Time to Kill: The Impact of Election Timing and Sequencing
on Post-Conflict Stability

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Abstract
Elections constitute a fundamental element of post-conflict peacebuilding efforts in the post-Cold War era and are often held soon after conflicts end. Yet, the impact of early elections on post-conflict stability is unclear. While early elections may facilitate peace agreements, hasten democratization, and promote economic recovery, they may also entrench wartime combatants in power, undermine genuine democracy, and spark an immediate return to violence. Our goals in this project are, thus, two-fold. The first is to understand the factors that lead to early elections and the second is to analyze the effect of electoral timing and sequencing on post-conflict stability. We argue that early elections, largely a product of the post-Cold War era, undermine post-conflict stability by occurring prior to demobilization and the development of strong political institutions. Our analysis is based on all civil wars that have ended between 1945 and 2006, and relies on duration models to examine the timing of post-conflict elections, as well as matching-methods to understand the causal relationship of electoral timing and sequencing to post-conflict stability.
Introduction

Elections constitute a fundamental element of post-conflict peacebuilding initiatives in the post-Cold War era, serving arguably to facilitate peace agreements (Lyons 2002), extricate international actors from conflicts abroad, (Lyons 2002), legitimize post-conflict governments (Bezhan 2006; Lacher 2007), stimulate democracy (Barrick n.d.; Bjornlund, Cowan and Gallery 2007; Clark 2000; Ocasio-Santiago 2007; Soudriette and Pilon 2007), and demonstrate the aptness of war-ravaged countries for international aid (Lyons 2002; Kumar 1998). As such, postconflict elections are often held soon after civil wars end. Angola, for example, held national elections a little more than a year after signing the Bicesse Accords (1991), while Bosnia-Herzegovina held them less than one year after signing the Dayton Agreement (1995). Mozambique conducted national elections three years after Bosnia, but only two years after ending its own civil war. Liberia, meanwhile, held elections in 2005, only two years after ending its second civil war in two decades.

Yet, the utility of early elections is debatable. On one hand, early elections may expedite peace settlements (Lyons 2002), facilitate home-grown governance (Diamond 2006), hasten democratization (Clark 2000), and enable post-conflict countries to attract international aid (Kumar 1998; Lyons 2002). On the other hand, early elections may entrench wartime combatants in power, hinder democratic consolidation, and prompt electorally marginalized groups to resume fighting (de Zeeuw 2008; Diamond 2006; Leyraud 2000; Paris 2004; Reilly 2002). Early elections may also be flawed or poorly designed, given the haste under which they are conducted, and leave the citizenry disenchanted with democracy as a result (Pouligny 2000; Reilly 2002).

In practice, post-conflict elections, especially early ones, have had rather mixed results. Angola immediately returned to war after holding elections in 1992. Yet, Mozambique did not and, in fact, experienced an uptick in democracy thereafter. Bosnia did not recede
into violence either, nor did Liberia. Yet, Liberia’s prior attempts at elections were not so successful. In 1997, less than two years after signing the Abuja Agreement, Liberia freely elected Charles Taylor president. Democratization stumbled thereafter and Liberia was embroiled in another civil war five years later.

A consensus has emerged, as a result, that “[i]ll-timed and ill-prepared elections do not produce democracy, or even political stability, after conflict” (Diamond 2006, 99). A consensus has not emerged, however, as to the optimal conditions for post-conflict elections. How soon after a civil war ends should elections be held? What conditions should exist on the ground before elections occur? Should national elections occur before subnational elections, or vice versa? In this study, we seek to understand whether or not elections affect the prospects for stability in post-conflict countries, and if they are beneficial, what are the conditions most likely to achieve these ends. We focus on the effect of electoral timing and sequencing, although we also analyze other aspects of elections, including the extent to which elections are democratic and the rules under which elections are conducted.

In brief, we argue that postconflict electoral timing is a function of the external and internal demand for elections, as well as the institutional capacity of countries to conduct elections. The external demand is driven by the democracy-promoting agenda of the international community - prominent in the post-Cold War era, while the internal demand is driven by expectations regarding the election results, but not on expectations about the violence-producing nature of these elections. The institutional capacity to conduct elections, meanwhile, is based on a country’s prior experience with elections, its wealth, and the amount of international assistance its receives. In turn, we argue that early elections tend to reignite conflict over late elections since the former are more likely to result in a mismatch between actors expectations about the election results and the actual results than the latter. Mismatches of this kind may prompt renewed fighting when elections occur soon
after conflicts ends since combatants are less likely to be demobilized in this context, and political institutions, such as courts, civil society organizations, as well as a free media, are less also likely to exist, or to function well, to enable former combatants, to contest the election results peacefully.

