Inside Parties:

Organizations, Electoral Success, and Comparative Political Behavior

Chapter 3: Party Institutions and Voter-Candidate Congruence

Georgia Kernell

University of California, Los Angeles

Department of Communication Studies

gkernell@ucla.edu

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Summary of Book.

This book investigates the internal party rules that shape representation, participation, and electoral outcomes. While extensive research examines electoral structures and institutions at the *country* level, very little work makes systematic comparisons of *party* institutions governing how parties select candidates, nominate leaders, write platforms, and allocate resources. Over a century ago Roberto Michels argued that centralized parties were more efficient, representative, and ultimately successful than their decentralized counterparts. This manuscript provides the first large-scale empirical test of Michels's thesis and finds, by and large, that he was correct. Specifically, focusing on four key areas, I find that inclusive and decentralized parties (i.e. those that allow local party members to participate in important decisions) are more likely to well-represent their core supporters at the expense of adopting less competitive positions in the general electorate. In contrast, exclusive centralized parties (i.e. those in which party leaders nominate candidates to office, write the manifesto, and direct resources) are better able to choose candidates and position the party platform to reflect the interests of the entire electorate. I also find that voters are less likely to identify with a party or participate in activities beyond voting – such as actively campaigning or persuading others to vote for their preferred party – if the party they support includes members in central decision making processes. In addition, the book identifies varying tradeoffs that parties face to maintaining clear and consistent policy appeals or acting strategically ambiguous. The impact of party institutions varies depending on both the party's ideological position and the electoral structures in each country.

Relevant information from Chapters 1 and 2.

This chapter motivates the book and summarizes its arguments and evidence. The standard theoretical literature on electoral competition portrays political parties as single actors or teams that appeal to voters with coherent, unified policy positions. Other research acknowledges that political parties are collections of actors with frequently incompatible ambitions and policy interests, who compete for control of the organization. Although this literature

allows for intraparty conflict, it fails to take fully into account the effect of a party's institutions in enabling or constraining different party actors from implementing their preferred policies.

In particular, Chapter 1 sets up a number of competing arguments – both new and from the literature – about how party organization may shape candidate, party, and voter behavior. Some arguments would suggest that more "democratically" organized parties – i.e. those that empower members – should be more responsive, representative, transparent, and thus successful. Others arguments point to these parties catering to a narrow segment of hard core party supporters. The arguments consider the effects of party organization on both positional and valence attributes of candidates.

Chapter 2 discusses the extensive data collection on party organization. Below I have copied a few excerpts describing the general scope of all the data as well as the candidate selection variable that is relevant for Chapter 3. These excerpts come from Chapter 2 as well as an article I wrote in CPS that also uses these data.

Scope of data:

To better understand the various ways in which major political parties select candidates, allocate resources, and adopt policy platforms, I collected data on candidate nomination rules for 66 parties in 20 long-standing parliamentary democracies. To obtain this information I draw on candidate nomination rules from two primary sources: official party documents – including statutes and bylaws – and in-person or telephone interviews with party bureaucrats and representatives. The statutes collected were in effect prior to each country's corresponding election, and the majority occurred between 2005 and 2014. In most cases, I interviewed the person(s) in charge of writing the party constitution or heading the party's internal organization, such as the General Secretary or Director of Organizational Development.[1] In-person interviews were held in Austria, Finland, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom. Telephone interviews were conducted in the remaining countries.

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[1] In a handful of cases these individuals were also members of parliament, but in most parties they worked only in the national headquarters.

This thorough investigation provided intricate details about how potential candidates initiate, compete for, and ultimately secure their party's nomination. It also revealed substantial variation among parties – both within and across countries.

Candidate Selection:

The coding used below distinguishes among parties that are *inclusive* (internally democratic; members select candidates), *exclusive* (leaders select candidates), and *semi-inclusive* (members and leaders share authority).[2]

Australia's Labor Party (ALP) provides an example of an inclusive party. Parliamentary candidates are selected by their districts' party members, and leaders have no formal influence over nominations. Any ALP member whose dues are paid in full may nominate him or herself to run on the party's ticket in the district where they live. All members in that district are then eligible to cast a single transferable vote at one of the ALP's polling locations or through an absentee internal party ballot.

In some democratic parties, the specific selection method (e.g., plurality, run-off, proportional representation) is left to the discretion of local, member-run organizations, as is the case with Sweden's Liberal People's Party. In others, such as the Swedish Moderate Party, bylaws standardize the candidate selection procedures employed by subnational bodies.[3]

The British Labour Party falls at the other end of the spectrum. Although Labour's constitution describes rules governing parliamentary candidate selection by members at the constituency level, "the normal procedure may be dispensed with by the National Executive Committee (NEC) ... when the NEC are of the opinion that the interests of the party would be best served by the suspension of the procedures" (Labour Party of Britain 2006). Since

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[2]Of course, this classification cannot account for all of the variation in candidate selection methods. For example, I consider parties semi-inclusive when party leaders can veto nominees selected by party members, regardless of the actual veto rule (e.g., majority or supermajority). More detailed information is not available for all parties, and I employ the three-part typology described above in the interest of including more parties into the analysis. More importantly, party supporters may not know the intricacies of their party's voting rules and may choose to participate (or not) simply based on their level of involvement in candidate selection. None of the parties examined here allow non-members to participate in selection.

[3]For example, in the Swedish Moderate Party each district's (member-elected) "recruitment committee" proposes a list of candidates. The list is then voted on by party members in that district. If the party list passes, it stands; if the list is voted down, each candidate is voted on separately.

ultimate authority rests with the NEC – a 33-person organization making up the party's central leadership – candidate selection for all constituencies is effectively in the hands of the party elite. In a few cases, such as Italy's National Alliance Party in 2006, exclusive parties rely on a single leader to hand pick all parliamentary candidates. Typically selection in these parties is not transparent. Final candidate lists are presented to party members at the same time as they are made known to the general public.

In many parties, candidate selection is shared by both members and leaders. Typically one group within the party holds proposal power; the other controls the veto. For example, local party members nominate candidates in the Spanish People's Party, and the national executive may veto. In the Dutch Labor Party (PvDA), members choose a pool of potential candidates, and party leaders select nominees from this group. The British Conservative Party reverses this sequence: the national office generates a list of acceptable candidates which members then choose among. These semi-inclusive parties are increasingly common in modern democracies; as Blondel observes, "more commonly, parties stand halfway between centralization and decentralization" (1978, 51).

