Cuing the Gap: Gender and Psychological Orientations to Politics

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Abstract:.

Introduction

Extensive research shows that women tend to be less interested and knowledgeable about politics than men. While gender gaps in many forms of political participation have been reduced, differences in women's psychological orientations to politics have been much less immune to women's changing roles in society (increased education, paid workforce participation, etc. See Thomas 2012). Rather, psychological orientations to politics appear to be heavily influenced by gendered forms of socialization.

In this paper, we examine stereotyped messages as one source of socialization. Using a unique experimental design, we examine the ways in which gendered messages about women in politics influences their reported levels of interest, knowledge and efficacy. We use two forms of gendered messages: supply-side arguments where we attribute women's underrepresentation to their lack of interest, and demand-side arguments that attribute women's underrepresentation to institutional discrimination. These messages are contrasted against a control group that received no message. Our findings show that framing women's political underrepresentation as a question of demand and/or institutional biases may be able to eliminate gender gaps in psychological orientations to politics and participation in political parties, in part because it disrupts dominant narratives about women in politics. We also find that emotions may be a moderating variable, though its effects are conditioned by participant gender and cue condition. Finally, contrary to survey research, our results suggest that other historically underrepresented political identities – in this case, non-official language speakers and non-citizens – suppress men's, but not women's, political knowledge and efficacy.

Psychological Orientations to Politics

Political participation and activity are determined by a number of factors. Here, we focus on what the literature refers to as *psychological orientations to politics* – political interest, political knowledge, and political efficacy (Burns, Schlozman, and Verba 2001). Political interest motivates "people to devote time and energy to keep themselves informed about politics" and is a necessary prerequisite for an active and engaged democratic citizenry (Gidengil et al. 2004: 18). Politically interested individuals are more likely to vote, discuss politics, contact their elected representatives, and engage in unconventional political activities (*ibid*.; Burns, Schlozman, and Verba 2001; Hooghe and Stolle 2004). Internal political efficacy refers to citizens' feelings of personal competence "to understand and to participate effectively in politics" (Craig, Niemi, and Silver 1990: 290; Morrell 2003; Thomas 2012) and is an important predictor of political participation. Political knowledge is required to access government services and programs, and it also translates into political power as governments are more responsive to citizen demands when knowledge is equitably distributed across society (Stolle and Gidengil 2010; Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996). Research also shows that well-informed

citizens vote differently than do their counterparts who are poorly informed (Lau and Redlawsk 2006). In short, across post-industrial democracies, psychological orientations to politics are critically important for understanding democratic citizenship.

It is well established that women are significantly less interested in politics, less knowledgeable about politics, and less confident in their political abilities than are men (Thomas 2012; Lawless and Fox 2010; Norris and Krook 2009; Gidengil et al. 2004; Mondak and Anderson 2004; Frazer and Macdonald 2003; Tong 2003; Burns, Schlozman and Verba 2001; Kenski and Jamieson 2000; Van Deth 2000). These gaps are problematic, as women doubt they can complete democratic tasks outside of casting a ballot, and as a result, are less likely than men to participate in most levels of politics.[1] For example, women are less likely to seek elected political office (Fox and Lawless 2011), and thus play less of a role than do men in democratic deliberation and policy-making. This is problematic for at least two reasons. First, it may delay or prevent representation in legislative bodies, as women and men do not necessarily share the same issue and policy preferences (*ibid.*). Second, research shows that in the legislature and the laboratory alike, women's and men's decision-making behaviour changes with the gender composition of that group (Karpowitz, Mendelberg, and Shaker 2012; Hannagan and Larimer 2010; Kathlene 1994). Specifically, men paired with women are more likely to choose outcomes that more closely match their preferences than are teams made up exclusively of men (Hannagan and Larimer 2010). This suggests that women's lower levels of political participation lead to outcomes that are less desirable for society as a whole.

Indeed, if women's political empowerment is measured as women's participation in political decision-making at the national level, then gender-based political inequality is the most pernicious and robust indicator of inequality measured by the Global Gender Gap Reports Hausmann, Tyson, and Zahidi 2013). In the top-ranked country (Iceland), women's political empowerment is about three-quarters of men's. In Canada, women's political empowerment is less than 20 per cent of men's, while in the United States, it is 15 per cent of men's (*ibid*.).[2] This inequality is due, in part, to gender gaps in psychological orientations to politics: men are more likely to participate in politics than women because men "are more likely to be interested, knowledgeable, and efficacious" in politics (Burns, Schlozman, and Verba 2001: 361).

When gender gaps in psychological orientations to politics are comprehensively analysed across time and space, research shows that neither socioeconomic differences nor traditional family structures account for these gaps (Thomas 2012; Lawless and Fox 2011). The only political factor that appears to narrow the gender gap in political interest over time is increasing the number of women elected to public office (Hanes and Thomas 2013; Norris and Krook 2009). Other political contextual factors, including the presence of representational quotas for women, maternity and parental leave, childcare, and

[1] Men are more likely than women to participate in every aspect of politics, save two: voting (Burns, Schlozman, and Verba 2001; Gidengil et al. 2004), and some forms of political consumerism (Stolle and Micheletti 2006).

[2] By contrast, according to the same report, Canadian women's economic participation and opportunities are roughly 78 per cent of men's, while women's and men's educational attainment, and health and survival rates are equal. Three factors comprised "political empowerment" in these reports: the proportion of women in parliament, the proportion of women in Cabinet, and the number of years women have served in the political executive (Hausmann, Tyson, and Zahidi 2012).

taxation structures, did not have any significant effect on the gaps. If we are to understand why these gaps persist, a new approach is required.

Social Identity, Stereotype Threat, and Gender

Social identity and social stereotypes are powerful psychological forces that can affect both attitudes and behavior (Tafjel and Turner 1988). Within this vast body of research, growing evidence suggests that cuing social identities and their associated stereotypes can affect academic performance (Steele 1997; Shih et al. 1999; Murphy et al. 2007). This phenomenon is sometimes referred to as stereotype threat. Typically, negative stereotypes allege an inability or lack of competence that is inherent to a group, such as women, in a particular field, such as mathematics or politics. Individuals do *not* have to believe the specific stereotype for its threat to affect their behaviour; they simply need to know that it exists (Steele 1997).

Vulnerability to stereotype threat is heterogeneous; because multiple social identities are common, the effects of stereotypes on behaviour can be complex. For example, Shih et al. (1999) found that Asian women performed differently in mathematics tests depending on which social identity was cued: Asian (positively associated with math skills) or female (negatively associated with math skills). In a later study, they show that social identity cues (Asian and female) have a reverse effect on verbal tests (Shih et al. 2006). In a related study, Keifer and Sekaquaptewa (2007) show that implicit cues are particularly detrimental to women's math scores when they hold implicit attitudes consistent with these stereotypes. In other words, cues in a social or experimental setting can activate negative stereotypes that then have an effect on performance (for a review, see Major and O'Brien 2005).