In disaggregating the effects of post-conflict elections, this study seeks to add a new dimension to the extant literature on democratization and war (Mansfield and Snyder 1995; Snyder 2000; Mansfield and Snyder 2002, 2005). Most work disaggregating these effects has focused on particular types of electoral systems, including power-sharing (Reilly 2002; Roeder and Rothchild 2005; Walter 2002). While we also consider these issues, we demonstrate how their effects are contingent, at least in part, on the timing and sequencing of post-conflict elections. Substantively, this study shares much in common with a smaller, but burgeoning literature on post-conflict elections (Bjornlund, Cowan and Gallery 2007; Buxton 2006; Diamond 2006; Kumar 1998; Leyraud 2000; Lyons 2002; Pouligny 2000; Reilly 2002; Sivapathasundaram 2004; de Zeeuw 2008). We differ from this literature methodologically, however. While this literature is based entirely on qualitative case studies of conflicts occurring primarily after the Cold War, we use quantitative techniques to generalize our findings over the entire post-WWII period and to disentangle the causal relationships between elections and violence through matching methods.

The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In the first section, we describe historical trends in the timing and sequencing of post-conflict elections. In the second section, we present our argument about the factors that influence electoral timing and the conditions that are most propitious for post-conflict elections, while in the fourth section we present the data we use and the measurements we employ in our statistical analysis. In the fifth section, we analyze the timing of the first post-conflict elections in countries while in the sixth, we examine the effects of electoral timing and sequencing on post-conflict reconstruction.
Post-Conflict Electoral Trends (1945-2008)

The first post-conflict elections (FPEs) in countries are typically deemed early or late based on either one of two conceptions of election timing. While in practice the two are often conflated, the first views elections in terms of how much time has passed after a civil war has ended, while the second understands them in terms of their ability to satisfy certain pre-requisites (Reilly 2002; Diamond 2006; Clark 2000; Lyons 2002; Leyraud 2000; Paris 2004). Accordingly, elections that occur within a certain date of a civil war ending or before certain conditions are satisfied, are considered early, while those that do not are deemed late. Within these different conceptions, there is no agreement as to how many years must transpire after a civil war has ended or what conditions must be satisfied for an election to be deemed late. Often, moreover, election timing is defined endogenously, whereby elections that are successful are defined as early and those that are unsuccessful in fostering peace and democracy are deemed late.

In this study, we define election timing exogenously in terms of the ability of FPEs to meet certain conditions. The conditions include at a minimum demobilization, and at a maximum a professionalized bureaucracy, a rule of law including an independent judicial system, and a free press. The relationship of first elections to the end of a civil war is relevant in so much as it is related to the ability of countries to meet these conditions. Within a short period of time, countries, even highly motivated ones with many resources, may have difficulty meeting these conditions. The passage of a significant amount of time, however, does not guarantee that countries will satisfy these conditions since countries may lack the motivation and/or resources to undertake needed measures to meet these conditions.

Figure 1 depicts trends in the timing of FPEs since the end of World War II. Elections have not yet occurred in 3 countries (i.e., Angola, Burma, and Sudan) denoted by unconnected circles. These circles represent the minimum number of years, which may elapse in
these countries between the end of their civil wars and the date of their first postconflict elections.¹ Over the post-World War II period, the civil war-election gap (i.e., the number of years between the end of a civil war and the first postconflict election) is shrinking.² Prior to 1980, the civil war-election gap averaged 5.46 years. Between 1980 and 1989, this figure dropped to 2.60 and after 1989, with the end of the Cold War, it dropped to 2.31. Strikingly, 77 percent of FPEs occur at the national level, largely for national legislatures. Only 15 percent occur at the subnational level and 8 percent occur at both levels simultaneously. In those cases where subnational elections occur prior to national elections, three-quarters of the time national elections occur within 2 years of subnational elections.³

Post-Conflict Elections in Perspective

At the broadest level, this study builds on the literature linking elections to violence, particularly regime-changing elections. According to this literature, politicians sometimes provoke violence in election periods to gain an electoral edge over their competitors (Brass 1997; Wilkinson 2004). Transitional elections, especially ones toward democracy (Mansfield and Snyder 1995; Snyder 2000; Hegre et al. 2001; Mansfield and Snyder 2002, 2005) are especially violence prone because powerful groups opposed to transitions may utilize force to prevent their occurrence, while politicians may use nationalistic rhetoric to maintain their authority in the absence of strong institutions. In advancing this literature, we differentiate between elections that occur within post-conflict environments and those that do not. We focus on the latter, which we contend are particularly vulnerable to the perils of regime changes, having characteristically weak political institutions likely to favor former

¹ These figures are determined by subtracting for each country the current year (2008) from the year each country’s civil war ended.
² See the "Data and Measurements" section of this paper to determine how the end of a civil war is coded.
³ Future interactions of this project will include information about the proportion of elections that occur before or after our conditions for post-conflict elections are met.
combatants. In post-conflict countries, those opposed to transitions, or to certain electoral outcomes, also have easier access to weapons and troops with which to resist both than in other countries.

Scholars who have examined post-conflict elections in particular are divided over the utility of these elections in ending conflicts, and in promoting peace and democracy afterwards. Terrence Lyons (2002) suggests that elections help terminate conflicts because international forces use elections as justification for extricating themselves from conflicts abroad, and are less willing to commit peacekeeping forces to countries without elections. Elections, Lyons further contends, help post-conflict countries attract international aid and investment from those reluctant to invest in countries without established governments, especially democratic ones.⁴ Caroline A. Hartzell and Matthew Hoddie (2003) suggest, meanwhile, that elections,

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⁴ Jensen (2003) finds that democracies attract higher levels of foreign direct investment than authoritarian
which incorporate power-sharing mechanisms, help end civil wars because they guarantee combatants a role in post-conflict governance. Barbara Walter (2002), who also finds that powersharing helps end conflicts, argues, in contrast, that the prospect of elections is not likely to end civil wars because combatants, fearing that elections will exclude them from political power, may pursue their political goals through war instead.