While candidate selection procedures surely reflect strategic decisions by party leaders (and in some cases, rank and file members), the level of internal party democracy is treated as exogenous. This assumption is supported by the fact that party institutions are exceptionally stable. A survey of party organizations over the past forty years reveals that parties rarely change their rules.[4] Even as parties are swept in or out of office, undergo significant turnover in leadership, and at times dramatically change their policy positions, internal rules remain intact. In most parties rule changes must be approved by supermajorities from both representatives in the highest leadership posts and member-elected delegates to the national party convention, leading to lengthy negotiations rather than rapid transformations.[5] In all

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[4]Specifically, in comparing Katz and Mair's (1992) descriptions of parties between 1960 and 1990 with my own codings, I find that the candidate selection methods have transformed in less than ten percent of the parties in both analyses.

[5]Interviews revealed that party leaders who would like to change candidate selection procedures are often unable to do so. In particular, once members have control they are remiss to "tie their hands" and abdicate authority, even if it could benefit the party overall. Because of these collective action problems,

parties, candidate selection procedures were in place long before the CSES survey respondents decided to participate in these elections.

Party institutions may reflect the historical or cultural environment in which they originated. Most countries experience some organizational variation across their most competitive parties, but in a few systems all of the parties employ similar rules. In particular, Nordic countries tend to have more inclusive parties than those in central and southern Europe. Japanese parties are also more exclusive (and secretive) in their processes. There is some evidence that party family also shapes organization. In many cases Labor parties that evolved out of hierarchical unions adopted similar structures. Radical right parties, frequently formed by a single person or family, are more exclusive. And Green parties, which advocate for increased government transparency and democratic participation, typically organize their parties accordingly.[6]

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party structures often reflect the strategic calculations made by party leaders many years ago, possibly when the party looked very different ideologically or electorally.

[6]Lundell (2004) examines the role of nine different party and country-level factors (including party family, federalism, and district magnitude), and finds only that region and party size are associated with inclusiveness. (Lundell also finds that parties in Nordic countries are more often internally democratic, while those in southern European tend to be exclusive.)

Chapter 3

Party Institutions and Voter-Candidate Congruence

Perhaps the most important way a party's organization can shape political outcomes is through the candidate selection process. Whether candidates respond to the interests of party leaders, members, or the general electorate will depend on the procedures set up within the party to determine which candidates make it on the ballot. Representative democracy is premised on the fundamental assumption that citizens's preferences should correspond with, and presumably inform, the behavior of candidates and elected officials. This normative mandate has been investigated in numerous settings over the last half century. Starting with Miller and Stokes's seminal article on issue convergence (1963), a considerable share of research in American politics examines constituency influence on congressional behavior (Achen 1978; Canes-Wrone, Brady, and Cogan 2002; Fenno 1978; Jacobson 1983; Kingdon 1989; Mayhew 1974). Although the standard spatial voting model indicates that two candidates should converge to the position of the median voter, empirical evidence of candidate-voter congruence in the U.S. is weak. Candidates' positions are clearly associated with those of their constituents, but the two major parties often diverge from each other and from the median voter (e.g., Ansolabehere, Snyder, and Stewart 2001; Burden 2004; Frendreis et al.

2003; Jessee 2010).

Similar research finds wide variation in candidate responsiveness outside the U.S. – both across parties and countries, as well as over time (e.g., Cain, Ferejohn and Fiorina 1987; Mattila and Raunio 2006; Müller and Strøm 1999). In a number of cases candidates or parties have moved away from – rather than with – their constituents, and they usually suffer the electoral consequences (Mair 1997).[1]

The literature offers several possible reasons for this discrepancy. One rationale is that voters are not strict policy maximizers. Votes also reflect campaign skills, incumbency, or other candidate attributes, giving candidates more latitude on policy than the spatial model allows (Adams and Merrill 2008; McCurley and Mondak 1995, Mondak 1995). A second possibility is that candidates seek benefits other than winning office; these include the intrinsic value of preferred policies, retaining support from resourceful party activists, and gaining recognition and future considerations from party leaders (Aldrich and McGinnis 1989; Kingdon 1989; Müller and Strøm 1999). A third explanation has candidates constrained by electoral institutions, such as party primaries, that compel them to respond to multiple constituencies with divergent preferences (Adams et al. 2005; Brady, Han and Pope 2007; Burden 2004).

The last argument, and the one investigated in the current chapter, upholds two standard assumptions: candidates are election-seeking and voters are policy-seeking (Downs 1957). Candidates may aspire for policy or leadership goals as well, but without winning office neither is attainable. And while voters care about competence, they do so only insofar as it helps advance their preferred policy. Electing a competent opponent may be a voter's worst nightmare.

A number of institutional factors may permit or prevent candidates from adopting policy positions that align squarely with voters' preferences. Previous research has concentrated

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[1]The British Labour Party in the late 1970s provides a notable example where this strategy proved electorally devastating. When the party increased the unions' control over party leadership, members of parliament and moderate voters defected to the Social Democrats.

extensively on features of the electoral system. Single-member plurality elections tend to produce all-or-nothing results, with only a single candidate winning and representing his or her district. Although these candidates are more likely to adopt moderate positions in line with the median voter, they may also be selected without the support of a majority in the electorate. Proportional representation procedures may allow for a greater variety of candidates to gain representation, and Huber and Powell (1994) find that proportional systems tend to produce greater congruence between both single-party and coalition governments and the median voter in society. In addition, previous work on candidate and government responsiveness has highlighted the importance of other factors, including: the media and a well-informed electorate (Adserá, Boix, and Payne 2003; Besley and Burgess 2002; Cox 1987), corruption (Stokes 2007), term limits (Ferraz and Finan 2011), and democratic experience (Keefer 2007).

This chapter shifts the focus from country-level institutions to parties by investigating how candidate selection shapes responsiveness. When making campaign promises or policy decisions, all politicians must weigh the costs and benefits of reinforcing the support of their core constituents, on the one hand, and appealing to potential new voters, on the other. A candidate who primarily caters to his or her party's core supporters may receive volunteer or financial support in election campaigns or be rewarded with plum party or legislative committee assignments. However, a candidate who strays too far from the general electorate may concede the opportunity to gain votes by appealing to swing voters.

For some politicians, and parties more generally, this tradeoff is especially severe. When candidates from the same party compete for their party's nomination through an internal party election, their popularity among party supporters is critical. A candidate who wanders too far from the party's core constituents risks losing the nomination to a fellow partisan. But a candidate who caters exclusively to party voters may stray too far from the general electorate.

I argue that the method used to select candidates determines whether or not potential

nominees respond more to their party's core constituents or to the party leadership. Candidates who rely exclusively on the support of local party members for nomination through intraparty contests like primaries may have a stronger local base of support in their constituency than those who are selected by national party leaders. However, these candidates may also be pulled away from the general electorate in favor of adopting positions that maximize votes among active, consistent party supporters. If party members are unwilling or unable to select candidates who are competitive in the general election, these intraparty contests should produce a more extreme set of candidates. If contrast, when candidates rely on party leaders for (re)nomination, their incentives may be better aligned with those of the general electorate. Leaders seek first and foremost to win elections, and they are likely to have better means (both through resources and an increased ability to solve collective action problems) to identify the vote-maximizing strategies. This tradeoff will be greatest in cases where the party's core supporters look least like potential swing voters.