For stereotype threat to be implicated in gender gaps in political interest, knowledge and efficacy, politics would have to be a masculine stereotyped field. We contend this it is the case. Politics is intimately connected to power and competition (Huddy and Terkildsen 1993a, 1993b; Sanbonmatsu 2002; Sanbonmatsu and Dolan 2009). Studies indicate that voters tend to prefer masculine to feminine traits when evaluating candidates for high political office, because masculine traits are seen as essential for politics, while feminine traits are not (Huddy and Capelos 2002; Schneider and Bos 2013). Importantly, women politicians are stereotyped as significantly less feminine than women in general, but *as* feminine as, and significantly less masculine than male politicians and politicians in general (Schneider and Bos 2013). Thus, while women in general remain broadly defined by diffuse gender roles, women in politics are defined by what they lack: femininity and specific masculine traits. It is no surprise, then, that preliminary evidence suggests that stereotype threat contributes to the gender gap in political knowledge (McGlone Aronson, and Kobrynowicz 2006). What remains unknown is if stereotype threat leads to women's disengagement from politics more generally, thus contributing to gender gaps in psychological orientations to politics.

The Role of Anxiety

It follows that individuals may become anxious, worried or stressed when confronted with negative stereotypes about a group that comprises part of their social identity. Generally, anxiety has been found to alter short-term memory, increase attention bias towards threatening information, while also increasing distractibility (see Lapointe et

al. 2013). However, research on the impact of negative emotions on engagement with politics has yielded mixed results.

Being anxious about a political candidate's positions or actions can be correlated with higher levels of reported political interest and information seeking (Marcus, Neuman, and MacKuen 2000). Similarly, those who feel anxious, stressed or worried about electoral politics typically retain more information, and are better able to answer questions about these events than are those who feel less threatened (Valentino et al. 2008). However, studies examining the links between anxiety and learning with issues such as war and terrorism found little, or even a negative relationship (Huddy et al. 2007, 2005).

It is not entirely clear how these processes are gendered. Women tend to report lower levels of self-efficacy, both in politics as well as a number of other fields, and are more likely to report being worried or fearful (for a review, see McLean and Anderson 2009). One study reports that, when presented with media reports of violent crime, women report feeling nearly twice as angry after reading the article than their male peers (Gosselin, Harell, and Duval 2013). This suggests that women may be more likely than men to feel higher levels of negative emotions.

It is unclear if and how anxiety affects psychological orientations to politics, especially for those with social identities that carry negative political stereotypes. It is plausible that individuals may further disengage from politics when confronted with a negative stereotype about their social identity group. Conversely, the stereotyped group may become more engaged if instead presented with a statement confirming unfair bias against then in politics. Because both scenarios are likely to produce negative emotions and anxiety, it is not clear how this may affect individuals' ability to recall information they already know about politics (i.e. political knowledge), or their levels of self-reported political interest and efficacy.

Multiple Identities, Multiple Effects?

Gender is but one social identity that is politicized and historically associated with legal restrictions on participation and negative political stereotypes. Arguably, we cannot fully understand the effect of gender-based stereotype threat in politics without also understanding how it interacts with other identities (see Hancock 2007).

Race, ethnicity, language, region, and citizenship status represent social cleavages pervasive in Canadian politics (Blais 2005; Gidengil et al. 2004; Turpel 1991; Cairns 1968). For example, non-citizens are prohibited from voting or holding public office, though they are free to join and donate to political parties and advocacy organizations. Women were prohibited from voting and holding public office at the federal level until 1921, though they were not legally recognized as "persons" until 1929. Gender equality is strongly conditioned by race in Canada, as gender equality gains typically benefit white women disproportionately (Doborolsky 2000; Turpel 1991).

Language is a predominant cleavage in Canada. Officially, Canada is a bilingual country, as this reflects both the country's colonial past and its current constitution. Quebec remains the only predominantly Francophone province, though others contain significant Francophone linguistic minorities. Official bilingualism dictates that every Canadian ought to be able to access federal government services in the language of their choice – English or French. The reality is that bilingual service provision is minimal to

non-existent throughout Canada.[3] In addition to this, nearly one-fifth of Canadians learned and still understand a language other than English or French, though just over 6% use one of these as their sole home language (Statistics Canada 2012). Approximately 6.5% of Canadians report that they do not know either official language (Statistics Canada 2013a).

Multiculturalism and Aboriginal rights are also formally recognized in the Canadian constitution, though this does not preclude assimilationist politics and policies (see, for example, Canada 1996). Both populations are politically underrepresented. For example, approximately one-fifth of Canadians identify as a visible minority (Statistics Canada 2013a), though visible minorities comprise less than 10% of federal elected representatives (Crawford 2011, see also Black and Hicks 2006).

Hypotheses and Expectations

This leads us to three sets of hypotheses. First, we anticipate that women will be systematically less likely than men to know about politics, and less likely to report interest in politics and confidence in their political abilities. We expect that these gaps can be increased by cuing gender before participants complete questionnaires that measure these psychological orientations to politics.

Second, we expect that anxiety will be a moderating factor. Women are anticipated to be more likely than men to report being anxious, stressed, or worried when confronted with a political knowledge test. This may explain, at least in part, these persistent gender gaps in psychological orientations to politics. We further anticipate that women will report higher levels of anxiety when gender is cued than when it is not.

Finally, we ask whether competing social identities produce different reactions to gender cues in politics. For our participants, language, ethnicity, and citizenship status are more salient social identities than gender. If this is the case, we expect these identities to weaken the effect that gender cues may have for some participants. As a result, the gender gaps may be smaller for non-citizens, and racialized participants than they are for Canadian citizens, and white participants. Our expectations about the effects of language are unclear. We anticipate significant differences to appear along both majority-minority linguistic group lines, as well as between groups whose mother tongue is an official language – that is, English or French – and those whose mother tongue is neither English nor French.[4]

Data and Methods

[3] For example, in Alberta, Manitoba, Ontario, Quebec, and Prince Edward Island, only about half the federal government offices provide services in both English and French (Service Canada 2013). By contrast, only about one third of Service Canada offices in British Columbia, Saskatchewan, and Nova Scotia offer services in French. In New Brunswick, all but three offices are fully bilingual; in Newfoundland and Labrador, all but two offices offer services in English only. Only one office in each of the Territories has bilingual services.

[4] Canadians who list English as their mother tongue make up about 12% of the population in Montreal, while those who list French as their mother tongue make up about 2% of the population in Calgary. All others listing a non-official language (neither English nor French) as their mother tongue make up between 21 and 22% of both cities (Statistics Canada 2013b, authors' calculations).

The experiment involved university 170 students; 89 completed the experiment in Montreal in June 2013, and 81 in Calgary in July through December 2013.[5] Students in both cities were recruited from large courses from various disciplines. Participants received $10 for their participation in the study, which lasted about 15 minutes. A description of the survey instrument is provided in Appendix A, and an overview of our sample characteristics is provided in Appendix B.