Scholars and policy-makers are likewise divided over the utility of post-conflict elections in post-war reconstruction. For Spiro Clark (2000), elections are “essential democratic elements of accountability and equality” and “a crucial element of leverage over transitional regimes” (p.37), while according to Marina Ottaway (2003) “[t]here can be little disagreement about the desirability of democracy as a solution to the problems of war-torn countries” (p. 320). Even if imperfect, some scholars contend that FPEs routinize democratic behavior and build institutions that facilitate more democratic elections in the future (Lindberg 2003). As Staffan I. Lindberg remarks, “it is not necessary, as some argue, to start off with a perfect world of democratic elections. To the contrary, for decent democratic wine to be produced, it has to mature in the bottle” (2003, 79).

International organizations, such as the United Nations, and other agencies including the USAID, view elections as vital to democracy and post-conflict stability, and have offered extensive assistance to countries in conducting elections, while recognizing today that elections are not sufficient to produce either outcome (UNDP n.d.; Santioso 2002). This aid runs the gambit from logistical matters regarding conducting elections (e.g., voter registration and monitoring) to advisory issues on electoral design and political campaigns. International organizations, like the UN, have been relatively successful in stimulating democracy in post-conflict environments, according to Bruce Russett (2005), helping to ensure free elections, constrain authoritarian leaders, and empower democratic forces, in contrast to unilateral countries.
interventions.

Others, however, are skeptical about about the utility of elections and the role of international organizations in promoting peace and democracy. Lyons (2000), who claims that elections are useful in ending civil wars, argues that post-conflict elections can impede democratization by installing former combatants in office and undermining the citizenry’s faith in democracy. Meanwhile, Collier, Hoeffler, and Söderbom (2006) find that elections do not reduce the risk of war but instead shift the risk between years, with the risk being lower in the year of an election and higher the year following an election. On the basis of which the authors conclude that “as with democracy itself, post-conflict elections should be promoted as intrinsically desirable rather than as mechanisms for increasing the durability of the postconflict peace” (Collier, Hoeffler and Söderbom 2006, 11). Thomas Flores and Irfan Nooruddin (2007), however, find that post-conflict elections that are a part of a democratization process, retard a countries’ economic recovery because new democracies cannot reliably commit to peace.

Several scholars suggest that the ability of elections to promote stability hinges on the political institutions within countries. Building on the seminal work of Arend Lijphart (1977), these scholars argue that consociationalism, or power-sharing more generally, are conducive to post-conflict stability because they can guarantee former combatants a role in the post-conflict government (Reilly 2002; Roeder and Rothchild 2005; Mukherjee 2006; Walter 2002). Arguing, however, against proportional representation (PR) systems advocated by power-sharing enthusiasts, Donald Horowitz claims that electoral systems, which encourage parties to reach out to multiple ethnic groups, promote post-conflict stability over PR systems (1991).

Finally, a number of other scholars have looked specifically at the issue of the electoral timing and sequencing, taking stances on both sides of these issues. Early elections, ac-
According to Terrence Lyons (2002) and Dileepan Sivapathasundaram (2004), facilitate peace agreements by capitalizing on the momentum of cease fires and ensuring international aid for these elections. Clark (2000) favors early elections as well because they expedite the democratization process, while she and Diamond (2006) contend that early elections also prevent wartime combatants from entrenching themselves in power and blocking democratic elections from occurring in the future. Diamond, however, only advocates early elections at the local level where elections may not only avert a legitimacy crisis, but also incorporate people in the reconstruction process. Finally, early elections, many several scholars claim, may enhance postconflict stability by helping post-conflict countries meet standards of good governance and, thus, attract international aid (Lyons 2002; Kumar 1998).

The United States, meanwhile, in the two countries that it has played a major role in post-conflict reconstruction, Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH) in the 1990s and Iraq today, has favored early elections. Defending the US position in BiH at the time, Secretary of State Warren Christopher, argued that elections “ought to come at the earliest possible date - to ensure that they are free and fair.” President George W. Bush has similarly favored early elections in Iraq. Explaining why elections, which he described as “a very important moment in the advance of democracy,” should not be postponed, Bush argued that holding elections would send a “clear message to the few people in Iraq that are trying to stop the march toward democracy that they cannot stop elections,” and “give the Iraqi people a chance to become invested in the future of that vital country.”