In the next section I review previous research on party responsiveness and investigate the tradeoffs confronting candidates who compete for the support of multiple constituencies. In doing so, I examine not only why, but when, these tradeoffs are likely to exist, and describe the institutional settings that lead candidates to respond to their parties' core voters instead of the general electorate. To evaluate responsiveness, I employ a random utility model that estimates parties' vote shares for different hypothetical locations, allowing us to identify the position that maximizes votes. I compare parties' current locations with both the vote-maximizing position as well as the position of the median party activist to investigate the degree to which parties' positions reflect intraparty and electoral system rules. The results reveal that exclusive parties (that is, those that allow leaders to select candidates) are more successful at the polls than parties that allow members to participate. Exclusive parties are also closer, on average, to the vote-maximizing position, and farther from their median party voter, than are democratic parties. In addition, I find that this effect is strongest for extreme parties positioned to the far left or right of the voter distribution.

Candidate Responsiveness

Previous Research

An abundance of theoretical work explains how parties adopt the positions they campaign on and pursue in office. Black (1948, 1958), Downs (1957), and Hotelling (1929) taught us that in two party competition where voters' preferences are single-peaked in a single dimension, parties optimize by adopting the position of the median voter. Modifications to this standard model include adding primary elections, multiple parties, multiple dimensions, heterogeneous parties, non-spatial valence party or candidate attributes, and incomplete information (see, for e.g., Adams and Merrill 2008; Aldrich 1983; Aldrich and McGinnis 1989; Aranson and Ordeshook 1972; Bawn et al. 2012; Burden 2004; Grofman 2004; and Kernell 2015). Previous research has also relaxed the assumption that voters are strict policy-maximizers, and that parties care only about winning office.

Empirical work finds support for the claim that parties often adopt off-median positions. Examining the U.S. case, Burden (2004) finds that candidates diverge both from each other and the from the median, and they do so even more as the competitiveness of their general election wanes or their primary election strengthens. Kedar (2008) shows that parties often adopt positions that are more extreme than those of their voters. And Adams and Merrill (2008) provide anecdotal evidence that parties with primaries may nominate higher-quality candidates that stray from the median in society.

One possible modification to the spatial model asks parties to maximize the utility of their own voters or supporters rather than that of the general electorate. Instead of approaching the median voter in society, parties may locate at the median member of their supporters. Especially in districts where one party dominates the playing field, candidates are often beholden to financial donors or campaign activists in order to secure the resources necessary to run a successful campaign. And when candidates must compete in pre-election intraparty contests for their party's nomination, such as in U.S. primaries, they must gain the support

of their primary electorate as well as general voters.

Previous research has demonstrated this tradeoff theoretically by showing that the general electorate and a party's voters are two distinct constituencies with unique preferences. Specifically, Aldrich (1983), Aldrich and McGinnis (1989), and McGann (2002) prove that the position of the median voter in a party is not the optimal position for a vote-maximizing party.[2] Candidates adopting the position of the median voter in their party diverge from each other and from the median voter in the electorate in equilibrium.

While this research provides clear predictions for parties' positions given a voter distribution and a set of candidate strategies (i.e. maximize votes or adopt the party's median voter's position), it is vague on what institutions lead candidates to pursue one strategy over another. Relatedly, previous research does not account for variation in candidate responsiveness across parties.[3] Although some studies view parties as vote-maximizing, while others assume leaders pursue policy or are constrained by policy-seeking activists, few models differentiate among party types according to their institutional organization.

Selection Rules and Candidate Responsiveness

Following the standard spatial model, let us assume that the relevant preferences of candidates and voters reside along a single policy dimension. Voters are sincere and choose the candidate positioned closest to them. Candidates seek (re)nomination and (re)election, and they may face a tradeoff between representing the median voter for their party and appealing to marginal voters in the general electorate.

Given these assumptions, if party members are more likely than party leaders to vote

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[2]Aldrich (1983) and Aldrich and McGinnis (1989) show this for the two party case. McGann (2002) extends this to a multiparty setting, finding that one-dimensional space an equilibrium exists when parties adopt a position at time t equal to the position of the median voter for their party at time $t - 1$.

[3]Aldrich and McGinnis (1989) state that party-based resources or candidates' preferences for policy outcomes may steer candidates toward the median voter in their party. McGann (2002) argues that "party leaders are often constrained by internal party politics," and posits that vote-maximizing leaders that exercise some control over their parties' position may move away from their party's median voter in order to gain votes.

sincerely when nominating parliamentary candidates, candidates in parties with inclusive candidate selection should face greater pressure to cater their appeal to their parties' core supporters than will candidates in parties with semi-inclusive or exclusive nomination procedures. Previous research supports the claim that party members vote more sincerely than party leaders, arguing that leaders have more of an incentive and are better equipped to make strategic decisions than rank and file party members (Kitschelt 1994, McGann 2002, Alesina and Spear 1988, Panebianco 1988, Kirchheimer 1966). Whereas members typically join for ideological or social reasons, leaders are motivated by the opportunity to win, and their jobs depend on the party's electoral success (Ware 1996, Scarrow 1994, Clark and Wilson 1961).[4] Even if party members are strategic and would like to nominate those candidates who are most likely to get elected, they face a greater coordination problem than party leaders. First, the size of the selectorate is greater in parties with inclusive candidate selection, making collective action more difficult. Second, members are less likely to invest time and money into determining the optimal candidates' positions by polling the electorate or educating themselves about aspiring candidates' and competing parties' platforms.[5] Indeed, when given the option, strategically-motivated members may choose to delegate candidate selection to party leaders, effectively democratically choosing an exclusive form of candidate selection (McGann 2002).

In a scenario where all party members vote sincerely, candidates in parties with inclusive candidate selection will be most likely to secure the nomination if they adopt the position of the median member in their party. At the opposite extreme, where strategic party leaders predict voters' and parties' positions perfectly, candidates in parties with exclusive candidate

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[4]This is not to say that party members necessarily hold more extreme positions than other actors. Recall that in the previous discussion we saw that even if candidates choose the position of the median party voter they will not be optimizing their vote share. In the next section I use partisans' positions, instead of party members' positions, to operationalize the argument.

[5]The degree to which this coordination problem prohibits members from choosing competitive candidates should depend on the intraparty electoral rules for nominating candidates. For example, plurality elections for candidate nominations in single member plurality districts will likely narrow the group of contenders in a party to two, and members may be able to coordinate more easily. When parties select multiple candidates for a party list coordination will be difficult, and members should be more likely to vote sincerely. The present analysis does not include parties' electoral formulae, but this is an important area for future research.

selection will locate at the position that maximizes voters in the general electorate. As Gallagher (1988: 15) argues, "where nominations are controlled centrally, we might expect to find that deputies follow the party line faithfully in parliament, as disloyalty will mean deselection."