The experimental design is comprised of three conditions involving exposure to different cues, to which participants were quasi randomly assigned.[6] After answering a few questions about faculty affiliation and politics – for example, how they evaluated the way democracy works in Canada, how they ranked various political issues by importance, as well as political party attachment at both the provincial and federal level – respondents were required to read short statements about women representation. The first cue highlights women as responsible for the representation gap, while the second underlines the role of political parties as a more systemic source of women's underrepresentation in parliament.

[Table 1 about here.]

The knowledge battery contains of 13 questions presented in randomized order.[7] There were seven traditional political knowledge items: two questions pertained to international politics, three to federal politics, and two to provincial politics. Another six questions were designed to tap 'practical political knowledge.'[8] On average, respondents answered about 7 of the 13 questions correctly in both city locations. The questions varied in difficulty, with correct responses ranging from 38% to 87% of the sample. In addition to a single additive scale based on all correct responses, we also created two sub-scales to distinguish between traditional political knowledge (including the seven international, federal and provincial politics items) and practical political knowledge (including the six practical items). On average, respondents answered 4 of 7 traditional

[5] Extreme weather conditions in Calgary at the time hampered recruitment in Calgary. Our participant count is relatively low, though not unusual for a student sample. The jury is still out on whether the use of student sample significantly reduces our capacity to generalize experimental results. Mintz et al. (2006) find it limits generalization but not Druckman and Kam (2011).

[6] The lab supervisor randomly assigned participants to computers onto which conditions were pre-loaded. Pure randomness could not be used to maintain a comparable number of participants to each condition.

[7] The study was conducted in English in Calgary and in French in Montreal. Parallel questions were asked in each city for the about provincial and practical politics items, with wording differences that reflect the provincial differences (e.g. names of Ministers, provincial social program names, etc.) are the same in each city, though the response categories reflect differences between each city and their respective provinces. In addition to the 13 items, we also added a test question that was based on information provided in the treatments: "Women make up about what percentage of the Canadian Parliament?" This item is not included in the knowledge batteries because those in the treatment conditions were provided this information earlier in the survey, whereas the control condition was not.

[8] These practical items are designed to respond to feminist critiques of existing political knowledge batteries. These critiques suggest that women's knowledge is underestimated because most political knowledge measures do not test whether individuals know about government programs and services. Stolle and Gidengil (2010) find that the gender gap in political knowledge narrows and, at times, closes the knowledge gap between privileged women and men. However, they also find that low-income, immigrant, and older women – those most often in need of these programs and services – are the least knowledgeable about politics, however defined.

items correctly, and 3 of 6 practical items. There was little evidence of differences between the two samples.[9] The questions were designed to be "tough, but fair," so that participants feel that they ought to, but may not know the answers. This is key both to the stereotype threat literature, as well as to our "anxiety as a mechanism" hypothesis.

Following the knowledge battery, participants were asked in randomized order whether they felt whether the political knowledge questions made them feel worried, anxious, or stressed. All three items load together into a single scale (Cronbach's alpha=.72). Given this high internal consistency, we treat them as a single scale for the purposes of our analysis.[10] We also note that there appears to be some difference across samples in the distribution on this item, with the English sample in Calgary reported more extreme emotional responses (mean=1.5) compared to the French sample in Montreal (mean=1.2).[11] We suspect this is due in part to the strength of the French versions of the words worried, anxious, and stressed.[12] Following these questions, participants were asked about their political activity, interest, and efficacy. The experiment concludes with a series of series of socio-demographic questions. For more information, please refer to Appendix A.

In the analysis, we provide both bivariate and multivariate results, using comparison of means and ANOVA analysis. All models include a treatment variable (labelled condition), which we examine individually and in interaction with our independent variables of interest (female=1; emotion scale). All models include a control for the sample (Calgary=0, Montreal=1) to account for variation due to the timing of the experiment as well as the language of the instrument.

Results

Table 2 presents the means for each of the three knowledge batteries by gender and by condition. The literature clearly suggests that we should expect women to do less well than men on political knowledge tests, at least in so far as they tap traditional types of political knowledge related to political personalities and institutions. Our data is consistent with this literature. For the full knowledge battery, men answered on average about one more question correctly than women. This difference appears to be largely driven by the traditional political knowledge questions included in the full battery, and can be seen again when we consider the traditional items in isolation. Both of these differences are statistically significant ($p<.05$).

[Table 2 about here]

As we expected, this gender difference in political knowledge does not extend to our practical political knowledge battery, where men and women both answer a little over half of the questions correctly on average. Similar to Gidengil and Stolle (2010), we find

[9] The two items capture different dimensions of political knowledge, with a correlation of only r=0.15.

[10] Note, though, that some research suggests that they should be treated separately, despite the fact that they are related (e.g. Huddy et al. 2005, Lapointe et al. 2013).

[11] Each emotion variable is measured on a 0-4 scale. The original index runs from 0-12, but was rescaled to 0-4 as some categories did not contain cases in all cue/gender combinations.

[12] Specifically, anxious in French – "anxieux" – carries stronger connotations with clinical diagnoses than it may in English.

that practical political knowledge – gained often from interacting with various institutions within one's community – are much less likely to create the sorts of differences that emerge when questions focus on institutional politics. The latter is facilitated by an interest in politics and certain behaviors, such as regularly following the news; both interest and media consumption are known to vary by gender. Practical political knowledge items, we suspect, are more immune to gendered socialization around the consumption of politics.

When it comes to our treatment effects, we do not find any significant effects across conditions. This implies that the treatment itself does not appear to have evoked more or less cognitive recall of political knowledge items, regardless of how they were measured. Yet, our hypothesis is based on the assumption that these stereotype cues should not affect all respondents equally. Rather, we expect that women should be particularly susceptible to our treatment conditions. To analyze this possibility, we run simple ANOVA tests that include a gender/condition interaction, along with a control for the sample. The results of this analysis are present in Table 3.

[Table 3 about here]

As with the bivariate results presented in Table 2, we find that gender matters for both the full knowledge battery as well as for the traditional knowledge battery. The effect remains significant when controls are introduced ($p<.05$). We find no evidence, again, of a direct effect of condition for these two knowledge batteries. However, we do find evidence that suggests a conditional effect for practical political knowledge ($p<.10$): when a supply-side argument was used, respondents answered about 3.7 questions correctly. In the demand-side and control conditions, respondents answered about 3.3 questions correctly. This is in opposition to our hypothesis, that such arguments would reduce correct responses, at least among women. A means analysis suggests instead that the effect is found in the reverse for men instead: in the supply-side condition, men answer about 4 questions correctly. There are no conditions where a comparable knowledge boost is found for women. However, this effect does not achieve statistical significance in analysis presented in Table 3. Despite this, these results point again to the uniqueness of practical political knowledge as a dimension of knowledge that has distinct correlates from more traditional measures.

Gender gaps are also found for political interest and political efficacy (Table 4). Men report levels of political interest that are nearly a point higher than women's ($p<0.05$). This is consistent with the literature. However, the gap generated for political efficacy is considerably smaller than what is predicted by the literature. On average, men are more likely to feel confident in their political abilities by just under half a point on our scale ($p<0.10$). These effects hold with the addition of sample controls.