Early elections, however, present several potential disadvantages, according to other scholars and policy-makers. Early elections may be violence prone because insufficiently de-

mobilized combatants may use force to thwart their opponents (Lyons 2002; Buxton 2006). Early elections may also take place in the presence of weak institutions and be hastily and, thus, poorly designed (Diamond 2006; Reilly 2002). Residual violence may also impede voter turnout and undermine the legitimacy of elections (Barrick n.d.). Flawed elections, in turn, may undermine people’s faith in democracy and compel them to become engaged in politics in less peaceful ways (Pouligny 2000). Finally, early elections may not give sufficient time for broad-based, programmatic political parties to develop rather than narrowly-focused, personalized parties (de Zeeuw 2008; Reilly 2002; Leyraud 2000). Instead, they may favor combatants who undermine/democracy once in power and use their positions to unfairly slant future elections in their favor (Reilly 2002; Diamond 2006; Paris 2004).

US policy-makers have likewise resisted early elections. Arguing against early elections in BiH, Senate Robert Dole, claimed that early elections would “only serve to unfairly legitimize nationalist extremists, entrench ethnic divisions and condemn Bosnia and its people to authoritarianism and partition.” Similarly, Senator Joseph Biden commenting on the timing of the first post-conflict elections held in Afghanistan and Iraq, wrote that “[w]hen elections are held without mature institutions of this kind, they tend to favor the most organized groups in those societies, which also tend to be the most radical. To put it another way, freedom and liberal democracy are not synonymous. The former without the latter is a recipe for chaos and the return to autocratic rule” (Biden 2005).

Although generally FPEs occur at the national level, recently scholars have advocated holding subnational elections before national ones. According to Roger Meyerson (2006), this sequencing of elections facilitates democratization by creating strong national leaders, who cultivate reputations for democracy at the subnational level before competing at the

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7 “Dole Out to Postpone election Bosnia’s,” The Star Ledger, August 30, 1996.
8 The institutions Biden is referring to are as follows: political parties, an independent judiciary, free media, modern education system, civil society, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and private sector
national level. Benjamin Reilly (2002) and James Dobbins, et al. (2003) argue, meanwhile, that holding subnational elections first promotes genuine political parties and inculcates citizens into the routine of democratic politics. Similarly, Larry Diamond (2006) and Jerome Leyraud (2000) claim that it creates a broader, more diverse, and more legitimate array of interlocutors at the national level. Leyraud further argues that this sequencing of elections helps mitigate confrontational attitudes, play down disruptive standpoints from marginalized political groups and broaden power-sharing.

A number of scholars suggest, however, that holding national elections before subnational elections is preferable. Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan (1992) favor this sequencing of elections because subnational elections, they argue, are marked generally by more divisive, nationalist rhetoric than national elections. Supporting Linz and Stepan’s contention, Dawn Brancati (2006; 2008), finds that empirically regional parties, which are more likely to promote intrastate conflict than state-wide parties, are stronger at the subnational level than at the national level of government. Moreover, Roger Meyerson (2006) argues that holding subnational elections first will not cultivate strong national leaders in countries with strong regional identities, since politicians who abstain from corruption at the local level may not be generally virtuous (and, thus, may not abstain from corruption at the national level). Meyerson also notes that politicians cannot cultivate reputations for democratic leadership at the local level if they do not have political powers independent of the national government, and do not want to compete ultimately at the national level. Finally, in consonance with Meyerson, Risley and Sisk (2005) argue that holding subnational elections first will lead to mutually hostile local leadership patterns when the electorate is “strongly homogenized on identity matters and manipulated by local ‘conflict entrepreneurs’ ” (37).

In trying to reconcile these competing views, we part from previous studies of post-conflict elections by using quantitative analysis to examine the effects of these elections. Previous
studies have relied entirely on case studies or anecdotal evidence to support their claims. As a result, these studies often reach different conclusions about the effects of post-conflict elections. While we also examine specific cases in depth to inform our argument, we try to generalize about the effects of post-conflict elections using quantitative analysis. Unlike previous studies, in this analysis, we also attempt to disentangle the causal relationship between post-conflict elections and post-conflict stability using matching methods.

Argument

Postconflict election timing, we argue, is based on the internal and external demand for elections, as well as the institutional capacity of countries to conduct them. The external demand for elections, especially democratic ones, is driven by the international community. While various major powers, including the United States, have always advocated democracy abroad, the United Nations did not outwardly or actively promoted democracy as a peace-building initiative until the collapse of the Soviet Union. The demise of the Soviet Union, a key player on the Security Council, gave the UN the freedom and will to promote democracy abroad. It also increased the number of democracies in the world, and spurred greater activism in favor of democracy more generally.

Negotiated settlements offer the UN the best opportunity to promote democracy because the UN, if invited in to broker the settlement, may influence the stipulations of the resulting peace agreement. In the post-Cold War era, the UN has generally favored early elections to ensure that postconflict countries conduct elections. Typically, it has also stressed national elections over subnational ones (Reilly 2002). International actors, besides the UN, have also favored early elections as an exit strategy (i.e., a means to turn over responsibility for post-conflict governance to post-conflict countries themselves), as the United States did in Bosnia-Herzegovina and post-Saddam Iraq. The international community more generally has
promoted early elections by offering material advantages to postconflict countries contingent on democratic reforms, including foreign aid and membership in international organizations.