While neither of these scenarios is likely to ring true in any party examined here (because just as party members may act strategically, party leaders may incorporate their sincere policy preferences, face additional pressures from members or voters, or simply miscalculate), the simplification is useful to formulate hypotheses about how candidate nomination shapes candidates' and parties' positions. First, I expect candidates to be closer to their party's median member in parties with inclusive candidate selection than in those where leaders control nominations. Second, candidates should be closer to the vote-maximizing position in exclusive, rather than inclusive, parties. As shown in the previous discussion, these strategies – appeal to the party's median member or maximize votes – are unique.[6]

While these arguments predict that inclusive parties' candidates will be pulled toward party activists at the expense of everyday voters, there are several competing reasons to expect inclusive parties to select more popular candidates.

One reason is that candidates from inclusive parties may have stronger local ties and be more in touch with the particular issues that affect their constituency. Focusing on issues salient to their own community may outweigh the negative effects of catering to party activists.

Second, even if parties formally abdicate authority to their members, control may effectively be in the hands of the leadership. Party leaders know the set of individuals interested in running for the nomination, and they may encourage individuals they support and dissuade those they do not. Leaders selectively offer endorsements and campaign assistance,

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[6]Adams and Merrill (2008) present a contradictory hypothesis in which they argue that primaries increase a party's chance of winning the general election by weeding out candidates with weak campaign skills. In their model of two-party competition, primaries lead parties off median, but they make up for this by adding candidate competence in a valence dimension. Chapter 4 investigates the relationship between party organization and candidate quality.

and they hold a wealth of information they can divvy out to preferred nominees (Cohen et al. 2008). In one inclusive party, a leader told me "In general the party is clever enough. The network is working and the best ones are chosen." Here, the leader was referring to the network of party leaders at the federal office using "back channels" of influence to pressure district organizations to select candidates the federal party endorsed. These back channels include contacting different members with influence in the community, making phone calls, and staging events with national party leaders and local candidates.[7]

Last, these arguments fail to mention the nonpositional benefits inclusive parties offer voters. Candidates selected through internal party primaries may be better fundraisers, campaigners, and public speakers. And voters who prefer the transparency these parties offer may be willing to sacrifice policy congruence for accountability. Thus, it is largely an empirical question as to how and how much the selectorate influences candidate and party positions.

Empirical Analyses: Measurement and Data

Measuring Electoral Success

To start, let us simply examine the breakdown of electoral success by candidate selection. The second column in Table 3.1 displays the mean vote share for each of the 63 parties for which we have organizational data. As we can see, semi-inclusive and exclusive parties receive roughly the same share of the vote: 28.9 and 27.7, respectively. In contrast, inclusive parties fare significantly worse; on average they receive only 18.5 percent of the vote. Parties with internally democratic nomination systems enjoy less electoral success than those that allow elites to control the nomination process.

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[7]Of course, the degree to which party leaders can informally orchestrate candidate selection may itself depend on other party rules, such as those governing how the party platform is written or resources are allocated. Additional organizational variables are included in subsequent analyses to capture these competing rules as best we can..

Party Type	Mean Vote	Mean Deviation	Mean Percent Deviation	N
Inclusive	18.5	-2.5	-0.12	23
Semi-inclusive	28.9	1.9	0.09	24
Exclusive	27.7	0.8	0.04	16

Table 3.1: Mean vote share, mean deviation in vote share from other competitive parties in a country, and mean percent deviation in vote share, by party inclusiveness.

Recall that certain party organizations are more common in some countries than others. If organization is related to the number of parties in a country, higher or lower vote shares may differ by inclusiveness simply because of the number of competitors. For example, parties in Scandinavian countries tend to be more inclusive and more abundant than those in the rest of the sample. To account for this confounding factor, I compute two standardized measures of party success. Mean deviation gives the difference in party vote share from all of the other sampled parties in the same country (i.e. $\text{vote}_{pc} - \text{average vote}_c$), averaged within inclusive, semi-inclusive, and exclusive parties.[8] Mean percent deviation reports the average percentage deviation ($100*\text{mean deviation}_p/\text{average vote}_c$) in each of these categories. These statistics are reported in the third and fourth columns of Table 3.1.

Again, inclusive parties fare far worse than semi-inclusive and exclusive parties. On average, these parties receive a vote share that is 2.5 percentage points lower than semi-inclusive or exclusive parties in their country. The standardized scores also make it clear that semi-inclusive parties are the most successful – receiving, on average, 1.9 percent more of the total vote share than their competitors. Across all three measures, inclusive parties do significantly worse than semi-inclusive parties ($p < 0.05$).

Measuring Candidate Responsiveness

The hypotheses presented above are premised on the spatial voting model. Candidates are argued to be "closer" or "farther" from their constituents (party supporters or the general

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[8]Recall that only parties receiving at least eight percent of the vote are in the sample.

electorate) based on their party's nomination and electoral institutions. Thus, when testing the hypotheses, a measure of candidate responsiveness should also reflect the spatial model (see Achen 1978). In what follows I measure candidate responsiveness with ideological congruence between parties and voters on a left-right scale.

The Party's Position

Ideally, a measure of candidates' ideological positions would be based on their policy statements and decisions in office. Unfortunately, no suitable cross-national data on candidate positions are available.[9] Instead of measuring candidate-voter congruence directly, I compare parties' and voters' preferences, which are both readily available. This is an acceptable proxy because the hypotheses presented in the previous section do not differentiate among candidates within parties; for example, all candidates in inclusive parties are hypothesized to be more responsive to their parties' core supporters than are candidates in parties without intraparty competition. To the extent a party's position represents the average position of its candidates, a measure of party-voter congruence captures the average effect of the institutional variables across all candidates in a party.

Parties' positions are measured using data from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES). These surveys are designed to explain election outcomes in democracies around the world, and all of the surveys examined in this project were conducted in the first two months following parliamentary elections held in each country. The number of survey respondents varies across countries from 860 (in the U.K.) to 3023 (in Germany). In each survey, respondents are asked to place themselves, as well as parties and party leaders in their country, on an ideological scale ranging from 0 (left) to 10 (right). Using the CSES data, I measure a party's position as the average placement of the party by all respondents. Parties' positions range from 1.85 (for the German PDS) to 8.95 (Swedish Moderate Party).[10]

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[9]Measures of candidates positions, such as ADA scores in the U.S. or NOMINATE scores in the U.S. or the U.K., are not widely available in the parliamentary democracies studied here. Candidates' votes are also not available in most countries, preventing us from calculating NOMINATE or other candidate position scores.

