					
		1992	0.29	0.45					
		1994	0.34	0.47					
		1996	0.34	0.48					
		2000	0.32	0.47					
		2004	0.31	0.46					

Table S3: Distribution of Sociodemographic Characteristics by Year




Figure S1: Average weighted correlations for Economic/Civil Rights vs. Moral Issues by type.




Figure S2: Two factors plots by type and year. Each panel reports the results of a single factor analysis applied to the responses of members of one of the three groups in a given study year. Each circle represents one issue domain. The location of a circle corresponds to the average factor loading for variables comprising the issue domain for the first two factors.

Log(P(Ideologue)/P(Alternative))	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P
church x income	-0.055 *	0.022	-2.54	0.011
income	0.087	0.072	1.21	0.225
church	0.193 **	0.072	2.68	0.007
age	0.002	0.002	0.97	0.334
gender	-0.396 ***	0.073	-5.43	0.000
black	-0.575 ***	0.117	-4.93	0.000
south	0.124	0.080	1.55	0.120
education	-0.131 ***	0.028	-4.6	0.000
professional	-0.085	0.086	-0.99	0.323
political interest	-0.211 ***	0.057	-3.68	0.000
political activism	-0.069	0.036	-1.9	0.058
year 1984	-1.169 ***	0.194	-6.02	0.000
year 1986	-0.314 *	0.158	-1.99	0.046
year 1988	-0.141	0.151	-0.93	0.353
year 1992	-0.132	0.138	-0.96	0.338
year 1994	0.443 **	0.139	3.19	0.001
year 1996	-0.736 ***	0.143	-5.13	0.000
year 2000	0.484 **	0.173	2.79	0.005
intercept	1.762 ***	0.329	5.35	0.000
N = 4548				

Table S4: Results of the Multinomial Logit model presented in Figure 7.

Party ID		Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P
Ideologues					
	Δ EM	-0.102	0.315	-0.33	0.745
	$(\Delta$ EM) ²	-0.619	0.804	-0.77	0.441
	education	0.543 **	0.194	2.8	0.005
	education ²	-0.070 **	0.021	-3.29	0.001
	income	0.250 ***	0.054	4.66	0.000
	church	0.239 ***	0.035	6.85	0.000
	age	-0.001	0.004	-0.28	0.780
	gender	-0.462 ***	0.103	-4.51	0.000
	black	-1.942 ***	0.161	-12.09	0.000
	south	0.066	0.113	0.58	0.560
	professional	-0.273 *	0.123	-2.22	0.026
Alternatives					
	Δ EM	0.514 *	0.214	2.4	0.016
	$(\Delta$ EM) ²	1.135 *	0.536	2.12	0.034
	education	0.377 *	0.163	2.32	0.020
	education ²	-0.029	0.019	-1.54	0.123
	income	0.200 ***	0.048	4.18	0.000
	church	0.158 ***	0.032	5	0.000
	age	-0.001	0.003	-0.39	0.696
	gender	-0.238 *	0.093	-2.56	0.011
	black	-1.690 ***	0.163	-10.39	0.000
	south	-0.084	0.102	-0.82	0.412
	professional	-0.148	0.114	-1.31	0.191
Agnostics					
	Δ EM	0.504	0.296	1.7	0.089
	$(\Delta$ EM) ²	1.258	0.755	1.67	0.096
	education	-0.134	0.215	-0.62	0.533
	education ²	0.019	0.025	0.77	0.443
	income	0.250 ***	0.061	4.11	0.000
	church	0.111 **	0.041	2.71	0.007
	age	-0.012 **	0.004	-3.13	0.002
	gender	0.021	0.118	0.18	0.859
	black	-1.477 ***	0.254	-5.81	0.000
	south	-0.007	0.126	-0.06	0.956
	professional	0.152	0.150	1.01	0.312
Control Dummies					
	year 1984	-0.177	0.150	-1.17	0.240
	year 1986	-0.410 **	0.131	-3.13	0.002
	year 1988	0.156	0.126	1.24	0.215
	year 1992	-0.328 **	0.117	-2.81	0.005
	year 1994	-0.024	0.114	-0.21	0.833
	year 1996	-0.246 *	0.120	-2.05	0.040
	year 2000	-0.496 **	0.143	-3.48	0.001
	Alternative	0.257	0.681	0.38	0.706
	Agnostic	1.150	0.762	1.51	0.132
	intercept	2.620 ***	0.540	4.85	0.000

N = 4540

Table S5: Results of the OLS Model presented in Figure 8.

Party ID	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P
Δ EM	0.682 ***	0.157	4.35	0.000
$(\Delta$ EM) ²	1.418 ***	0.385	3.68	0.000
income	0.186 *	0.076	2.45	0.014
education	-0.215 ***	0.056	-3.82	0.000
church	0.134	0.078	1.7	0.089
church x income	-0.191 *	0.078	-2.44	0.015
church x income x education	0.047 ***	0.012	3.81	0.000
$(\text{church x income})^2$	0.007 *	0.003	2.35	0.019
education x $(\text{church x income})^2$	-0.002 **	0.001	-2.84	0.004
age	-0.005 **	0.002	-2.81	0.005
gender	-0.257 ***	0.060	-4.31	0.000
black	-1.844 ***	0.103	-17.93	0.000
south	-0.022	0.065	-0.34	0.734
professional	-0.185 *	0.072	-2.55	0.011
year 1984	-0.310 *	0.148	-2.1	0.036
year 1986	-0.426 **	0.131	-3.25	0.001
year 1988	0.154	0.127	1.22	0.223
year 1992	-0.325 **	0.117	-2.78	0.005
year 1994	0.046	0.114	0.4	0.687
year 1996	-0.242 *	0.119	-2.03	0.042
year 2000	-0.401 **	0.143	-2.8	0.005
intercept	4.758 ***	0.315	15.12	0.000
N = 4540				

Table S6: Results of the OLS Model presented in Figure 9.