The internal demand for elections is driven, in contrast, by expectations regarding the outcome of elections. If actors involved in a conflict anticipate that they will not only gain by holding an election, but perform well in an election and also perform better by holding the election sooner rather than later, they will seek to hold elections quickly after a civil war ends. The logic explaining the demand for early elections in postconflict countries is similar to that explaining the demand for early elections in stable parliamentary systems of government. Arguably, parliamentary governments call elections early when they fear that their electoral prospects will decline in the future, especially in the face of an expected economic slowdown (Grofman and van Rozendall 1997; Lupia and Strom 1995; Smith 2003; Kayser 2005).

Actors’ expectations in this regard largely depend on the manner in which a conflict ends, that is, on whether a civil war ends in the victory of one side (either the rebel or government side), or in a stalemate. If a conflict ends in a victory, the victorious side can expect to do well in the election, and may even ensure an outcome in its favor by banning their wartime opponents from participating in elections. When a war ends in a stalemate, culminating typically in a peace treaty, actors’ expectations about how they will perform in elections, particularly early ones, are much less clear, unless the election entails powersharing. Powersharing, defined broadly, includes any political arrangement that enables multiple groups to share political power, such as federalism and proportional representation systems (Hartzell and Hoddie 2003). Defined more narrowly, powersharing arrangements include only political institutions that specifically apportion political offices among groups, such as grand coalitions and reserved seats. Under this more narrow definition, actors should have very clear expectations about their electoral fate. As a result, powersharing arrangements should
be associated with early elections, unless brokering powersharing arrangements themselves takes longer than devising other types of systems. Actors may also base their expectations on other factors, such as the size of a particular ethnic or religious group that they purport to represent, or the ability to cheat effectively in an election, an ability that should lie with the government. Actors should not base their expectations, however, on the ability to use violence to manipulate an election in their favor. For if actors believed that they had a military advantage over their opponents, they would have continued to prosecute the election in the first place.

While actors’ expectations regarding electoral outcomes are important in assessing their support for elections, their expectations regarding whether these elections will lead to violence seems much less relevant in predicting the timing of an election. An argument can be made that if actors expect elections, particularly early elections, to lead to violence, then actors that desire violence will support early elections. However, this seems like a rather contrived, convoluted and unnecessary way for actors to renew conflicts since actors, who desire to resume fighting can do so without resorting to electoral subterfuge. There does not, moreover, appear to be an empirical cases that fit this hypothesis. An argument can also be made that actors, who do not want violence and expect early elections to provoke violence, may seek to delay elections. However, actors should be very reluctant to agitate for late elections, regardless of their preferences, because a position favoring late elections may reveal, or be interpreted by their opponents, as an inability to continue to fight, and prompt their opponents, in turn, to resume fighting.

Whether elections actually occur in practice, and when they occur, depends not only the internal and external demand for elections, but also on the ability of those favoring elections to impose their preferences on the rest of the country. This, in turn, may depend on the manner in which a conflict ends. If a conflict ends in victory, the victorious side can impose
its preferences for elections on a country. If a conflict ends in a stalemate, neither party to the conflict should be able to impose their preferences for election on the other since neither should be stronger than the other. International actors, however, have considerable influence on countries in the case of settlements. The extent to which they do depends on how much post-conflict countries need and desire the material advantages international actors offer them.

Finally, the ability of countries to act on their preferences for early elections, depends on their institutional infrastructure. Among other things, this infrastructure includes, electoral commissions with officials experienced in running elections, electoral laws outlining electoral rules and procedures for the conduct of elections, as well as the machinery needed to conduct elections (e.g., ballots, voting booths and poll workers). Having an infrastructure in place reduces both the cost of postconflict elections, as well as the amount of time needed to build an appropriate infrastructure from scratch. Countries that have held elections in the past and, thus, already have an electoral infrastructure in place, are best equipped to hold postconflict elections sooner rather than later.

In terms of sheer logistical issues, whether or not countries held democratic elections may be less important in predicting election timing than whether or not countries hold elections at all. Postconflict elections may not necessarily be democratic. Infrastructures used in the past for non-democratic purposes can be converted to democratic elections, although with more difficulty than those already directed toward democratic ends. Civil wars, however, can decimate infrastructures. Not only can they destroy buildings and machinery, but they can also execute officials experienced in conducting elections. Longer and more devastating civil wars, therefore, are less likely to be followed by early elections than other civil wars. Economically more advanced countries are more apt to invest in developing electoral infrastructures while international assistance can aid countries in building appropriate infrastructures.
Early elections, in turn, we argue, are more likely than late elections to reignite conflict due to mismatches between actors expectations about electoral results and the actual results. Mismatches of this nature are more likely to occur when elections are held soon after wars end because the conditions on which actors base their expectations about these elections, such as population, are not very reliable in this context. More reliable predictors, such as public opinion polling, are less likely to exist for these purposes in the early stage of a post-conflict environment. Population is not a very reliable predictor since civil wars kill civilians, drive others out of their homelands, and force people to relocate within their own countries.

The extent to which civil wars disrupt populations is often not known until the dust is settled and national censuses are conducted. When elections occur soon after elections are held, there is often insufficient time to conduct censuses. Population estimates prior to wars are often poor in the first place since conflict-prone countries frequently manipulate censuses for political ends. In these countries, government have compelled certain groups to declare themselves members of other groups in order to build national identities. They have often also distorted population estimates to enhance their power through national myth making and to rally support against opposition groups by exaggerating the threat posed to them by these groups.