[10]Party locations are often estimated using the mean placement by the most educated respondents in the country. In this case, they are almost identical so I use the overall mean.

The Median Party Activist's and Voter's Positions

A second measurement problem arises when one tries to find cross-national estimates of party members' positions. Recall that the hypotheses describe party responsiveness to members. Yet, surveys of party members exist in only a handful of cases, and there are no other cross-national estimates of party members' positions available. Thus, I measure the positions of "active partisans." To be considered an active partisan, a person must vote, identify, and campaign for a political party. Partisanship is measured using a two-part question. First, respondents are asked, "do you usually think of yourself as close to any particular party?" If a respondent replies "yes," and proceeds to identify a valid political party when asked to name the party that they feel close to, I consider an individual to be a partisan of that party. To be an active partisan, I employ two additional questions. The survey states: "Here is a list of things some people do during elections. Which if any did you do during the most recent election?" The first question asks if the respondent "showed [their] support for a particular party or candidate by, for example, attending a meeting, putting up a poster, or in some other way?" If an individual responds "yes" to this question, they are asked how often they participated in this campaign activity, with "frequently," "occasionally," and "rarely" as possible answers. I consider respondents active partisans if they are partisans who voted for the party they identify with, and they report frequently or occasionally participating in campaign activities. The median position of active partisans is used in the following analyses as a measure for the median party member's position. In all of the parties examined here any voter is eligible to become a party member.

In addition, for several of the analyses I examine congruence between parties and their own voters. *Party voter distance* is the absolute value of the difference between a party's position and its median voter's position. This quantity is plotted in Figure 3.1 for each of the 52 parties in the analysis. The figure displays both within and across country variation. For example, in Italy, both of the right-wing parties score much higher on *party voter distance* than parties from any other country. In Germany, the five parties exhibit different

Figure 3.1: The absolute value of the difference between the party's average placement, by all respondents, and the party's median voter's position, for all of the parties in the data.

levels of congruence, with the CDU and the PDS farthest from their voters (1.29 and 1.15, respectively), the FDP and the Greens very close (less than 0.15) to their median voters, and the SPD in the middle (at 0.69).

The Vote-maximizing Position in the General Electorate

Identifying the positions of parties, voters, and active partisans is relatively straightforward. Finding the position that maximizes votes, however, requires several assumptions about how voters would behave if parties adopted different positions. The position that maximizes votes for a given party depends on the number and location of other political parties, and the distribution of voters. To find the position for each party that optimizes electoral success, I estimate a random utility model of vote choice in each country. Voters choose parties based on individual-level attributes (such as education) as well as two individual-party characteristics: whether or not the voter is a partisan of the party, and the distance between the voter and the party.[11] After estimating the random utility model in each country, I plug varying party

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[11]As is typical in analyses of this type, I only estimate the model for voters. To include non-voters, one could first model the binary choice to vote (or not), and then model the choice of which party to support. By leaving this step out I am assuming that nonvoters will stay nonvoters regardless of the position that parties adopt, or that parties are unable to estimate nonvoters' positions and do not make strategic decisions based on the positions of those who abstain.

positions into the fitted model to find the position that maximizes votes, holding all other parties constant.[12]

Specifically, in each country, I assume that the utility for voter i from party p is given by the function

$$U_{ip} = \alpha_p + \beta * X_{ip} + \gamma_p * Y_i + \epsilon_{ip},$$

where X_{ip} is a vector of individual-party level variables (distance and partisanship), Y_i is a vector of individual-level characteristics, and ϵ_{ip} is an idiosyncratic error term with a type-one extreme value distribution.[13]

The probability that a voter chooses party p is:

$$P_{ip} = Pr(U_{ip} > U_{ij}) \forall j.$$

This gives rise to the familiar multinomial logit choice probabilities:

$$P_{ip} = \frac{e^{\alpha_p + \beta * X_{ip} + \gamma_p * Y_i}}{\sum_j e^{\alpha_j + \beta * X_{ij} + \gamma_j * Y_i}}.$$

After running this model in each country, I use the estimates of α_p, γ_p, and β to predict the vote share for each party, given the positions of their competitors. I find the position that maximizes votes computationally by allowing each party to search in increments of 0.01 over a set range of positions. In the results presented below I allow parties to search over the entire 0-10 spectrum of voters. However, in other analyses I limited parties' searches to specific areas, including: where parties are bounded by the party to their left and right,

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[12]This is similar to the model employed by Adams, Merrill and Grofman (2005). They model the effect of voter-party distance as a quadratic function.

[13]This model assumes independence of irrelevant alternatives. I use a multinomial (or conditional) logit model instead of a multinomial probit or mixed logit at this point because the former is computationally difficult and often performs worse even when the IIA assumption is violated (Kropko 2008, Dow and Endersby 2004). In doing so, I assume that the ratio in probabilities of voting for one party over another should be equal regardless of the location of a third party. In other research not shown here I have used a mixed logit model to relax this assumption (Glaskow 2001) and found similar results.

and where parties can only move within a given number of units or standard deviations of their current voters. Results vary somewhat, as I discuss below. I have also allowed for iterative party maximization processes, where one party maximizes given other party locations, then another party maximizes, and so on, until all parties choose to remain in their current position.

Results from the Random Utility Models of Vote Choice

Before turning to describe the measures of party-voter congruence, let us briefly examine the output from the random utility models of vote choice. Table 3.2 presents results from a vote choice model for Canada's 2004 election. The base category in this model is the Liberal Party of Canada; the other three choice outcomes are the Conservative Party of Canada, the New Democratic Party, and the Bloc Québécois.[14] *Distance* is an individual-party specific variable that equals the absolute value of the difference between a respondent's self placement and the mean placement of the party. The other independent variables in this model include education, male, and age.[15] In every model, I constrain the coefficient on *distance* to be equal across parties. As expected, *distance* has a significant, negative effect on vote choice: voters are much more likely to vote for parties that are ideologically close to them. This coefficient is consistently negative and significant across countries. We also see that education and age have a significant impact on vote choice; specifically, younger, educated individuals are more likely to vote for the Liberals than for any other Canadian party in 2004. Overall, demographic variables matter to varying degrees across countries, with education causing the greatest shifts in vote choice. Partisanship always increases the probability that a person will vote for a party, and both income and male often have no

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[14]In Canada, a choice of the Bloc does not make sense for voters outside of Québéc, and I have run separate choice sets for voters within and outside of this region.

[15]A variety of different specifications of the model were employed, including a quadratic loss function for distance, partisanship instead of (or in addition to) these demographic variables, and including other individual-level variables. In the next section, I discuss how the results vary according to different specifications of the RUM model. At this point I run the same RUM model in each country, although results are similar if I choose the RUM model for each country that performs best in that context.