[Tables 4 and 5 about here]

Of particular interest in Table 5 is the interaction between gender and condition for political interest. Our general theoretical expectation is that cueing women's under-representation should lead women to psychologically disengage with politics. We do not expect a similar effect for men. Table 5 provides some evidence that such an effect exists,

at least when we focus solely on political interest. Along with a direct effect for gender, the gender/condition interaction approaches significance ($p<.15$) as well. This effect is illustrated in Figure 1. In both the control group ($p<0.10$), as well as the supply-side treatment ($p=0.10$), men are more likely to report higher levels of political interest than women. This difference is not present in the demand-side condition. This pattern is replicated for political knowledge scores, especially with respect to the traditional knowledge battery, though the results do not achieve conventional levels of statistical significance.

[Figure 1 about here]

This finding, while preliminary, provides an interesting avenue for refining our understanding of how gendered messages influence women's political interest levels. When *no* messages are present, as in our control condition, we find the expected gender gap. Reminding women of their under-representation and suggesting that it is due to their lack of interest in politics does nothing to reduce this gap. In other words, this suggests that the supply-side argument, at best, is not compelling, and at worst, reflects that dominant discourse around women's under-representation. The demand-side argument, on the other hand, led women to report slightly higher and men to report slightly lower overall levels of political interest, making their scores indistinguishable. Recall that the demand-side argument suggests that women's underrepresentation is in part due to institutional biases. We suspect that this message is more novel, and thus was able to disrupt dominant discourses for women, but especially for men.

Our second hypothesis relates to the moderating role of emotions. We expect that negative emotions such as anxiety, worry and stress would lead to weaker cognitive performance, and that women would be particularly likely to feel such emotions, especially when reminded of their under-representation in politics. Table 6 presents the overall levels on our emotional response battery by gender, sample, and condition. In general, our data are inconsistent with our expectation that responding to the political knowledge battery would induce more of an emotional response from women compared to men. Overall, men scored 1.6 on the 0-4 emotional response battery, whereas women averaged only 1.2. This pattern is more pronounced in Montreal, though it is also present in the Calgary sample. In other words, men reported reacting more strongly than women to answering the political knowledge battery.

[Table 6 about here]

Interestingly, our data tend to suggest a gendered emotional response to our treatments as well. Men were most likely to respond emotionally in the control condition, reporting relatively high levels of stress, anxiety and worry. This was reduced when the knowledge battery was preceded by a cue about women's under-representation in politics. It is as if reminding men that they are dominant in the political sphere took off some of the pressure from answering the questions corrected. Women, on the other hand, responded less emotionally overall than men to the questions. Yet, their highest level of emotional response came when they were told their underrepresentation was due to discrimination. As was suggested in the preceding analysis presented in Figure 1, the

demand-side argument tends to evoke more a response from women, and tends to evoke the least response from men.

A true test of this hypothesis requires a three-way interaction between condition, gender and emotion level.[13] Results show that the three-way interaction is statistically significant for the full knowledge scale ($p<0.10$), and approaches statistical significance for political interest ($p<0.15$).[14] The effects are shown in Figure 2, where the political knowledge and interest scores are plotted by gender and condition for all participants reporting high levels of stress, anxiety, and worry after completing the knowledge battery. The results for women are consistent with our hypothesis: their scores are lowest in the supply-side condition, and highest in the control group. This suggests that cuing women that their political underrepresentation is due to their own lack of interest suppresses their psychological engagement with politics. Furthermore, cuing that women's underrepresentation in politics is due to discrimination does *not* necessarily increase women's interest and knowledge.

The effects are reverse for men. Cuing that women's underrepresentation is due to discrimination suppresses men's political knowledge and interest when they are stressed, anxious, or worried. By contrast, the supply-side cue consistently increases men's psychological engagement with politics.

[Figure 2 about here]

Though preliminary, it appears that we can evoke difference levels of emotional responses from men and women depending on how we conditioned the knowledge test. Table 6 shows that women's reported levels of emotion are lowest for the supply-side condition, and highest for the demand-side condition, while men appear to be most emotional in control condition and least emotional in the demand-side condition. The implications for gender differences in such emotions suggest that gender differences in psychological orientations to politics may in fact result from the fact that men feel more pressure to know about politics when cued that women are not interested, and this in turn facilitates greater cognitive recall. Our preliminary findings also point in the direction that highlighting the institutional barriers to women's access to politics can potentially have a broader impact on balancing gender gaps in political knowledge. We believe this is a particularly promising avenue for future research.

Our final set of questions relates to whether gender differences in psychological orientations to politics differ across other salient socio-demographic cleavages. In Table 7, we present a breakdown of scores for the traditional and practical knowledge items, political interest, and efficacy by gender, as well as by language and citizenship. When it

[13] We have run initial ANOVA analyses (not shown) that include the emotion scale separately in the models presented in Tables 3 and 5, as well as new models two-way interactions with condition and gender respectively. While we find a direct effect of emotion that approaches statistical significance on the traditional knowledge battery and efficacy ($p<0.15$), the interactions do not reach conventional significance levels. Note, too, that our emotion battery is weakly but positively related to the full ($r=0.09$) and traditional knowledge battery ($r=0.13$), as well as our political efficacy measure ($r=0.11$). The association with political interest is very weak ($r=0.05$)

[14] The three-way interaction is statistically significant for political efficacy as well ($p<0.05$), though an outlier arguably drives this. In the supply-side condition score exceptionally low on efficacy; no other discernable pattern is found.

comes to traditional political knowledge items, we find the expected gender differences between men and women when it comes to those most likely to be from the majority in Canada (e.g. Anglophones and Francophones, as well as citizens and permanent residents). When it comes to those who speak a non-official language, and those in Canada on temporary permits (either work or, more likely, student visas), the gender difference weakens, and in some cases disappears. Interestingly, this appears to be due to the fact that men in these two categories tend to perform less well on the political knowledge items. Women's responses in these two categories tend to not vary greatly from other women's. A similar pattern is found for political efficacy.

[Table 7 about here]

As with our other analyses, these differences disappear when we consider practical political knowledge. While citizens and Anglophones tend to do relatively better on these items than others, there is not any noticeable difference between men and women among these subgroups. However, when political interest is examined, gender differences persist across all subgroups, with men consistently reporting interest levels that are about 1 point higher than women's. Levels of political interest are also lower for Anglophone and Allophones.

Conclusions and Next Steps

Overall, our pilot study produced several findings that provide important insights to gender gaps in women's psychological orientations to politics. First, as first suggested by Stolle and Gidengil (2010), we too confirm that gender differences in political knowledge persist when participants are required to name political leaders and know institutional trivia, but disappears when participants are asked about policy and government programs. Preliminary evidence suggests that women's political knowledge and interest are lowest when they are cued that their underrepresentation is the result of their own lack of interest in politics, or when they are given no cue at all. By contrast, there is no comparable effect when women are cued that their underrepresentation is the result of demand-side, institutional discrimination. This may be because the discrimination cue disrupts dominant narratives about women and politics. It is worth noting that this demand-side cue also elicited the strongest reported emotional response from participants who are women.