Mismatches of this kind are more likely to lead to wars when elections occur soon after conflicts end. In these situations combatants are less likely to be demobilized. They are also less likely to have peaceful recourses to contest election results, since robust political institutions, civil societies, and free media are not likely to exist or function well in early post-conflict environments. In Mexico, 7 months after the Mexican government declared a ceasefire in 1994, Chiapans elected Eduardo Robledo governor in elections the Zapatista Army of National Liberation (EZLN) considered fraudulent. The rebel organization threatened to renew violence in Chiapans amid protests by thousands of Chiapans demanding the
resignation of Robledo. The government, however, acted first breaking the ceasefire in 1995, the same day Robledo resigned, by invading Zapatistan strongholds in Chiapas.

Early elections are also more likely to be contested than later elections since they are apt to be less competitive and less fair than later elections. Following early elections residual violence may dampen turnout and bias elections in favor of one group. Institutions that help prevent cheating may not be fully established. Early elections may also favor wartime combatants. Holding quasi-democratic elections in which wartime combatants are elected to office, should not necessarily provoke conflict any more than dividing power among wartime combatants without elections. Holding democratic elections in which wartime combatants are not favored, however, is more likely to maintain stability than either of these two scenarios.

Data and Measures

Civil wars are armed conflicts that result in at least 1,000 deaths from relatively continual fighting between the government of a sovereign, internationally recognized state, and one or more armed opposition groups, which recruits mostly locally and controls part of a country’s territory (Doyle and Sambanis 2006). To identify all post-WWII civil wars, we use Michael Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis’ peacekeeping dataset (2006), which follows a very explicit set of coding procedures according to this definition of civil wars. We are currently in the process of extending their dataset by filling in information for civil wars that have ended since 1999, and adding information for civil wars that began and ended after this date.9

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9 This definition of civil wars differs from others in a number of respects. Some definitions require a specific number of deaths per year (e.g., 100 deaths per year (Fearon and Laitin 2003)) instead of relatively consistent fighting. Others require that each side to a conflict incur a certain number of deaths (e.g., 100 deaths per side (Fearon and Laitin 2003). Most do not explicitly require the opposition to recruit mostly locally or to control part of a country’s territory in order to exclude cases of civil war engineered entirely by a foreign country. To ensure that the results of this analysis are not driven by different definitions of civil wars and a different selection of cases, future iterations of this project will include robustness tests, excluding border line cases of civil wars and in/excluding cases of civil war in other notable datasets, such
First postconflict elections are defined as the first direct national or subnational elections in countries following the end of a civil war. To distinguish between the two, we also identify separately the first national postconflict elections and the first postconflict subnational elections held in countries. Countries for which a civil war has resulted in two or more states, which do not participate in joint elections, are excluded from this analysis since elections within sovereign states cannot reignite civil wars, although they can potentially spark international wars. Following the state death literature, we consider a country a sovereign state when at least two major powers recognize it (Fazal 2007).

For national elections, the analysis includes all direct presidential and legislative elections, including constituent assemblies. National elections in which one or more actors to a conflict are not allowed to participate, or choose not to participate, are included but identified by a separate variable denoting limited competition. For local elections, only direct elections at the level of the municipality or above are included. Additionally, in countries where rebel groups have fought for control over a specific territory and/or where rebels purport to represent a group that constitutes the dominant group in a particular territory only elections in that territory are included. For both national and subnational elections, we use only the start date of the election since elections can take place on multiple months, days and even years. These data are based on at least one official source (e.g., election commission as (Fearon and Laitin 2003) and PRIO, as well as alternative enddates.

10 In future iterations of this project, we will conduct robustness tests with alternative end dates for civil wars, and different levels of precision for the time variables.

11 The following civil wars are excluded as a result, with the sovereign state created from the war in brackets: China [Taiwan] (1947-1947); India [Pakistan] (1946-1948); Korea [North and South Korea] (1950-1953); Pakistan [Bangladesh] (1971-1971); Ethiopia [Eritrea] (1974-1991) and Israel [Palestine] (1947-1997); South Africa [Namibia] (1965-1989).

12 There are too few instances of national elections were competition is limited in this manner to analyze reliably. The countries and date of these elections are as follows: Greece (1950) election; Russia (1999); Cyprus (1976).

13 We could not reliably collect data on elections to offices below the municipality level.
and national legislature), or two unofficial sources (e.g., newspapers and election monitoring reports).  

To capture the external demand for elections, we distinguish among civil wars that end in the post-Cold War era and those that end prior to this period with a single indicator variable coded 1 for the post-Cold War era, and 0 otherwise. We also distinguish between civil wars involving UN intervention and those that do not, with an indicator variable coded 1 for cases of UN intervention, and 0 otherwise. Since the UN serves different roles in civil wars (Doyle and Sambanis 2006; Fortna 2008), we also distinguish among these roles with separate indicator variables for mediation, peacekeeping (traditional and multidimensional, and enforcement based on (Doyle and Sambanis 2006).  Through mediation, the UN can influence the decision to hold early elections, while through peacekeeping and enforcement, it can keep violence at bay so that citizens can turn out at the polls and vote.