Independent variable		Cons/Liberals	NDP/Liberals	BQ/Liberals
Distance	-.45** (.05)			
Education		-.26** (.09)	-.38** (.10)	-.30* (.12)
Male		.44 (.23)	-.23 (.26)	.38 (.31)
Age		-.03* (.01)	-.03** (.01)	-.05** (.01)
Constant		2.37** (.81)	3.78** (.93)	2.76* (1.09)
Log-likelihood			-615.89	
McFadden R^2			.08	

Note. Liberal Party of Canada is base category. Standard errors in parentheses. **Indicates significance at the 99% level; *indicates significance at the 95% level.

Table 3.2: Multinomial Logit Estimates of Vote Choice in Canada's 2004 Election.

effect. The intercepts represent unobserved party attributes. In most countries, there are significant differences across parties that are unaccounted for by the variables included in the model. The McFadden R-squared statistic for this model ranges from 0.08 (in Canada) to 0.31 (in Portugal).

Examining Parties' and Voters' Positions

After running discrete choice models in each country (like the one displayed in Table 3.2 for Canada), I compare the position of the party with the position that maximizes votes, as well as the position of the mean party voter and the mean party activist for each party.

To better understand the relationships among these four positions, consider the following example. Figure 3.2 depicts each of these four positions for the two largest parties in Spain. Positions for the PP are shown on the top horizontal axis, and positions for the PSOE are on the bottom. Each party's (mean) position is indicated by a vertical line, and the maximizing position (max), median party voter (mvp), and median active partisan (map) are all shown on their respective party's horizontal axis. The estimated kernel density of voters is also shown in the graph.

The two parties hold very different positions: the Spanish Socialist Workers Party (PSOE) is located at 3.3, and the People's Party (PP) is at 7.2. However, the positions that maximize votes for each party are much closer together. They are located at 4 for the PSOE and 4.6

Spain

Figure 3.2: Positions of the People's Party (PP) and the Spanish Socialist Workers Party (PSOE), as well as their median party voter (mvp), median active partisan (map) and vote-maximizing position (max).

for the PP. Both parties are positioned away from their vote-maximizing position in the direction of their own party's voters and activists. In the PSOE, the party is to the left of the position that maximizes votes, and slightly to the right of the position of the median voter in the party (as well as the position of the median active partisan). In contrast, the PP has moved much farther from the vote-maximizing position, relative to the position of its own voters. In fact, the PP is even more conservative than the position of its median active partisan.[16]

The parties in Spain are representative of the parties in the entire data set. In total, I find that only five parties are positioned on the other side of the maximizing position from their voters.[17] Moreover, more than a third of parties have moved so far in the direction of their voters that they are more extreme than their party's median active partisan. I interpret

[16] Although party members are traditionally portrayed as ideological extremists (May 1973), modern empirical research often finds that party members differ from voters on descriptive qualities (such as education, sex, and income) but not ideology (Norris 1995, Narud and Skare 1999, Koole 2007, Weldon 2007, Linek and Lyons 2007). In every country examined here, however, active partisans and party voters hold significantly different ideological positions.

[17] In all but one of these cases, the parties are very close to the vote-maximizing position. In the only example where this is not the case (the Candian Bloc Québécois), there are only two active partisans. The average number of active partisans across the parties is 24.

this to mean that party members (i.e. those individuals who actually participate in party nominations) are even farther from the vote-maximizing position than active partisans. One way to investigate this is to compare the positions of active partisans and party voters with those of party members. Unfortunately, I do not have information about party membership for most of the parties analyzed here. Based on historical studies of party members, I suspect that there are more active partisans than party members. If active partisans are more similar than party members to the median party voter (and the vote maximizing position), we should observe some parties adopting positions more extreme than the median active partisan.[18]

In the Spanish case, the parties appear to fit my expectation about candidate selection. In the PSOE, the national elite exclusively nominate and select all candidates. In contrast, the PP is significantly more decentralized. In this party, subnational party members nominate and select candidates for parliament. The national party elite may veto candidates with a majority vote. As hypothesized, the position of the decentralized PP is farther from its vote-maximizing position, in the direction of party voters and activists, than the centralized PSOE is from its vote-maximizing position. However, as I discuss in the next section, the *distance* between ideological positions may not be the correct measure for testing arguments about party organization and positioning.

Measuring Congruence as Distance or Vote Share

Simply examining differences in left-right locations of parties and their voters misses the tradeoff parties face in acquiring or losing votes. Because voters are not distributed uniformly, a shift in party position may cause a different change in vote shares at one position than

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[18]I initially expected most parties to adopt positions between their median party voter and the vote maximizing position. Of course parties may adopt more extreme positions for reasons other than democratic candidate selection, and the fact that we see movement among so many parties - including those with exclusive nominations - makes me suspect that something else is causing parties to be more extreme. One possibility is that voters prefer extreme parties (as in the directional voting model [Rabinowitz and MacDonald 1989]), or that moderate voters engage in "policy balancing" (i.e. choosing extreme parties that balance out other extreme candidates [Kedar 2005]). I have not modified the random utility model to allow for either of these possibilities. Another possibility is simply that candidates or party leaders are not vote-maximizing. I discuss this in more detail in the following section.

at another. Thus, if parties gauge movement in terms of the number of general electorate voters they have to gain or lose, we should use changes in the share of voters (rather than distance) to measure party responsiveness. In contrast, the existing literature on congruence tends to concentrate on ideological distance. In the analysis below, I employ both measures that quantify shifts in ideological position, as well as those that reflect changes in vote share.

To understand how a party's position affects its vote share, I again employ the random utility model. The fitted model is used to predict a party's vote share at the position of its median active partisan and its median voter from the previous election. I then compare these vote shares with the vote share obtained at the party's actual position as well as the predicted vote share at the vote-maximizing position.

Beyond this, I measure a party's success at appealing to a broad segment of the population instead of simply its core voters by using the variable *proportion closest*, which indicates the proportion of total voters who are closest to a party. Once again the logic in the spatial voting model is instructive. A party that moves toward a vote-maximizing position is by definition optimizing the number of voters that are closer to it than any other party. This variable ranges from 0 to 1, with higher values indicating that a party is closer to more voters, and presumably freer to respond to the interests of marginal voters. In the data the variable ranges from 0.03 in the Dutch Labor Party to 0.59 in the Spanish Socialist Workers Party. These two examples are suggestive of a bias – the total proportion of the electorate that a party can obtain will depend on the number (and positions) of other parties competing. For this reason, in the following analyses that employ *proportion closest* as the dependent variable I control for the number of parties in a country.