Contrary to our expectations, men report stronger emotional responses to our political knowledge questions than do women. This reported emotional response was highest in the control group; we suspect this may be because any cue about women's underrepresentation indicates to men that pressure they may feel to perform well in politics is minimized. Future work will further probe how emotion and anxiety moderate gender gaps in psychological orientations to politics by measuring them directly (physiologically), rather than relying entirely on self-reports.

Finally, our intersectional analysis suggests that other political identities, notably non-official language and non-citizen status, suppressed men's but not women's political knowledge and efficacy. This runs contrary to Stolle and Gidengil's (2010) findings. Comparable effects are not found for political interest.

Overall, these findings have implications for our understandings of persistent differences in women's and men's psychological engagement with politics. While we create these stereotypical cues in a laboratory setting, research examining the gendered nature of political media indicates that messages used in our cues is common. As a result, our future projects will go beyond previous work by examining not only how political inequalities are cued, but how they are framed.

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TABLES AND FIGURES

Table 1: Experimental Design

Condition	*N*	*Cue*
1. Supply-side stereotype threat	N=57 (30 Mtl)	We are interested in what men and women know about politics. Women comprise about 52% of the Canadian population, but only about 25% of the elected political representatives. Some say this is due, in part, to the fact that women just aren't as interested in politics as men. For example, in a recent survey, men were nearly 1.5 times more likely than women to say they are very interested in politics. As a result, men are more likely than women to seek elected political office. Next are some questions about what you know about politics. Please answer to the best of your ability.
2. Demand-side stereotype threat	N=53 (29 Mtl)	As you may know, women comprise about 52% of the Canadian population, but only about 25% of the elected political representatives. Some say this is due, in part, to unfair bias in the political system against women. For example, political parties are more likely to nominate women candidates in ridings where their party is unlikely to win. As a result, men are more likely than women to be elected to political office. Next are some knowledge questions about politics. Please answer to the best of your ability.
3. Control	N=60 (30 Mtl)	(No cue) Next are some questions about what you know about politics. Please answer to the best of your ability.

Table 2: Mean Knowledge Scores by Gender and Condition

	Full Knowledge Scale (0-13)	Traditional Knowledge Scale (0-7)	Practical Knowledge Scale (0-6)
Men	8.2	4.8	3.5
Women	7.4	4.1	3.4
Supply-Side Condition	8.0	4.4	3.7
Demand-Side Condition	7.6	4.3	3.3
Control	7.6	4.4	3.3

Table 3: Predicting Knowledge Based on Gender and Condition (ANOVA)

	Full Knowledge Scale			
	Partial SS	df	f	p-val
Model	51.44	6	2.09	0.06
Woman	29.19	1	7.11	0.01
Condition	10.31	2	1.26	0.29
Woman*Condition	12.92	2	1.57	0.21
Sample	4.67	1	1.14	0.29
Residual	669.15	163		
Total	720.59	169		

	Traditional Knowledge Scale			
	Partial SS	df	f	p-val
Model	41.49	6	3.13	0.01
Woman	23.59	1	23.59	0.00
Condition	0.86	2	0.43	0.82
Woman*Condition	6.13	2	1.39	0.25
Sample	16.79	1	7.61	0.01
Residual	359.62	163		
Total	401.11	169		

	Practical Knowledge Scale			
	Partial SS	df	f	p-val
Model	13.79	6	1.74	0.11
Woman	0.30	1	0.23	0.64
Condition	7.06	2	2.67	0.07
Woman*Condition	3.58	2	1.35	0.26
Sample	3.75	1	2.84	0.09
Residual	215.20	163		
Total	228.99	169		

Table 4: Mean Interest and Efficacy Scores by Gender and Condition

	Political Interest	Political Efficacy
Men	6.9	4.1
Women	6.1	3.7
Supply-Side Condition	6.3	3.8
Demand-Side Condition	6.7	3.8
Control	6.4	4.0

Table 5: Predicting Interest and Efficacy Based on Gender and Condition (ANOVA)

	Political Interest			
	Partial SS	df	f	p-val
Model	89.07	6	3.04	0.01
Woman	33.75	1	6.90	0.01
Condition	1.86	2	0.19	0.83
Woman*Condition	18.77	2	1.92	0.15
Sample	43.03	1	8.80	0.00
Residual	797.05	163		
Total	886.12	169		

	Political Efficacy			
	Partial SS	df	f	p-val
Model	12.43	6	0.72	0.64
Woman	8.66	1	3.00	0.09
Condition	1.62	2	0.28	0.76
Woman*Condition	1.34	2	0.23	0.79
Sample	0.08	1	0.03	0.87
Residual	470.18	163		
Total	482.61	169		



Figure 1: Gender and Condition Effects on Political Interest

Note: Figure presents predicted level of political interest based on ANOVA results presented in Table 5.

Table 6: Mean Emotional Responses by Gender, Sample, and Condition

	Calgary	Montreal	Total
Men	1.6	1.6	6.2
Women	1.5	1.0	4.6
Supply-Side Condition	1.6	1.1	5.2
Demand-Side Condition	1.5	1.2	5.2
Control	1.5	1.3	5.4

	Men	Women	Total
Supply-Side Condition	1.7	1.1	5.2
Demand-Side Condition	1.3	1.4	5.2
Control	1.7	1.1	5.4
Total	1.6	1.2	

Note: Emotional Response Scale run from 0-4, with higher scores indicating feeling more worried, anxious and stressed.



Figure 2: Gender and Condition Effects on Political Interest and Political Knowledge for High Levels of Negative Emotion

Note: All differences are statistically significant, save for the control and demand-side levels for women's political knowledge. Figure presents predicted levels of knowledge and interest based on ANOVA results presented in Appendix A.

Table 7: Psychological Orientation to Politics Levels by Gender, Language and Citizenship

Traditional Political Knowledge			Political Interest		
	Men	*Women*		*Men*	*Women*
French	5.3	4.5	French	7.8	6.6
English	5.0	3.7	English	6.6	5.8
Other	4.0	3.4	Other	6.2	5.1
Citizen	5.0	4.1	Citizen	6.9	6.2
Permanent Resident	4.4	4.1	Permanent Resident	6.8	6.0
Other	3.9	4.1	Other	7.3	6.1

Practical Political Knowledge			Political Efficacy		
	Men	*Women*		*Men*	*Women*
French	3.5	3.2	French	4.7	3.5
English	3.5	3.4	English	4.3	4.0
Other	3.5	3.8	Other	3.5	3.5
Citizen	3.8	3.4	Citizen	4.3	3.7
Permanent Resident	2.8	3.2	Permanent Resident	3.5	3.6
Other	2.7	3.1	Other	4.0	3.6

APPENDIX A: Three-way interactions

Full Knowledge Scale				
	Partial SS	df	f	p-val
Model	157.33	24	1.69	0.03
Woman	14.81	1	3.81	0.05
Condition	6.22	2	0.80	0.45
Emotion	8.08	3	0.69	0.56
Women*Condition*Emotion	104.81	17	1.59	0.07
Sample	5.40	1	1.39	0.24
Residual	563.25	145		
Total	720.59	169		

Political Interest				
	Partial SS	df	f	p-val
Model	193.59	24	1.69	0.03
Woman	25.09	1	5.25	0.02
Condition	6.89	2	0.72	0.49
Emotion	7.12	3	0.50	0.69
Women*Condition*Emotion	113.10	17	5.31	0.02
Sample	25.35	1	1.39	0.15
Residual	692.54	145		
Total	886.13	169		

APPENDIX B: INSTRUMENT

1. PRE-EXPERIMENTAL QUESTIONNAIRE.

We'd like to ask you a few questions about politics.