Other regional organizations, including NATO, conduct peacekeeping operations, although generally less often and on a much smaller scale. We, therefore, measure non-UN peace operations with an indicator coded 1 for non-UN operations, and 0 otherwise based on Doyle and Sambanis (2006). We also combine UN and non-UN peace operations into a single variable coded all peace operations coded 1 if the UN or another organization conducted a peace operation in a country, and 0 otherwise. Since major powers, including the United States, have advocated elections as an exit strategy, we also measure major power intervention with an indicator coded 1 if a major power (i.e., China, France, Russia, United Kingdom and United States) intervened militarily in a conflict (outside of a UN mission), or provided extensive political support for one or more parties to a conflict, based on Doyle

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14 Information about the reliability of the data is provided in a separate variable indicating if (1) the year, day and month, (2) the year and month, or (3) only the year, have been confirmed by at least official source or two unofficial sources.

15 There are two few cases of the each type of peacekeeping to separate out the effects of the two.

To represent the internal demands for elections, we measure the outcome of a war—whether it ended in a government victory, rebel victory, or a truce/settlement— with indicator variables representing each outcome, based on Doyle and Sambanis (2006).\textsuperscript{16} We also measure powersharing arrangements according to a broad definition of powersharing and a narrow one. Powersharing (broad) is coded 1 if countries have proportional representation (PR) systems and/or decentralized systems of government (i.e., subnational legislatures with independent decision-making authority in at least one political area (Riker 1964)), and 0 otherwise.\textsuperscript{17} As a robustness test, we also create separate indicators for PR systems and decentralization. Powersharing (narrow) is coded 1 if a certain share of seats or specific offices are set aside for different groups involved in the civil war, and 0 otherwise.\textsuperscript{18,19}

To capture the ability of countries to conduct elections, we identify the last elections held prior to the end of the civil war, using multiple indicator variables categorizing elections according to how far in the past they occurred and a separate indicator for countries that never held elections. Despite a robust infrastructure, countries that held elections right before a civil war (1-2 years) are less likely to hold elections immediately after a civil war for the same office since election terms are typically 4-5 years in length. We also measure the intensity and duration of civil wars since both can undermine the electoral infrastructure in countries. To this end, we measure civil war duration (days), as well as the number of war-related deaths and displacements. The data for each are based on the Doyle and Sambanis’

\textsuperscript{16}Settlements and truces are combined in this model since power is asymmetric in both cases.
\textsuperscript{17}See Brancati:2008b for details about the coding methodology for decentralization.
\textsuperscript{18}The data collection for this variable is not yet complete.
\textsuperscript{19}Since powersharing arrangements may take longer to negotiated than other electoral systems, in future iterations of this project, we also analyze the time that elapsed between the powersharing agreement and the first postconflict election.
peacekeeping dataset.\textsuperscript{20}

Since richer countries can rebuild their infrastructures more easily than poorer countries and are likely to have stronger electoral infrastructures in the first place, we also measure the \textit{per capita income} of countries using Fearon and Laitin (2003), as well as the GDP per capita (constant USD, 2000) using the \textit{World Development Indicators Online} (World Bank 2002).\textsuperscript{21} We also measure of the amount of foreign assistance countries (e.g. unilateral transfers and food aid) receive, – \textit{net current transfers per capita} based on Doyle and Sambanis (2006). We are in the process of working with the UN and other aid agencies to measure electoral assistance specifically. Finally, since residual violence can disrupt and delay elections, in future iterations of this project, we will also measure the presence of residual violence at the end of the civil war with an simple indicator variable, coded 1 for residual violence and 0 otherwise.

\textbf{Analysis}

For the analysis predicting the timing of FPEs, we use a Cox proportional hazards model with the Efron method to deal with ties because it does not make any assumptions about the shape of the underlying hazard function.\textsuperscript{22} Table 1 shows the results of our analysis predicting the timing of postconflict elections based on the external and internal demand for elections.\textsuperscript{23}

\textsuperscript{20}See Sambanis and Doyle (2006, 75) for information about the coding of these two variables. Since death and displacement figures are uncertain, in future iterations of this project, we will compare these figures to those from other notable datasets and conduct robustness tests with these different figures.

\textsuperscript{21}See Fearon and Laitin (2003) regarding how they extended the Penn World Table data on per capita income using data from the World Development Indicators and how they interpolated missing data using per capita energy consumption.

\textsuperscript{22}The Cox model does assume, however, that the survival curves for two different values of a given set of covariates have hazard functions that are proportional over time. We test if the proportionality assumption holds in these models using (1) Kaplan-Meier graphs, (2) Schoenfeld residuals, and (3) a log time interaction with the model covariates.

\textsuperscript{23}Currently, the dependent variable is measured in terms of years until the FPE is held since the month/day are missing for a few elections that occur at the subnational level. These missing dates will be identified
variables for UN intervention and the post-Cold War era. Post-Cold War era is significant in Model 1, increasing the risk of an election by 86 percent. UN intervention is not significant.