The hypotheses should primarily operate at the district level. For example, a candidate from a party with inclusive candidate selection should be closer to the position of the median party voter *in his or her district* than will a candidate from a party where leaders control nominations. To account for this, both variables are also created at the district level and are then averaged across districts to create a party-level variable that describes the average

district-level effect. *Party voter distance (district)* takes the mean across districts of the absolute value of the difference between a party's position in a district (that is, the mean position of the party as placed by all respondents from a given district) and that party's median voter's position in that district. Likewise, *proportion closest (district)* is the mean (across districts) of the proportion of voters in a district who are closer to the given party than any other party.

Other Variables

Additional Intraparty Competition Variables

In addition to the three candidate selection indicators – *inclusive*, *semi-inclusive*, and *exclusive* – I include two other variables described in Chapter 2 that also measure the degree to which members, rather than leaders, exert control over important party strategies. Recall that *decentralized finance* is an index variable that ranges from 0 (national party levies and collects all membership fees) to 4 (local party chapters exclusively set and receive subscriptions). I hypothesize that candidates are more responsive to members, and less likely to maximize votes, in parties with decentralized finances.

Member delegates is an indicator variable that equals 1 if conventions are exclusively made up of rank and file party members and 0 if they are not. In the latter, delegations may include members of parliament, national elite, ex-leaders or union representatives. I expect member control over party conventions to lead candidates to be more responsive to party voters.

Control Variables

I also expect that when more parties compete, the ideological space a party can capture will decrease on average. The variable *1/effective number of legislative parties* divides one by the effective number of legislative parties in the last election, as described by Laakso and

Taagepera (1979). This formula should approximate the average effect of an increase in the number of parties on the space available to a party. Because I am taking the inverse of the effective number of parties I expect the variable to have a positive effect on distance.

Two variables measure parties' relative ideological positions. Party *extremism* is the absolute value of the difference between 5 and the party's mean placement by voters in the CSES survey (which can range from 0 to 10). If the highest density of voters is toward the middle on the ideological scale, parties on the extremes will receive support from voters with a greater range of ideological positions, even when they earn equal vote shares as those parties in the center.[19] This places a higher upper bound on distance from the median party voter for extreme parties than for non-extreme parties. I include this variable in regressions where *party voter distance* is the dependent variable, and I expect extreme parties to be farther, on average, from the median party voter than less extreme parties.

Interior designates whether or not a party is positioned between two other competitive parties.[20] This variable equals 1 for interior parties and 0 otherwise. For all parties, moving from the position that maximizes votes to the position of the median voter should lead to a decrease in the proportion of voters who are closest to the party. However, all else equal, this effect should be greater for parties at the extremes than those in the interior. Extreme parties lose voters who are close to the party they border. Interior parties also lose voters close to one party they border, but they simultaneously gain voters from the party to the side they move toward. Thus I expect the intraparty competition variables to have a greater (negative) effect for non-interior parties than for interior parties, all else equal.

In federal countries competition frequently occurs on a territorial dimension as well as a common ideological dimension. If party ideology is not the primary factor in voters' decisions, candidates and parties may be less ideologically responsive, both to voters and the general public. If this is the case I expect *federalism*, which takes on the value of 1 if the country is

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[19] A visual inspection of the data shows a unimodal distribution of voters, where the maximum is between 4 and 6 on the ideological scale, in most countries.

[20] A party is considered competitive if it received at least eight percent of the vote in the last election. This is also the standard used to select the parties examined in this project.

federal or quasi-federal, and 0 if it is unitary, to have a positive effect on *party voter distance (district)* and *proportion closest (district)*.

I also include an indicator variable identifying whether or not a country's electoral rules are *majoritarian* or proportional.

Results

As a first cut, Figure 3.3 plots the average distance between parties and all voters (left) or their own voters (right). As we can see, the pattern is striking: inclusive parties are significantly farther from the general electorate than are exclusive parties, but they are much closer to their own supporters. This lends support to the hypothesis that inclusive parties pull candidates closer to their core support base at the expense of moving away from the rest of the electorate.


Figure 3.3: Distance to all voters in the general electorate (left) and party voters, by candidate selection.

Next, I turn to regression models to examine how intraparty candidate competition shapes

	1. ClosMax	2. DistMax	3. DistAct
Inclusive	-0.30	-0.12	0.05
	(0.50)	(0.17)	(0.09)
Exclusive	0.89*	-0.43**	0.30***
	(0.55)	(0.19)	(0.10)
Member Delegates	0.11	-0.14	0.20**
	(0.48)	(0.17)	(0.09)
National Fees	-0.35	0.03	0.09*
	(0.28)	(0.10)	(0.05)
Interior	0.81*	-0.52***	-0.03
	(0.49)	(0.15)	(0.08)
Majoritarian	0.65	-0.26	0.27***
	(0.47)	(0.17)	(0.09)
Constant	-1.31**	1.74***	0.19*
	(0.64)	(0.21)	(0.11)
Observations	127	132	127

Note: ClosMax = indicator if party is closer to vote-maximizing position (1) than mean activist (0). DistMax = distance from vote-maximizing position. DistAct = distance from mean activist position. There are 18 countries in the analysis.

Table 3.3: Party organization and distance to the median voter and vote-maximizing positions.

congruence between parties, the vote maximizing position, and party supporters. All of the models below are using national, rather than district, measures of congruence. They are also all employing the vote-maximizing position for a party given its competitors' current positions (i.e., not using the dynamic maximization process). (I am still generating and exploring those results.) And I am only presenting those results where parties are constrained to move within the ideological space occupied by their nearest neighbors.

Table 3.3 presents results for three party-level regressions where the dependent variables measure some attribute about distance. The models presented throughout are multilevel with party-years as the unit of analysis, nested within countries. The dependent variable in Model 1, "ClosMax," is binary: it equals 1 if the party is closer to the vote-maximizing position than to the position of the mean activist. The dependent variables in Models 2 and 3 measure the party's distance from the vote-maximizing position ("DistMax") and the mean activist ("DistAct"), respectively. Model 1 is a logistic model; Models 2 and 3 are linear regressions. *Semi-inclusive* is the base category for each model.

The first thing to notice in Table 3.3 is that in none of the analyses is the coefficient on *inclusive* significant. Distance does not appear to depend on candidate selection, given that candidates are at least partially selected by members. *Exclusive*, however, is significant: parties where leaders exclusively select candidates are closer to the vote-maximizing position relative to the mean party activist.

Member Delegates is not statistically significant in Models 1 or 2, and it is positive and significant in Model 3, meaning that when convention delegates are allocated proportionally to members, parties are *farther* from their mean activist. *National Fees* is only significant in Model 3, and it is in the expected direction: when the National Party receives the membership fee, parties are farther from the average activist.