Nous aimerions maintenant vous poser quelques questions concernant la politique.

On the whole, how satisfied are you with the way democracy works in Canada?

a. Very satisfied
b. Fairly satisfied
c. Not very satisfied
d. Not at all satisfied

De manière générale, êtes-vous satisfait(e) du fonctionnement de la démocratie au Canada ?

e. Très satisfait(e)
f. Plutôt satisfait(e)
g. Plutôt insatisfait(e)
h. Très insatisfait(e)

Using a scale that runs from 0 to 10, where 0 means "Not important at all" and 10 means "Very important," how important are each of these issues to you: [RANDOMIZE ORDER]



a. Health care?
b. Welfare?
c. Education?
d. The Environment?
e. Crime and Justice?
f. Defense and International Affairs?
g. Immigration and Minorities?
h. The Economy?

Sur une échelle allant de 0 à 10, où 0 signifie "Aucune importance" et 10 signifie "Beaucoup d'importance", quelle

importance accordez-vous à chacun des enjeux suivants ? [RANDOMIZE ORDER]

i. La santé
j. Les services sociaux
k. L'éducation
l. L'environnement
m. La lutte contre le crime et la justice
n. La défense et les affaires internationales
o. L'immigration et les droits des minorités
p. L'économie

In politics, people sometimes talk of left and right. Where would you place yourself on the scale below?



En politique, les gens parlent parfois de gauche et de droite. Où vous placeriez-vous sur l'échelle ci-dessous ?

In ***federal*** politics, do you usually think of yourself as a Liberal, Conservative, NDP, Green, or none of these?

a. Liberal
b. Conservative
c. NDP
d. Green
e. None of these [skip next question]

En politique fédérale, vous considérez-vous habituellement :
Libéral ?
Conservateur?
NPD ?
Bloc québécois ?
Parti vert ?
Rien de cela [skip next question]

How strong is your attachment to your political party?

a. Very strong
b. Fairly strong
c. Not very strong

Dans quelle mesure vous sentez-vous proche de ce parti ?

1. Très proche
2. Plutôt proche
3. Pas très proche

In ***provincial*** politics, do you usually think of yourself as a Progressive Conservative, Wildrose, Liberal, NDP, or none of these?

f. Progressive Conservative
g. Wildrose
h. Liberal
i. NDP
j. None of these [skip next question]

En politique provinciale, vous considérez-vous habituellement :
Libéral ?
Péquiste ?
Coalition avenir Québec ?
Québec Solidaire ?
Option nationale ?
Parti vert ?
Rien de cela

How strong is your attachment to your political party?

d. Very strong
e. Fairly strong
f. Not very strong

Vous sentez-vous proche de ce parti ?
a. Très proche
b. Plutôt proche
c. Pas très proche

EXPERIMENTAL PROTOCOL. Participants will be randomly assigned to stereotype cue conditions. Cue conditions include:

<u>*Design: Women's Political Representation*</u>. This study employs a 2 (participant gender) x 3 (stereotype cue) design. Participants will be required to read short statements before they can proceed in the study. Two thirds of the participants will be selected to receive a representation condition; the other third will form the control group.

Both representation conditions are technically true: women are less interested in politics than are men (Thomas, 2012), and political parties disproportionately nominate women in districts they cannot win (Thomas and Bodet, forthcoming).

- Participants in the supply-side condition (N=60 (30 men, 30 women) / QC: N=30) will be required to read the following:

- *We are interested in what men and women know about politics. Women comprise about 52% of the Canadian population, but only about 25% of the elected political representatives. Some say this is due, in part, to the fact that women just aren't as interested in politics as men. For example, in a recent survey, men were nearly 1.5 times more likely than women to say they are very interested in politics. As a result, men are more likely than women to seek elected political office.*
- *Next are some questions about what you know about politics. Please answer to the best of your ability.*

- Participants in the demand-side condition (N=60 (30 men, 30 women) / QC N=30) will be required to read the following:
  - *As you may know, women comprise about 52% of the Canadian population, but only about 25% of the elected political representatives. Some say this is due, in part, to unfair bias in the political system against women. For example, political parties are more likely to nominate women candidates in ridings where their party is unlikely to win. As a result, men are more likely than women to be elected to political office.*
  - *Next are some knowledge questions about politics. Please answer to the best of your ability.*
- Participants in the control condition (N=60 (30 men, 30 women) / QC N=30) will receive no cue. They will be required to read the following:
  - *Next are some questions about what you know about politics. Please answer to the best of your ability.*

TOTAL N = 180 (Calgary), 90 (Quebec)

T1 : *Les femmes constituent près de 52% de la population canadienne. Cependant, seulement autour de 25% des représentant(e)s politiques élu(e)s sont des femmes. Certains avancent que cet état de choses est en partie dû au fait que les femmes ne s'intéressent pas autant que les hommes à la politique. Par exemple, un récent sondage montre que les hommes sont 1,5 fois plus susceptibles que les femmes d'affirmer qu'ils s'intéressent beaucoup à la politique. En conséquence, les hommes sont plus susceptibles que les femmes de tenter de se faire élire comme députés) Voici maintenant quelques questions au sujet de la politique. Veuillez s'il vous plaît répondre au meilleur de vos connaissances.*

T2 : Les femmes constituent près de 52% de la population canadienne. Cependant, seulement autour de 25% des représentant(e)s politiques élu(e)s sont des femmes. Certains avancent que cet état de choses est en partie dû à un biais défavorable du système politique envers les femmes. Par exemple, les partis politiques sont plus susceptibles de

nommer des femmes candidates dans les circonscriptions où ces partis ont peu de chances de remporter l'élection. En conséquence, les hommes sont plus susceptibles d'être élus que les femmes.
Voici maintenant quelques questions au sujet de la politique. Veuillez s'il vous plaît répondre au meilleur de vos connaissances..

Control : Voici maintenant quelques questions au sujet de la politique. Merci de répondre au meilleur de vos connaissances.