[Table 1 About Here]

Model 2 interacts UN intervention and the post-Cold War era to determine if the effect of UN intervention is greater in the post-Cold War era. According to this analysis, UN intervention in the post-Cold War increases the odds of an election by 136 percent (all else equal). This is greater than the effect of UN intervention in the Cold War era, or the effect of the post-Cold War era in the absence of UN intervention. In this model the main effects for UN intervention and the post-Cold War era are individually significant ($p \leq 0.10$ level) and jointly significant with their interaction term ($p \leq 0.01$). If we add a variable for major power intervention to the model (not shown) and interact it with the post-Cold War era, the involvement of a major power in a civil war in the post-Cold War era increases the odds of an election by 93 percent ($p \leq 0.10$ level).

Models 3 and 4 explore the internal demand for post-conflict elections, as well as the interaction between the internal and external demand for elections. Model 3 includes variables for the war outcome, as well as UN intervention and the post-Cold War era. Powersharing variables will be added subsequently. According to this analysis, whether wars end in victory (government or rebels) or a settlement/truce, has no effect on the timing of FPEs. Interacting these different outcomes with a variable representing whether countries had held elections within 5 years prior to the end of the civil war, does not suggest the effect of these different war outcomes are moderated by a country’s prior history of elections.

Model 4 explores whether the effect of settlements/truces is different depending on UN and the final analysis will be based on days to the first election.
intervention and the post-Cold War era.\textsuperscript{24,25} According to the analysis, UN intervention in the post-Cold War era in cases of civil wars ending in settlements increases the odds of an election by 139 percent, all else equal.

Table 2 shows the results of our analysis predicting the timing of postconflict elections based on the institutional capacity of states to conduct elections. Model 5, exploring the effects of war intensity and duration, suggests that deaths and refugees/internally displaced persons do not have a significant effect on election timing, although war duration raises slightly the risk of an election. These results are not driven by particular countries.\textsuperscript{26}

Model 6 introduces information about the previous elections held in countries, assuming that more recent elections are indicative of greater institutional capacity. None of these variables, however, are not individually or jointly significant. Model 7 introduces per capita income into the analysis. In it, a higher per capita income is positively associated with the risk of holding an election, although the effect is not significant, which may in part be due to the loss of more than a quarter of the cases due to missing data.\textsuperscript{27} The results are also insignificant if we use GDP per capita, which likewise contains a lot of missing data. Model 8 includes information about foreign transfers, which can help compensate for a low GDP. The effect, however, is not significant in Model 8, nor is it significant if we include GDP in the model. The lack of significance may be due to imprecise nature of the variable.

\textsuperscript{24}In alternative models interacting UN intervention with settlements (and not Post-Cold War Era), the interaction effect between UN intervention and settlements is not significant.

\textsuperscript{25}Both types of victories are combined in this analysis since differentiating the two does not yield interesting and/or significant results, and combining the two increases the degrees of freedom.

\textsuperscript{26}One potential reason for the latter finding, which we will explore in future iterations of this project, is that it is dependent on how the end dates of civil wars are coded and whether some wars that involved failed attempts at peacekeeping, are coded single wars or multiple wars.

\textsuperscript{27}In future iterations of this project, we will attempt to interpolate missing economic data.
Conclusion

Going forward, the previous analysis will be revised to include additional variables, better measures, and an expanded dataset on civil wars, with additional robust tests for case selection and various measurements. It will also include an analysis of how the timing of post-conflict elections are related to the abilities of countries to meet given conditions, such as demobilization, a free media, and an independent judicial system. It will also include the second part of the analysis, in which we analyze the effect of electoral timing and sequencing on post-conflict stability after pre-processing our data by means of matching. Since the matching is based on only observed variables, we have tried to identify all potential confounders of in the first stage of the analysis. Thus far, the analysis reveals that the post-Cold War era, as well as UN and non-UN major power intervention, are confounders. These variables affect electoral timing, are causally prior to it, and influence post-conflict stability conditional on timing.

For the matching, we will employ and compare various methods, such as nearest neighbor, Mahalanobis metric and genetic matching (Sekhon and Diamond 2008), implemented through R and MatchIt (Ho et al. 2007). Since electoral timing is continuous, we will match the data using different cuts of our independent variable (i.e., electoral timing) based on our theoretical expectations (elections within 2 years being the obvious starting point). While we lose information in dichotomizing electoral timing, we gain in the ability to deal with the potentially non-random nature of election timing. Other methods of establishing causality, which do not require us to dichotomize electoral timing, such as instrumental variable (IV) regression and Heckman selection models, are not easily applied to this study and have their own shortcomings. We will also match based on whether the first postconflict elections in

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28 They are as follows: (1) It is difficult/impossible to find an instrument that affects timing but not post-conflict stability, (2) the orthogonality assumption of IV regression does not hold for models with non-linear dependent variables, such as duration models, which we use here in order to incorporate information about
countries are national elections or subnational ones in order to explore the effect of electoral sequencing on post-conflict stability. After pre-processing the data by means of matching, we will analyze the effect of electoral timing on post-conflict stability using Cox proportional hazards models as in the first stage of the analysis.
References


Table 1: External and Internal Demand for Post-Conflict Elections

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*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors in parentheses
Table 2: External and Internal Demand for Post-Conflict Elections

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