An indicator for "interior" parties (i.e. those with competitive parties on both sides) reveals that these parties tend to be closer to the vote-maximizing position. An interaction between *interior* and *inclusive* is not significant (not shown). In addition, in models not

	4. ClosMax	5. Unmax	6. UnmaxPer	7. Vote
Inclusive	0.06	-0.03***	-0.03	-7.94***
	(0.47)	(0.01)	(0.03)	(2.08)
Exclusive	1.41**	-0.04***	-0.05*	-5.24**
	(0.56)	(0.01)	(0.03)	(2.39)
Member Delegates	0.45	0.00	0.02	-6.43***
	(0.49)	(0.01)	(0.03)	(2.06)
National Fees	-0.07	0.01	0.00	2.53**
	(0.27)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(1.19)
Interior	0.64	-0.04***	-0.15***	2.16
	(0.46)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(1.86)
Majoritarian	0.82*	-0.00	-0.04	2.58
	(0.47)	(0.01)	(0.03)	(2.16)
Constant	-1.83***	0.07***	0.24***	28.93***
	(0.66)	(0.01)	(0.03)	(2.65)
Observations	127	132	132	129

Note: ClosMax = indicator if party is closer to vote-maximizing vote share (1) than mean activist vote share (0). Unmax = difference in proportion from vote-maximizing position. UnmaxPer = Unmax divided by percent vote. Vote = vote share in election. There are 18 countries in the analysis.

Table 3.4: Party organization and vote proportion difference from the median voter and the vote-maximizing position.

shown here an indicator for *federalism* at the country level is generally not significant. A variable measuring competition as *1/number of parties* does not change the results for the other variables.[21]

Table 3.4 presents results when the dependent variable compares vote proportions rather than left-right locations. Here, "ClosMax" indicates whether or not the party's vote share is closer to the vote-maximizing share (1) or to the mean activist share (0). "Unmax" is the unmaximized vote share, i.e. the additional percent of the vote the party would receive had they located at the vote-maximizing position. And "UnmaxPer" is the same as "Unmax," except it is taken as a percentage of the party's actual vote.

Again, we find little evidence that there is a significant difference between inclusive and semi-inclusive parties. With the exception of Model 2, *inclusive* is not significant. In Model 2, however, the results indicate that inclusive parties have a *smaller* vote share that they miss out on by being inclusive – contrary to expectations. Taken as a percent (Model 3), this is no longer significant.

Exclusive again goes in the predicted direction. Parties with leader-driven selection tend to be closer to the vote-maximizing position in vote share as well as location. Similarly, they have a smaller share of the vote that is unmaximized – both in absolute and standardized measures. This supports the claim that candidates selected by leaders are more likely to adopt positions that appeal to all voters, not simply the party faithful. *Member Delegates* and *Fees* are again not significant. Interior parties are closer to the vote-maximizing outcome. And an indicator for whether or not the country has a majoritarian electoral system does not reveal a consistent pattern across models.

The aforementioned models directly test the hypotheses by examining ideological congruence between parties and voters. The results have important implications for party success; if individuals behave according to the spatial model, parties with inclusive candidate selec-

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[21]NOTE: I am presenting here only a handful of models, but I am currently looking more in depth at different specifications of these variables, different maximization methods, and including party, rather than party-year, as the unit of analysis.

tion should suffer electorally. Table 3.1 shows that member-led parties tend to do worse at the polls. But does this hold up systematically?

The fourth model in Table 3.4 includes vote percent as the dependent variable. The findings demonstrate that parties with inclusive candidate selection do significantly worse at the polls than parties with semi-inclusive candidate selection. On average, inclusive candidate selection is associated with almost an eight percent decrease in vote share. However, the coefficient on *exclusive* is also negative and significant. The relationship between member control and vote share is not monotonic; parties with semi-inclusive candidate selection outperform both those with strict inclusive or exclusive nomination rules. (The difference between exclusive and inclusive is statistically significant.)

The two other institutional variables – *Member Delegates* and *National Fees* – are also significant and in the hypothesized direction. More control to members is associated with a lower overall share of the vote. But based on the results for Models 1-6, it is doubtful that this operates through party location. Parties that give members control may perform worse for other reasons. For example, members may be less equipped to allocate financial resources efficiently. Or they may run less professional vetting processes when selecting candidates.

Overall the results lend some support to the argument that exclusive candidate selection leads parties to move closer to marginal voters, but farther from their base. These parties are also less successful electorally. But location can only be part of the story. Only half of the difference in vote share between exclusive and inclusive parties can be explained by location. In addition, the effect on congruence seems to operate primarily for exclusive parties (inclusive and semi-inclusive are not statistically different from each other). Yet, the effect on vote share is largest between inclusive and all others. More needs to be done to understand this difference and dynamic.

Conclusion

This chapter provides an institutional rationale for variation in candidate and party responsiveness, as well as electoral success, within and across countries. Election-seeking candidates may adopt suboptimal positions if they are constrained through inclusive party nomination procedures. As voters acquire more influence over candidate selection, parties may become less representative of the general public, and ultimately less successful at the polls.

The findings raise a number of questions and suggestions for future work. First, measuring candidates', rather than parties', positions cross-nationally will enable a more direct test of the hypotheses. This is a huge endeavor that requires comparable metrics for positioning losing as well as winning candidates from democracies around the world. Similarly, cross-national party member surveys may allow researchers to test the effects of institutions on members' perceptions of representation. I explore this to some degree in Chapter 5.

Third, although this chapter focusses on positioning and responsiveness, other characteristics matter as well. Recall the arguments presented in Chapter 1, which see electoral success as the product of two different mechanisms: candidate *responsiveness* and candiate *quality*. Some candidates are better at managing campaigns and fundraising, appear more competent, or simply have more clout in a general election campaign. Perhaps for some voters, enough of the time, it is worth trading position for quality. And if parties with primaries select higher-quality candidates (as Adams and Merrill [2008] argue), inclusive candidate selection may have countervailing effects on vote share. We turn in Chapter 4 to investigate this phenomenon by asking how party organizations shape candidates' nonpositional characteristics.

Fourth, this research raises the question: do voters gain anything by electing parties that better represent them? Controlling for government policy, are constituents more satisfied with democracy, more likely to participate, or stronger partisans when their preferred parties are more in line with core constituents? The answer may have implications for party and

electoral system design. We will address these questions in Chapters 5 and 6.

Perhaps the most interesting question these findings raise is: why are parties democratizing? Parties are increasingly adopting decentralized practices to nominate candidates, elect leaders, run campaigns, write platforms or organize party finances (Lundell 2004, Bille 2001, Saglie and Heidar 2004, Pennings and Hazan 2001). However, decentralized practices – at least with respect to candidate selection – appear to be electorally costly. Previous research suggests that parties democratize to increase membership and appear more transparent (Lundell 2004, Katz 2001), but a systematic study of democratization across parties has yet to be conducted. This issue is discussed further in the book's conclusion.