3. POST-TREATMENT QUESTIONNAIRE. [RANDOMIZE 1 THROUGH 13]

1. Who is the current Chancellor of Germany?

Qui est le chancelier ou la chancelière actuel(le) de l'Allemagne?

a. Rita Süssmuth
b. Helmut Kohl
c. Gerhard Schröder
d. Angela Merkel*

2. Who was the first president of South Africa after apartheid ended?

Qui fut le premier président de l'Afrique du Sud après la fin de l'apartheid?

a. Thabo Mbeki
b. Jacob Zuma
c. Nelson Mandela*
d. Robert Mugabe

3. What is the name of the Finance Minister of Canada?

Quel est le nom de la personne qui dirige le ministère des Finances du Canada?

a. Vic Toews
b. John Baird
c. Jim Flaherty*
d. Tony Clement

4. What is the name of the Finance Minister of Alberta?

a. Doug Horner*

b. Rob Nicholson
c. Dave Hancock
d. Thomas Lukaszuk

Quel est le nom de la personne qui dirige le ministère des Finances et de l'Économie du Québec?

a. Nicolas Marceau*
b. Jean-François Lisée
c. Pierre Duschesne
d. Bertrand St-Arnaud

5. How many seats are there in the Legislative Assembly of Alberta?

a. 77
b. 87*
c. 97
d. 107

Combien de sièges compte l'Assemblée nationale ?

e. 105
f. 115
g. 125*
h. 135

6. Since 2007, Canadian federal elections must be held at least every…

a. Three years
b. Four years*
c. Five years
d. Six years

Depuis 2007, quelle règle s'applique aux élections fédérale au Canada ? Les élections doivent être tenues au minimum tous les …

g. 3 ans
h. 4 ans*
i. 5 ans
j. 6 ans

7. Which level of government has primary responsibility for health care?

a. The provincial government*
b. The federal government
c. The municipal government
d. None of these

Quel niveau de gouvernement est responsable de ce qui relève de la santé ?

a. Le gouvernement provincial*
b. Le gouvernement fédéral

c. Le gouvernement municipal
d. Aucune de ces réponses

8. If someone had to go to court and could not afford a lawyer, where would be the BEST place to go?
    e. The Alberta Ombudsman
    f. The Alberta Ministry of Justice and Solicitor General
    g. The Alberta Bar Association
    h. Legal Aid Alberta*

Si une personne doit se présenter en cour mais n'est pas en mesure de se payer un avocat, quel serait l'endroit le plus indiqué pour obtenir de l'aide ?

    i. Le bureau du Protecteur du citoyen
    j. Le ministère de la Justice
    k. Le Barreau
    l. Le bureau d'aide juridique*

9. Imagine someone is trying to rent an apartment in Calgary. If they were refused an apartment and thought it was because they were a student, where would be the BEST place to go to make a complaint?
    m. The Calgary City Police Service
    n. The Alberta Ombudsman
    o. The Alberta Human Rights Commission*
    p. The Alberta Ministry of Justice and Solicitor General

Imaginez qu'une personne tente de louer un appartement à Montréal. Si cette personne se voyait refuser la possibilité de louer un appartement et pensait que c'est en raison de son statut d'étudiant(e), quel serait l'endroit le PLUS INDIQUÉ pour déposer une plainte?

    q. Le Service de police de la ville de Montréal
    r. L'ombudsman de la Ville de Montréal
    s. La Commission des droits de la personne et des droits*
    t. La Régie du logement

10. Which of the following medical services is NOT FULLY covered by Alberta Health Care with a doctor's referral?
    u. Physiotherapy*
    v. Laboratory testing (blood tests, urine test, etc.)
    w. Diagnostic imaging (MRI, ultrasound, etc)
    x. Examination by specialist physician

Lequel de ces services médicaux n'est PAS ENTIÈREMENT couvert par la Régie de l'assurance maladie du Québec ?

a. La physiothérapie
b. Les tests en laboratoire (tests sanguins, d'urine, etc.)
c. L'imagerie diagnostique (résonnance magnétique, échographie, etc.)
d. L'examen par un médecin spécialiste

11. If someone is working in Canada and has to take care of a seriously ill relative, how many weeks of compassionate care benefits are paid?

Si quelqu'un travaille au Canada et doit prendre soin d'un proche gravement malade, à combien de semaines de prestations de compassion cette personne a-t-elle droit?

y. 4 weeks
z. 6 weeks*
aa. 8 weeks
bb. 12 weeks

12. If you knew of a child being abused, where would be the BEST place to go to file a report?

cc. The Calgary City Police Service
dd. The Alberta Ministry of Justice and Solicitor General
ee. The Calgary and Area Child and Family Services Authorities*
ff. The Calgary Board of Education

Si vous appreniez qu'un enfant était victime d'abus, où serait-il le plus indiqué de signaler le problème ?

gg. Le Service de la police municipale
hh. Le ministère de la Famille
ii. La Direction de la protection de la jeunesse *
jj. Le ministère de la Santé et des services sociaux OU, pour faire miroir : le ministère de l'Éducation, du Loisir et du Sport

13. In order to claim tuition tax credits with the Canadian Revenue Agency, which tax form would a student enrolled in a Canadian university need to fill out?

Quel formulaire de la déclaration de revenus les étudiants inscrits dans une université canadienne doivent-ils remplir afin d'obtenir le crédit d'impôt pour les frais de scolarité et le matériel scolaire auprès de l'Agence canadienne du revenu ?

a. TL11A
b. T324
c. TS11
d. T2202A*

14. [NOT RANDOMIZED] Women make up about what percentage of the Canadian Parliament?

Quelle est la pourcentage approximative de femmes au parliament du Canada?

e. 15%
f. 20%
g. 25%*
h. 30%

[RANDOMIZE ORDER]

After responding to these political questions, do you feel : WORRIED?
Very worried, somewhat worried, a little worried, not at all worried.

After responding to these political knowledge questions, do you feel : ANXIOUS?
Very anxious, somewhat anxious, a little anxious, not at all anxious

After responding to these political knowledge questions, do you feel : STRESSED?
Very stressed, somewhat stressed, a little stressed, not at all stressed

Après avoir répondu à ces questions sur vos connaissances politiques, vous sentez-vous : [RANDOMIZE]

Très stressé(e) ?
Plutôt stressé(e) ?
Peu stressé(e) ?
Pas du tout stressé(e) ?

Très inquiet(ète) ?
Plutôt inquiet(ète) ?
Peu inquiet(ète) ?
Pas du tout inquiet(ète) ?

Très anxieux(se) ?
Plutôt anxieux(se) ?
Peu anxieux(se) ?
Pas du tout anxieux(se) ?

Next, we'd like to ask you about political activities. Please indicate if you have done, might do, or would never do any of these activities. [RANDOMIZE ORDER]

Maintenant, nous aimerions en savoir plus au sujet de votre implication politique. Indiquez si vous avez déjà fait, pourriez faire, ou ne feriez jamais les activités suivantes. [RANDOMIZE]

1. Sign a petition.
Signer une pétition

2. Vote in an election
Voter lors d'une election

3. Volunteer for a political party or candidate
Faire du bénévolat pour un parti ou un candidat politique

4. Buy products for political, ethical, or environmental reasons
Acheter des produits pour des raisons politiques, éthiques ou environnementales

5. Take part in a march, rally, or protest
Participer à une marche, un rassemblement ou une manifestation

6. Use the Internet to be politically active
Utiliser l'Internet à des fins politiques

7. Volunteer for a community group or non-profit organization
Faire du bénévolat auprès d'un groupe communautaire ou d'un organisme sans but lucratif

9. Join a political party
Devenir membre d'un parti politique

10. Donate money to a political party
Faire un don à un parti politique

How interested are you in politics generally? Using a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means no interest at all and 10 means a great deal of interest.

0……..1……. 2……. 3……. 4……. 5……. 6……. 7……. 8……. 9……. 10

Sur une échelle allant de 0 à 10, où 0 signifie "Pas intéressé(e) du tout" et 10 signifie "Très intéressé(e)", quel est votre intérêt pour la politique en général ?

For each of the following items, please tell us how much you agree or disagree with each statement. [RANDOMIZE]

Pour chacune des questions suivantes, veuillez s'il vous plaît nous indiquer dans quelle mesure vous êtes en accord ou en désaccord avec l'affirmation proposée.

1. Sometimes politics and government seem so complicated that a person like me really can't understand what's going on. Do you:
    a. Strongly agree
    b. Agree
    c. Disagree
    d. Strongly disagree.

Parfois la politique et le gouvernement semblent si compliqués qu'une personne comme moi ne peut pas comprendre ce qui se passe. Êtes-vous :

Complètement d'accord
Plutôt d'accord
Plutôt en désaccord
Complètement en désaccord

2. I would be capable of stating my political opinion openly.
Je peux exprimer mes opinions politiques ouvertement.

3. I often don't feel sure of myself when talking with other people about politics.*
Je me sens souvent peu sûr de moi quand je parle de politique avec d'autres.

4..I would be capable of transmitting information about political movements or parties that I support.
Je serais capable de transmettre de l'information au sujet de mouvements ou de partis politiques que je soutiens.

5. I do not have the skills to actively campaign for the election of political candidates that I trust.
Je n'ai pas les habiletés nécessaires pour faire campagne pour l'élection d'un(e) candidat(e) politique en lequel ou laquelle j'ai confiance.

6. I would be capable of finding ways to support political causes that I believe are just.
Je serais capable de trouver des moyens pour soutenir les causes politiques que je considère juste.

7. I do not have the skills to mobilize people in my community to support political causes in which I believe.
Je n'ai pas les habiletés nécessaires pour mobiliser les gens de ma communauté dans le but de soutenir les causes politiques en lesquelles je crois.

8. The government doesn't really care what people like me think.
Je ne crois pas que le gouvernement se soucie beaucoup de ce que les gens comme moi pensent.

Now we would like to ask you a few more questions about yourself before you complete the experiment.

Maintenant, nous aimerions vous poser quelques questions avant de terminer l'expérience.

First, what faculty are you currently enrolled in?

a. Arts
b. Education
c. Environmental Design
d. Graduate Studies
e. Haskayne School of Business
f. Kinesiology
g. Law
h. Medicine
i. Nursing
j. Schulich School of Engineering
k. Science
l. Social Work
m. Veterinary Medicine
n. Other

À quelle faculté êtes-vous affilié(e)?

École des sciences de la gestion
Faculté de communication
Faculté de science politique et droit
Faculté des arts
Faculté des sciences
Faculté des sciences de l'éducation
Faculté des sciences humaines
École supérieure de mode
Aucune

What is the highest level of education that you have COMPLETED?

a. High school
b. Undergraduate – First Year
c. Undergraduate – Second Year
d. Undergraduate – Third Year
e. Undergraduate – Fourth Year
f. I am a graduate student.
g. Other (please specify)

Quel est le plus haut niveau d'éducation que vous avez COMPLÉTÉ ?

Secondaire complété
Collège ou cégep complété
Première année du baccalauréat complétée
Deuxième année du baccalauréat complétée
Troisième année du baccalauréat complétée
Je suis à la maîtrise ou au doctorat
Autre

Do you identify as a man or a woman?

a. Man
b. Woman

Vous êtes:

Un homme
Une femme

What is your status in Canada?

a. Citizen
b. Permanent resident
c. Other (please specify)

Quel est votre statut au Canada ?
Citoyen
Résident(e) permanant(e)
Autre

What is your religion, if you have one? [Open-ended]

Quelle est votre religion, si vous en avez une?

In your life, would you say that religion is very important, somewhat important, not very important, or not important at all?

a. Very important
b. Somewhat important
c. Not very important
d. Not important at all

Diriez-vous que la religion tient une place très importante, assez importante, pas très importante, ou pas importante du tout dans votre vie?

To what ethnic or cultural group(s) do you belong? [Open-ended]

À quel groupe ethnique ou culturel appartenez-vous?

What is the first language you learned and still understand?

English
French
Other

Quelle est la première langue que vous avez apprise et que vous comprenez encore?
Français
Anglais
Autre

What is the highest level of education that your MOTHER has completed ?

No schooling
Some elementary
Completed elementary
Some secondary/High school
Complete secondary/High school
Some technical, community collège, CEGEP or collège classique
Completed technical, community collège, CEGEP or collège classique
Some university
Bachelor's degree
Master's or Ph.D.
Don't know

Quel est le plus haut niveau d'éducation que VOTRE MÈRE a complété ?

Aucune scolarité
Primaire non complété
Primaire complété
Secondaire non complété
Secondaire complété
Collège, collège classique ou cégep non complété
Collège, collège classique ou cégep complété
Quelques années d'études à l'université - diplôme non obtenu

Baccalauréat
Maîtrise ou Doctorat
Je ne sais pas

What is the highest level of education that your FATHER has completed ?

No schooling
Some elementary
Completed elementary
Some secondary/High school
Complete secondary/High school
Some technical, community collège, CEGEP or collège classique
Completed technical, community collège, CEGEP or collège classique
Some university
Bachelor's degree
Master's or Ph.D.
Don't know

Quel est le plus haut niveau d'éducation que VOTRE PÈRE a complété ?

Même options réponses que plus haut

Generally speaking, how many days in a week do you do read, watch or listen to the news?

Never 1 2 3 4 5 6 Everyday

En général, combien de jours par semaine consultez-vous les nouvelles (à télévision, à la radio, dans la presse écrite ou sur le web)?
Jamais 1 2 3 4 5 6 Tous les jours

We are interested in any further comments you may wish to make this study.

(open ended page)

Vos commentaires concernant cette étude sont les bienvenus.

APPENDIX B : SAMPLE CHARACTERISTICS

	Calgary	*Montreal*	*Total*
City	21%	79%	
Language			
French	0%	88%	69%
English	71%	2%	17%
Other	30%	10%	14%
Citizenship			
Citizen	83%	69%	72%
Permanent Resident (landed immigrant)	13%	11%	12%
Other	4%	20%	17%
Partisanship			
Liberal	29%	12%	17%
Conservative	42%	1%	10%
NDP	8%	29%	25%
Bloc Québécois	n/a	19%	15%
Green	0%	8%	11%
None	21%	30%	24%
Ideology			
Mean Left-Right Placement (0-10)	6.3	4.7	5.1
Gender			
Men	67%	35%	42%
Women	33%	65%	58%